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FOREWORD
The U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Strategy
Conference each year addresses a major security issue of
relevance to the United States and its allies. Recognizing
that the ultimate symbol of the nation’s commitment
is “boots on the ground,” the USAWC focuses the
Strategy Conference on the subject’s implications for
ground power. The conference brings together top
national security strategists, senior military leaders,
media, university faculty, and the policymaking
community to consider, discuss, and debate topics
concerning America’s national security strategy. The
2006 conference was designed to help frame vital
questions that offer insights on the conference theme:
“A Nation at War.”
The phrase “A Nation at War” evokes images of
mobilization of the nation’s resources: military surely,
but also the government, industry, and the population.
Thus far in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT),
though, the mobilization has not been on the scale
seen in past “global” wars. As the Nation approached
the 5-year mark of the start of the GWOT, the USAWC
focused the attention of its Seventeenth Annual
Strategy Conference on whether or not the evidence
supports the continuing assumption that the Nation
is really at war. Some would insist that the answer is
obviously yes. The conference studied this question in
depth with panels on the homeland security aspects,
the international context, the legal foundation for the
war, and the associated economic and domestic policy
issues. The conclusion was that the answer to the
question is not as clear as first thought. Much of the
evidence suggests that the Nation—or at least some
parts of it—is not at war.


The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to provide
this summary, analysis, and associated papers from
the 2006 conference.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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INTRODUCTION
Is America at war? To the soldier under attack
today from a roadside bomb or a group of insurgents
in Iraq, the answer seems clear: a resounding yes. The
same unequivocal response would have emanated
from Afghanistan in 2002, although that theater has
suffered from inattention in the intervening years. In
Afghanistan, the answer to the war question is a bit
harder: soldiers in Kabul recognize that they are at
“something other than peace,” but may not be sure
that they are at war . . . and with whom. As one draws
farther and farther from the theaters of war, confusion
increases about whether or not the Nation is really at
war. Even in some parts of the Defense Department,
bureaucracy—in the most pejorative sense of the
word—reigns, providing examples that suggest even
the agency charged with prosecuting the war is unable
to instill in all its people the urgency that should attach
when a nation is involved in an existential fight. Military
personnel serving in Iraq and Afghanistan sometimes
can see the faults of their own Department, but are
more likely to focus their attention on other parts of
the government. In 2005 (and undoubtedly continuing
in 2006), senior leaders in Iraq increasingly were
asking, “Where’s the rest of the U.S. Government?”
The State Department, with its significant investment
of personnel and other resources in Iraq, is protected
somewhat from the implied criticism, but many parts
of the diplomatic corps also are missing the expected
sense of urgency. Perhaps worst of all is the answer
that would come from the broad American public.
Their vocal response might be affirmative, but except
for those families with loved ones in the military, there



might be scant tangible evidence that the Nation is at
war.
Part of the confusion stems from the nature of
the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The war is
certainly existential, but judging the performance of
the nation by the standard of the fight for the nation’s
life in World War II is wrong. Even in World War II,
some parts of the United States—government and
public—might have been only marginally affected,
but the overwhelming majority of the country felt
in daily life the sacrifices required for the war effort.
Mobilization was immense; American industry was
mobilized on par with the nation’s citizenry. Although
some actions—like saving tin foil to be used in building
battleships—were more symbolic than significant,
virtually every American was acutely aware of his or
her role in the war. When making comparisons against
the World War II standard, analysts of today’s GWOT
can not be faulted for suggesting that the Nation really
is not at war.
A better standard to use for comparison would
perhaps be the Cold War. The Department of Defense
(DoD), in its Quadrennial Defense Review and other
documents, has recognized that the United States is
engaged in “. . . what will be a long war.”1 During the
Cold War, the nuclear threat sometimes seemed like the
Sword of Damocles hanging over the head of the U.S.
populace, but faith in deterrence—even that provided
by mutually assured destruction—allowed Americans
to continue with their everyday lives. Industry was
able to focus on products other than military materiel,
contributing to the strength of the economy that was
key in the eventual defeat of the Soviet Union. The
analogy with the Cold War is not perfect: the economy
may be of less importance in the GWOT than finding



the intellectual capital to win the diplomatic and
informational “battles” that lie ahead. Nonetheless, the
Cold War paradigm is probably more appropriate for
a comparison with today’s GWOT.
For the U.S. Army War College’s Seventeenth Annual Strategy Conference, the Strategic Studies Institute
proposed analysis of several of the many dimensions
of the GWOT. Recognizing that no conference could
hope to be comprehensive in such an analysis, the
conference organizers decided to concentrate on five
distinct aspects of the current war, hoping to touch in
some way on each of the elements of national power.
1. Defending the nation’s borders (addressing—at
least in part—the informational element of national
power). When in a war—either of the Cold War or
World War II variety—defense of the borders is an
imperative. One side of a current political debate
suggests that open borders are the more desirable
alternative. While not specifically addressing the
national security risks, the pundits on this side of the
equation point out that tightening borders and limiting
foreign entrance into the country are accompanied by
real costs: economic costs, intellectual costs, and costs
in international goodwill. Finding the balance between
open and tightly-constricted borders presents a major
national security challenge.
2. Building and maintaining international support
(addressing an issue for the diplomatic element of
national power). Even a “unilateral” preemptive
attack requires the support of other nations, whether
organized in a loosely-bound coalition or bonded
together as allies in a legally-binding treaty. In Iraq
and other recent operations, some part of that support
simply has served a legitimizing function. Absent an
international mandate—from the United Nations (UN)



or other internationally-recognized body—the addition
of coalition partners confers a degree of legitimacy on
a particular operation. Those partners, though, join
because of their own national interests, not necessarily
because of some shared rationale for the conflict at
hand. Those same interests drive alliances, too, but
alliance partners usually can be expected to contribute
significant—not token—forces to a fight. Both alliances
and legitimizing coalitions provide a valuable service
in the GWOT and any war; again the question is one of
balance.
3. The domestic context and the Reserve
Components (addressing domestic support through
an analysis of one part of the military element of
national power). Available evidence suggests that
the Army’s personnel and equipment are stressed by
the on-going requirements of “the long war” and the
continuing obligations for engagement around the
world. One key piece of evidence is the paradigm shift
in how the Army Reserve and National Guard are
mobilized, deployed, and employed. While supporting
processes remain mired in a Cold War mentality, the
Reserve Components have gone from being a strategic
reserve—the Cold War model—to an operational
reserve. A new force generation model is attempting
to put some predictability into deployment cycles,
but the reserves in the GWOT are deploying more
regularly, with some predictable adverse impacts on
recruiting, retaining, and equipping the force. Another
adverse impact became obvious in the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina, when many of the National Guard
first responders in the affected States were unavailable
because of deployment. As with nearly all of the adverse
impacts of limited force size, adaptable leaders found
“work around” solutions that dedicated soldiers could



execute to accomplish the mission. However, these
solutions frequently fell short of the desired end-state
and were clearly executed on the backs of war-weary
soldiers, both active and reserve.
4. Economic dimensions (addressing the economic
element of national power). Economic globalization
may be a good phenomenon for those nations blessed
with the ability to move rapidly as markets shift.
However, globalization also creates a regime of “loser”
nations, those with no ability to adapt quickly and with
no safety net when a broad swath of their citizenry find
themselves unemployed, possibly producing recruiting
opportunities for America’s enemies around the
world. Another economic phenomenon that affects the
means to execute the nation’s strategy is the amount of
America’s external debt. A robust economy is needed
to prosecute the war; some of the current monetary and
taxation policies put the economy at significant risk in
the mid-term.
5. The rule of law (also addressing the information
element of national power). One of America’s
enduring values is the legal foundation of society.
Even when—perhaps especially when—America’s
enemies ignore the basic provisions of international
law, America should set an example for the rest of the
world by adhering to the highest legal standards. In the
GWOT, that example has been tarnished by perceived
inadequate justification (casus belli) for the war in Iraq
and by inappropriate conduct during the war. Notable
among the latter is the treatment of prisoners at Abu
Ghraib prison in Iraq, but the practice of rendition of
prisoners to third countries and the use of “aggressive
interrogation techniques”— some believe this to be a
euphemism for torture—are not helping the United
States win the “war of ideas” in the Muslim world.



Legal scholars are challenged to lay out the legal basis
for the war and then to state the rules under which
the war should be prosecuted. Neither the war model
nor the law enforcement model covers precisely
all the situations being encountered in the GWOT.
Soldiers fighting the war deserve clear guidance on
the application of jus in bello; American citizens asked
to support the war need to know that their soldiers
are acting appropriately in a war that was justified
adequately.
This book is a compilation of the papers that resulted
from panels convened to discuss the five particular
aspects of the war described above. Where papers were
not provided, the editor’s comments seek to provide
the gist of each panelist’s presentation. A brief analysis
of each panel’s contribution—analysis sometimes
engendered by questions asked by the Strategy
Conference audience—is also part of this conference
report and may provide some added meaning to the
panelists’ presentations and help in understanding the
complex issues addressed.
ENDNOTES - INTRODUCTION
1. Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 6, 2006, p. v,
inter alia.



PANEL I
THE HOMELAND SECURITY CONTEXT:
NATIONAL ACCESS VERSUS NATIONAL SECURITY
General.
Immigration—especially changing the status of
millions of illegal immigrants—is a “hot button”
topic as the President and Congress attempt to craft
a reasonable policy, while listening to a cacophony
of voices recommending one solution or another. To
their great credit, the panelists on “National Access
vs. National Security” steered clear of the controversy.
They focused instead on the national security interests
that help to locate the balance between a theoretical
“hermetically sealed” border and one that is so open
that unwanted personnel are able to cross at will to do
Americans harm or to perpetrate their own criminal
enterprises. Without saying so explicitly, the panel made
the point that the largely-Hispanic illegal immigrant
issue is a by-product of a border management system
that lacked appropriate enforcement and resources
to work effectively. Nonetheless, the real national
security interest is not immigrants who provide cheap
labor (although they do have an economic and social
impact); the threat is from those—not immigrants at
all—who come to the United States to do harm to the
American people.
In his opening remarks, panel moderator Ted
Gong pointed out the paradigm shift that followed
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11).
Prior to those attacks, the granting of visas was
perceived as increasingly liberal. Perhaps a result



of the government’s decreased ability to process a
growing number of visa requests, the average visit
length had progressively increased, causing concern
about overstays. Further, with some countries, the
visa requirement was eliminated altogether in favor
of the Visa Waiver Program, developed for those
countries which were considered least likely to have
citizens overstaying their visa-authorized time in the
U.S. Whether strategic calculation or simple workload
analysis produced the liberal policy was moot; the open
borders were considered good for American commerce
and society, which benefited from the free exchange of
goods and ideas. The policy also supported government
efforts to open other countries to American travelers
and business.
September 11, of course, forced lawmakers and
the public to think differently about visa policies and
immigration management. The indefinite visa—even
for America’s strongest allies—was eliminated entirely,
and visas granted after 9/11 were often for significantly
shorter stays. In an age when an airplane could be used
as a guided missile, the restrictions seemed appropriate,
but produced immediate impacts on personal access to
the United States for businessmen and tourists. In the
longer term, adverse impacts were felt on other forms
of commerce, too. Diplomatic efforts to open targeted
countries by offering reciprocal entry to America also
were affected negatively. The latter seemed especially
counterproductive to efforts to spread American values
abroad. Almost 5 years after 9/11, some technological
applications and procedural changes have mitigated
the effects of restricted cross-border flow, but no final
balance has been found between tight borders and the
need for adequate screening of international traffic
terminating in the United States.



Ms. Elaine Dezenski.
At an International Organization for Migration
(IOM) conference earlier this year, Panelist Elaine
Dezenski said,
On any map, national borders look like big, imposing
monuments to national sovereignty, but the number
of places where reality meets image is very small.
Instead, boundaries between countries often amount to
imaginary lines across mountain ranges or deserts, or
simply a counter at an airport. People may cross borders
either temporarily or to migrate for reasons ranging
from tourism, business, to seek economic or social
opportunity,—or to engage in acts of terrorism. Our
challenge today is to develop approaches that make that
line on a map as transparent and welcoming as possible
for those in the first group while making it as imposing
as possible to the second.1

Border security is too often translated as sealed
borders, but the demands of legitimate commerce
require that borders be as transparent as possible. Ms.
Dezenski provided insights into the “layered security”
that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) sees
as key for integrated border management, describing
three key parts: interoperability, biometrics, and
international cooperation. Although she described the
first two as separate components, she did not really
distinguish between them as she spoke about the U.S.
Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology
(US-VISIT) program. The biometrics was explained in
some detail; the interoperability had to be assumed,
though she was clear that the concept of US-VISIT is
based on the idea that integrated border management systems are the foundation of ensuring that
those visiting the United States are appropriately



identified and assessed for risk. At established ports
of entry, those seeking entry to the United States are
required to submit two fingerprints and to have a
digital photo taken. Ms. Dezenski claimed that it takes
only 15 seconds for the data to be gathered and for
it to be processed through a database that identifies
those to whom the United States would deny access.
The processing time seems incredible, especially
when the process must include a search through
various databases (perhaps what she meant when she
mentioned interoperability2). This technology generally
was available earlier, but it took the horror of 9/11 to
provide the political will to develop and install such a
system at the borders. The goal of the program seems to
be to slow down legitimate visitors—tourists, students,
legal immigrants—only imperceptibly, while filtering
the terrorists, criminals, and illegal immigrants. The
system seems to be working in both regards: 15 seconds
is not a too-high price to pay for border security, and the
identities of undesirable entrants are being unraveled
before they gain entry to the United States.
Two problems remain. First, US-VISIT screens
only people who use the normal and legitimate
ports of entry. Those who take advantage of porous
American borders to bypass the system are still able
to enter the United States. Second, in an age in which
terrorists contemplate the use of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD), the system to keep them out of the
United States needs to be perfect, not just “a help” in
screening the millions of visitors to America each year.
In the end, US-VISIT cannot reach this lofty goal, but is
probably the best possible program until alternatives
or improvements are developed.
International cooperation is a requirement for
“layered security” that essentially extends America’s
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borders further from U.S. shores. The second program
Ms. Dezenski discussed—the Western Hemisphere
Travel Initiative—was an outgrowth of the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004, which
required the Department of State and DHS to close the
so-called “Western Hemisphere loophole” that allowed
travelers—including U.S. citizens—to cross borders in
the Americas, the Caribbean, and Bermuda without
a passport or other identification proving name and
citizenship. The initiative will be phased in over the
course of the next 2 years and is the cause of much
consternation, especially in Canada. Some options are
being considered for new credentialing options that
would provide frequent travelers an option other than
a passport.
Ms. Dezenski concluded her remarks with an
overview of the Security and Prosperity Partnership
(SPP) with Canada and Mexico. According to the
leaders of the three North American nations, the
program’s aim is to “. . . ensure North America is the
most economically dynamic region in the world and a
secure home for our citizens.”3 The partnership covers
a variety of issues, from avian influenza pandemics
and emergency management to energy security, but
calls for “smart, secure” borders in North America.
The partnership looks closely at development of
common American/Canadian/Mexican strategies
for the free and secure flow of commerce across the
borders of the continent. Just as a natural—or manmade—disaster in one country can affect the other
continental neighbors, a unilateral border enforcement
regime can have impacts beyond the enacting nation’s
shores. The SPP goal is to ensure common external
border processes and procedures that allow the
governments to have less concern about commerce
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crossing the borders shared by the three countries. To
paraphrase Ms. Dezenski, “We’re not there yet. . . and
it will be a while.” As with the “simpler” process of
personnel flow, the goal for such partnerships must be
perfection so long as one terrorist cell can produce such
dramatically disproportionate casualties, either with
WMD or with improvised “weapons” as seen on 9/11.
That goal is impossible, of course, but SPP provides
a policy framework to focus on those areas of shared
importance.
A common framework is only as effective as its
ability to get it right every time, by stopping the flow
of terrorists, their money or their weapons. Arguably,
the best policy would “push the borders” even further
from North American shores. Ms. Dezenski provided
some detail about initiatives with Canada and Mexico,
two countries with which the United States has
frequent immigration or travel issues, but with which
the United States also is traditionally very friendly.
Left unaddressed by Ms. Dezenski was the greater
challenge with nations—especially those with interests
inimical to those of the United States—further from
U.S. borders. Obtaining their cooperation in extending
America’s borders will be problematic. At the same
time, broader challenges exist with key trading partners
in Europe and elsewhere. Obtaining their cooperation
in American border policies will be essential to creating
a lasting and effective border management system.
Mr. Mark Krikorian.
Mark Krikorian and Demetrios Papademetriou
were perhaps the most likely panelists to raise the
controversial illegal immigrant issue—from both sides
of the aisle: Mr. Krikorian from the “low immigration,
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tight border” perspective and Mr. Papademetriou
from the “high immigration, loose border” side. They
both stayed away from inflammatory statements, but
the structure of their comments made their separate
positions clear. Mr. Krikorian’s comments were based
on the thesis that mass immigration is fundamentally
incompatible with homeland security in the modern
security environment.4 According to Mr. Krikorian,
borders should not be viewed simply as obstacles to
overcome for the free flow of goods; they should be
seen as the “home front,” which has become more than
just an expression for the Global War on Terrorism
(GWOT). In World War II, references were made
numerous times to the “home front,” but the likelihood
of attack on the North American continent was remote.
That same paradigm does not hold today: The attacks
of 9/11 made it clear that attacks are possible and likely
if the borders are not better protected. Even though the
contours of the fight against radical Islam were visible
before 9/11, the “loose border” immigration policy
allowed fully one-third of the al-Qa’ida operatives
from 1993 to 9/11 to have visas. Another third were in
the country illegally; the other third were naturalized
citizens or temporary residents. To Mr. Krikorian, the
“loose borders” did not protect American citizens
adequately.
Mr. Krikorian then went on to postulate how loose
borders might affect the United States in future wars.
Having learned from asymmetric successes in Iraq and
elsewhere, future foes may choose to challenge American intervention in their affairs by attacks on the mainland. Imagine a war with Colombia, perhaps precipitated by U.S. intervention to protect the Colombian government from insurgents of the Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed
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Forces of Colombia or FARC). Irregular attacks could
be facilitated by the half-million Colombians already
in the United States. Similar “friendly” populations are
resident in the United States for potential challengers
like China, Russia, and even north Korea. Attacking the
United States at home will figure into the calculation of
all future enemies, and immigrants from the enemies’
particular part of the world may very well act to help
their former—or current—countrymen. What Mr.
Krikorian fails to explain is the absence of such attacks
during the current GWOT. Hundreds of thousands
of Iraqis and Afghans—not to mention even-larger
Muslim communities—live in the United States, but
there have been virtually no attacks since 9/11. That
may simply speak well of assimilation into American
society, but it is evidence that Mr. Krikorian should not
ignore as he attempts to “raise the borders” around the
United States. He did make one valuable comparison,
stating that al-Qai’da is to terrorism as the Mafia was to
crime. The Mafia was able to operate among the large
Italian immigrant community only until assimilation
“drained the sea” in which the criminal “fish” were
swimming. Neglecting the value of assimilation, he
implied that denying immigration—and concurrently
reducing the number of illegal immigrants already in
the country—will achieve the same result.
The initial response to insecurity at the borders
was to profile Arabs and Muslims. This selective law
enforcement is doomed to failure—and not just because
of protests about racial profiling. Such profiling may
be the prudent step to take, but targeting the citizens
of one region or country is a gamble; none of the 9/11
attackers came from a country that was on the American
terrorist list prior to 9/11. Expanding the “blacklist”
to all Arab countries—even if possible—would also
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not stop the flow of terrorists. Radicals—both Muslim
and otherwise—live in Russia, China, the Philippines,
India, Pakistan, etc. Extending a visa waiver program
even to some long-term allies is fraught with risk.
Although he was short on specific proposals,
Mr. Krikorian emphasized the need for a huge
investment in border controls. He denies that the
impact of tightened controls would be inimical to the
U.S. economy,5 but nonetheless calls for significant
investment of money into programs like US-VISIT. The
greater investment—and eventually the harder one to
achieve—is in the political will to enforce unpopular
immigration policies. The policies being enforced
need to be the right ones, e.g., allowing entry for those
genuinely being persecuted in their own countries,
allowing entry to those who have the right technical or
advanced skills needed for technological or industrial
development, and allowing bona fide family members
to join the American citizen member of their family.
This retains America’s traditional image as a haven for
immigrants, while also balancing the national security
and societal development interests of the United States.
Access to America is not a right or entitlement, as many
on both the right and left of the political spectrum seem
to believe; it is a privilege that should be granted based
on American interests.
Ms. Susan Sim.
An international perspective on immigration and
borders was gained from panelist Susan Sim. Ms.
Sim started by pointing out Singapore’s contributions
of police trainers, LSTs (Landing Ship, Tank), and
transport planes to the coalition in Iraq and identified
Singapore as an “unwavering partner” in the GWOT.
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She explicitly stated that the risk of terrorism is a risk
that Singapore recognizes that it shares with the United States. Not all countries, of course, recognize that—
or at least will not explicitly say so, perhaps because
they are content to have the United States and its
closest partners in the terrorists’ cross-hairs. Singapore
clearly understands the need to defend one’s borders
from those wishing to do its citizens harm, and is
situated in a part of the world where demographics
suggest that the risk may be very near. Singapore and
abutting Malaysia have sizable Muslim populations of
their own, but also are located just a few dozen miles
across the Singapore Strait from Indonesia, with the
largest Muslim population in the world. Some profiling
is prudent in light of the Bali bombings in 2002 and
2005, but it also is important to remember that not all
Muslims are extremists and terrorists, of course.
Ms. Sim also recognized the difficulties in erecting
barriers at a nation’s borders. One of those is cost,
which was addressed only obliquely. While Singapore
is supporting U.S. initiatives for “biometric passports,”
there is clearly a direct cost involved, one that poorer
nations will not be able to cover on their own. Ms.
Sim’s real concerns were with the costs that are more
difficult to measure: the impact of increased border
security on Singapore’s trade, which is crucial to its
prosperity. The United States also is affected by trade
restrictions, but not to the same extent as Singapore, a
nation directly dependent on international trading for
its prosperity. When traders find themselves slowed
more than imperceptibly at ports, they will seek other
outlets for their products. When buyers find themselves
unable to inspect products in Singapore because of visa
restrictions, they will quickly learn to go elsewhere,
to places where security is not as cumbersome. Just
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like the United States, Singapore must find a way—
perhaps technologically—to balance border security
with commerce.
An even greater concern for Ms. Sim was the effect
on personal travel—especially for the purpose of
education—to the United States. She mentioned the
value of the education that she personally received
in the United States, but also pointed at Indonesian
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (who is
known—thankfully—as SBY) as a major example of
the value of an American education. While an officer
in the Indonesian Army, SBY received training in
the United States at Fort Benning, Georgia, and Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas, both under the auspices of the
International Military Education and Training (IMET)
program. While in the United States, he also received
a master’s degree and “. . . picked up the ideas of
Samuel Huntington.” His career is considered a great
model of integrity in public service and resulted in his
being the first directly-elected president of Indonesia.
Additionally, several of the reformers who wrote the
election laws in 1999 were educated in political science
in the United States; Ms. Sim was a journalist covering
those proceedings and heard them several times break
out into debates about the U.S. Constitution. There are
other benefits to the United States in foreign education:
Costs for American students are held down because
of what Ms. Sim described as a $13 billion “industry”
of foreign education. American students also are
exposed to other cultures as they share classrooms and
dormitory spaces and interact socially with foreign
students on their campuses.
The “transforming experience” of an education
in America cannot be understated, although there
certainly are examples of people—such as several of
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the 9/11 terrorists—who were exposed to American
culture and were revulsed by what they perceived as
the libertine nature of U.S. society. Ms. Sim—as with
Ms. Dezenski—also left uncovered any discussion
of how to get other nations to see that terrorism is a
risk for them and how to get countries antithetical
to the United States to work to tighten their borders.
Singapore’s contributions in this regard are significant
and appreciated, but getting friends and allies to
help is the easy part of extending borders virtually.
Although perhaps only implicitly, Ms. Sim concluded
that technological and other improvements to border
security can only go so far; what is really needed to
complement them is an “ideological counterforce” that
enlists Muslim “moderate elites” in stopping Muslim
extremists and their message of hatred and violence.
Dr. Demetrious Papademetriou.
Dr. Demetrious Papademetriou has been an immigration scholar for many years; as an immigrant himself, he brought yet another unique perspective to the
panel. In his brief comments, Dr. Papademetriou emphasized that hermetically-sealed borders are impossible
and that, even if they were possible, the adverse impact—
culturally, economically, and technologically—on the
United States would be more than its citizens would
care to bear. Technology in some distant future may be
able to sort people perfectly through some automated
process, but no such system will be available at least for
the foreseeable future. He supports biometric initiatives,
but does not believe they will achieve the level of
security protection desired by many Americans.
Although realistic, the statements about imperfect
sealing of the borders may have been a bit of a red
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herring. Dr. Papademetriou has long been an advocate
of broad immigration policies.6 To some, that advocacy
will seem not to have been sufficiently tempered by
the experience of 9/11. However, he presented a
compelling argument that immigration is critical to
address the needs of the “losers” of globalization.
Some nations are unable to keep up with the rapid
pace of technology and commerce and find themselves
with citizens whose livelihood is no longer sustainable.
Richer nations like the United States, according to
Dr. Papademetriou, have the financial capacity—
and perhaps the moral obligation—to help those
disadvantaged by globalization and the United States
has “enormous capacity” to absorb them. In later
questioning, he nonetheless averred that there should
be some need in the United States for the immigrants
to be allowed legally into the country.
Tamar Jacoby, another immigration scholar, says,
If it really were a choice . . . between cheaper produce and
American security, no one would even pose the question
. . . But that isn’t the choice. We can have security and
remain connected to the world, too. Most of the war
against terror ought to take place beyond our borders,
using military means and intelligence to stop evildoers
before they arrive at our shores. Then, when it comes to
immigration, the key is recognizing the reality of how
many are coming, creating legal channels for those we
can vet easily and focusing resources—money, agents,
technology, and the rest—on the much smaller number
who might conceivably do us harm.7

While Ms. Jacoby’s desire to see the war on terrorism
far away from American shores is idealistic, her point is
solid: America has the ability to have secure borders that
do not unnecessarily hinder commercial or intellectual
intercourse. Technology will play an important role in
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providing that security, but will never bring the perfect
solution that seems necessary in an age of non-state
terrorist actors with potential access to WMD. While
these procedural and technological initiatives should
be pursued, they must be complemented by efforts to
win the war of ideas, to address radical and violent
terrorists—Muslim or otherwise—in a holistic way
that encompasses more than simply placing obstacles
in the way of their access to America.
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PANEL I
BORDER SECURITY: A FOREIGN PERSPECTIVE
Ms. Susan Sim
The National Security Imperative.
In the war against terrorism, the first imperative
for any government is to stop would-be terrorists
from entering the country’s shores. A nation’s borders
constitute at least part of its first line of defense, and it is
good strategy to push the borders as far out as possible
so that terrorists and their materiel are stopped at their
point of departure before they get on a plane to a New
York airport or send a dirty bomb on a container ship
to Long Beach. With stringent visa requirements, each
U.S. consulate abroad can be turned into a virtual
border checkpoint to identify aliens who might pose
a security threat to the United States and to deny
them entry. Various U.S. border security measures—
Container Security Initiative (CSI), Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI), Radiation Detection Initiative
(RDI), Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism
(C-TPAT)—to check and clear containers bound for
the United States start in Singapore, thousands of
miles from any American customs check points. And
in pushing its borders out, the United States has shifted
some of the burden—and shared the costs—of U.S.
homeland security with other countries like Singapore,
which have to invest in building up home-front security
capabilities to take into account American requirements
as well as their own.
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The government of Singapore agrees that these
border initiatives are necessary security measures.
Singapore was among the first to sign up for CSI,
PSI, RDI and C-TPAT. As a participant in the U.S.
Visa-Waiver Program, Singapore will begin issuing
biometric passports to Singaporeans in August 2006,
before the October 26 deadline.1 Singapore strongly
supported Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and
IRAQI FREEDOM, and sent police trainers, LSTs
(Landing Ship, Tanks), and transport planes to assist
in the reconstruction of Iraq. One LST is still in the Gulf
region. Last year, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong
signed with President Bush a Strategic Framework
Agreement for a Closer Cooperation Partnership in
Defence and Security that further expands the scope of
U.S.-Singapore cooperation. In the Global War on Terror
(GWOT), Singapore must be an unwavering partner.
As Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff put
it when he met Ambassadors from the Association of
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries at the
Singapore Residence last year, “We are all equally at
risk because the terrorist networks are equally hostile
to your governments as to the United States.” The
common goal is to take down terrorist cells, deny them
sanctuary, and to stymie their recruitment.
The main debates over immigration policies in this
security environment center on two difficulties:
• One, how to balance freedom of quick access of
people, goods, and services with the security
demands for greater scrutiny of these flows and
the integrity of the supply chain; and,
• Two, how to formulate a differentiated-enough
risk profile to detect security threats accurately
without unnecessarily victimizing those who
are of no risk.
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Security risk profiling is an operational tool that
governments have no choice but to use. Based on
research, intelligence gathering and sharing with
the security agencies, including those from the
United States, risk profiling is necessary from a risk
management standpoint as it allows Singapore to
utilize finite operational resources better and to
strike a good balance between facilitating trade and
travel while ensuring a robust security threshold at
border checkpoints. In the CSI program, for example,
cooperation procedures between Singapore and the
United States allow for the exchange of information,
identification, screening, and sealing of targeted U.S.bound containers.
Singapore has also invested heavily in technology
which can help conduct inspections of goods and
people quickly, efficiently, and with good detection
rates. In fact, Singapore believes that one strategic
effort on which countries can work together more
urgently is the development and deployment of
biometric passports. Such a project is an investment
which would restrict the space for terrorist movement
by tightening passport controls and border security.
It will not only make mobility extremely difficult
for terrorists; it will also boost the chances of timely
detection of suspects after an incident. But it is an
expensive proposition. If the United States did not lead
on this issue in international fora like the International
Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), no one would
have much incentive to invest in the technology. But
leadership means providing assistance or resources to
encourage countries to develop the system, especially
less-developed ones where borders are often most lax
and passport controls weak.
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The Costs of Prevention.
The rub is that successful prevention does not give
governments a demonstrable success story that will
convince their citizens that the extra effort is worth
the risks to economic competitiveness. Singapore is
primarily a trading nation. Without trade, Singapore
would die. Singapore is now the world’s busiest
container port by volume and has to be very careful
that CSI, RDI, and C-TPAT combined do not lead to
unacceptable delays and extra costs for shippers,
because they will then go to other ports that are not as
rigorous in inspecting their goods. For example, since
the launch of C-TPAT in April 2005, Singapore has
registered 10,434 applicants, 5,777 certified members,
and 1,500 validated companies who exceed minimum
security criteria. But those applicants are all still
waiting to see what the hullabaloo is about since there
are no “green lane” benefits for them. Since eligibility
for the program is restricted to U.S. companies,
the downstream/spin-off benefits for Singaporean
exporters are still unclear.
Many Americans—Senators, Congressmen, university heads, and captains of industry—have been
extremely concerned about the impact the post-9/11
U.S. immigration regime is having across a wide range
of activities.
• According to a study released June 2, 2004, by
the Santangelo Group, an international business
and economic development consulting firm
based in Washington, DC, visa backlogs have
cost U.S. businesses more than $30 billion in
revenue loss and indirect expenses. In particular,
small- to medium-sized exporters experience
disproportionately severe losses because of the
way the government handles visas for foreign
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business travellers. Two concrete examples
were highlighted in The Los Angeles Times last
year:
		

1. In “Hawaii Loses Out Big,” the paper reported
that the organizers of a conference for Asian
insurance executives moved the event from
Hawaii to Hong Kong out of concern that
they would not be able to get visas for the
thousands of Chinese participants they
were expecting. That is a lot of hotel rooms
cancelled.

		

2. The Times also reported that Boeing has lost
millions of dollars because foreign customers,
particularly those from the Middle East and
other Muslim countries, could not get visas
for their pilots to pick up their new jets or
undergo training in the United States. Is it
any wonder that major U.S. companies now
feel they need to set up training centers
overseas if they are to sell their products
abroad?

• Speaking at a conference in Washington, DC,
on the role of foreign visitors last year, Senators
Norm Coleman and Jeff Bingaman noted that
2005 was the first school year since September
11, 2001, that the total number of international
students in the United States actually decreased.
International applications to U.S. graduate
schools fell 28 percent from the fall of 2003 to the
fall of 2004, and 54 percent of all English-as-aSecond-Language programs reported declines.
Where are these students going? According
to the Senators, they are going to the United
Kingdom, Canada, and Australia because they
have fewer hurdles for international students.
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Senator Coleman found this decline troubling. In his
words:
In a world that too often hates Americans because they
don’t know us, international education represents an
opportunity to break down barriers. It is in our local and
national interest for the best and the brightest foreign
students to study in America because these are the people
who will lead their nations one day. The experience they
gain within our democratic system and our values gives
them a better understanding of what America is and who
Americans are. I’ve also heard from American colleges
and universities. The presence of international students
give American students an irreplaceable opportunity to
learn about other cultures and other points of view.

And here’s the kicker: International education is a
$13 billion-a-year industry, and foreign students who
pay full tuition help keep costs down for American
students.
Many industry chiefs have expressed concern
that the United States is not producing enough
engineers and science graduates. The percentage of
U.S. undergraduates taking engineering is the second
lowest of all developed countries; China graduates
three times as many engineering students as the United
States. A recent U.S. News and World Report article on
“The Fight for the Future: What America must do to
keep up with roaring economies like those of China,
India and South Korea” noted that 56 percent of
engineering doctorates awarded in the United States
go to foreign-born students. U.S. research institutes
traditionally have attracted some of the best scientific
scholars in the world. Their continued commitment to
the institutes will, to an extent, be influenced by their
experience in getting their visas renewed. Anecdotal
evidence suggests that many Indians and Chinese
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are now choosing to stay at home as their economies
grow and afford them greater opportunities. And if
these research and development talents want to work
abroad, Singapore—and others perhaps less friendly
to the United States—will grab them.
These statistics and anecdotes speak to questions
that only Americans can answer: questions of America’s
economic competitiveness, America’s role as the
intellectual hub of the world, and—since perception
is reality for most people who live outside the United
States—the impact of such horror stories about visa
backlogs on U.S. foreign policy goals. America cannot
afford isolationism to deal with terrorism.
Transformational Power of Access.
As President George Bush has said, the war on
terror is a generational and global struggle of ideas—a
struggle that pits the power of hate against the power
of hope. A key task that the administration has set for
itself is how to speak more effectively with Muslim
countries: to show them that there is no war on Islam
or a clash of civilizations, perceptions that will create a
perpetual cycle of hate. But America cannot hector on
one hand, and slap with the other, and hope to decrease
anti-Americanism. Visa regimes with the announced
intention of profiling male Muslims aged 16 to 45
from Muslim countries can only be seen as tarring all
Muslims indiscriminately.
A critical component of a comprehensive strategy
to counter al-Qa’ida and its ilk is the development of
an ideological counterforce to challenge the rhetoric
of the extremist preachers who recruit in madrassahs
and on the Internet. As non-Muslims, Americans are
not up to the task. America and its allies in the GWOT
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need to support the mobilization of the moderate elite
in Muslim communities and not allow them to be
intimidated by the extremist fringe. But it is difficult for
American diplomats to encourage moderate Muslims
to speak out against extremist violence when American
policies say in effect: Muslims are all the same and we
do not trust them to do right.
Karen Hughes, the Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, outlined four strategic pillars in her public diplomacy efforts to ensure the
United States prevails in this battle of ideas. She calls
them the Four Es: engagement, exchanges, education,
and empowerment. In her words, “People who have
the opportunity to come here learn for themselves that
Americans are generous, hard-working people who
value faith and family.” That is generally agreed . . .
but foreigners first have to get to America before they
can learn about Americans.
To end on a positive note: an education in the
United States is a transforming experience, and
people so empowered are key to changing their own
societies. One of the most successful examples of the
benefits—to America—of an American education is
Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.
While in the United States for military training (under
the International Military Education and Training
program), he earned a master’s degree from Webster
University and picked up the ideas of Samuel
Huntington on democracy. “SBY,” as he is popularly
known, won Indonesia’s first direct presidential
election in 2004 and is making sure that his country’s
reform efforts are irreversible. Another less wellknown but crucial success story: the reformers who
wrote Indonesia’s new election laws in 1999. Three of
them studied political science in graduate programs
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at Northern Illinois University in the early 1990s
and used their training to strengthen Indonesia’s
experiment with democracy. It was surreal to watch
them at work in Jakarta. As they wrote the new laws,
they occasionally would break into debates about the
U.S. Constitution and its applicability to Indonesia.
Anything that America can do to ensure the continued
ready availability of these transformational experiences
will redound to the benefit of the United States and to
friendly—and less than friendly—nations around the
world.
ENDNOTES - SIM
1. Explanatory notes on Singapore’s participation in U.S.
border security initiatives:
•

Container Security Initiative (CSI). Singapore was the first
in Asia to implement the CSI program on March 17, 2003.
This is a container trade supply chain initiative. Singapore
believes in CSI’s value for global maritime security, and
has signed a Declaration of Principles with U.S. Customs
Administrations. This Declaration provides a framework
to implement joint CSI procedures such as the exchange of
information, identification, screening and sealing of U.S.bound containers whose profiles are considered highrisk for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or other
implements of terrorism. U.S. customs inspectors, located
side-by-side with Singapore Customs officials, study the
manifests and help decide which containers to screen
using scanners the Singapore government purchased.

•

Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Again Singapore
was the first—and may still be the only—country in
Southeast Asia to participate in PSI. This initiative builds
on efforts by the international community to prevent the
proliferation of WMD. Singapore’s policy support and
resource investment in this initiative involve surveillance
and/or interdiction of suspect vessels and the deployment
of mobile radiographic scanners to scan and detect the
presence of WMD in shipping containers.
31

•

Radiation Detection Initiative (RDI). This is a U.S.
Department of Energy initiative that Singapore agreed to
implement in March 2005. Radiation detection equipment
will be deployed at Singapore’s ports to deter and detect
the trafficking of nuclear material that may be used to
make illicit nuclear weapons or “dirty bombs.” For the
pilot project at Singapore’s Pasir Panjang Container
Terminal, the U.S. Energy Department will be responsible
for acquiring, installing and maintaining the equipment
while Singapore will be responsible for operating it.

•

U.S. Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism
(C-TPAT) Program. C-TPAT is much applauded as
a volunteer government-trade community/industry
scheme that will be an important component for securing
the global supply chains and facilitating legitimate cargo
and conveyances. Under this scheme, goods imported
by eligible U.S. importers will be provided a gradation
of facilitated clearance through Customs access if they
qualify for certification and validation.
Level

Groupings

Level of Checks

Tier 1
Tier 2

Certified members
Validated members,
meeting minimum security criteria
Validated members,
exceeding minimum security criteria

Front-of-Line inspections

Tier 3

•

Reductions in checks
Green Lane Privilege

Biometric passports. Singapore is one of the 26 countries
under the Visa Waiver Program (VWP). This program
commits Singapore to develop and issue tamper-resistant
machine-readable passports (MRP) with biometric
identifiers by October 26, 2006. The United States also
requires that any travel documents issued with biometrics
identifiers must comply with the standards laid down and
endorsed by the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO). Singapore has supported this initiative as an
excellent security measure and has begun a pilot project
to issue biometric passports to frequent travellers; by
August 2006, every Singaporean will be able to apply for
a biometric passport that complies with the standards set
by ICAO.

32

PANEL II
THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT:
COALITION BUILDING AND MAINTENANCE
General.
An international perspective on “A Nation at
War” was gained by a look at coalition building
and maintenance, one of the challenges inherent in
executing a global strategy. A global strategy is certainly appropriate for the American global superpower,
but adequate forces to execute that strategy must be
available to avoid a significant disconnect between
ends, ways, and means. By itself, the U.S. military
is too stretched by the ongoing war in Iraq—among
other challenges—to carry out the many aspects
of the current strategy. That is certainly cause for
alarm, but the Quadrennial Defense Review makes the
case in various places that international partners will
complement American forces to close the gap between
strategic requirements and available military power.1
For this plan to work, those partners must come with
very real capabilities, not just be accepted as a partner
for political reasons.
Fighting a war alongside soldiers of other nations is
nothing new to American forces, of course. Some of the
earliest nation’s fights may seem to have been mainly
solo events, but even then other nations participated
in a variety of ways. More recently—at least in an
historical sense—success in the two World Wars of the
past century was only possible because of the combined
efforts of many nations. From the U.S. perspective,
American leadership in World War II was key, but
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even more observers would draw that conclusion from
studies of the Korean War and the Vietnam War. Other
nations contributed significant forces for both, but
both conflicts are remembered much more—at least by
Americans—as American wars. That phenomenon may
have been a result of the bipolar geopolitical situation
of the Cold War, but the trend continued in the first
Gulf War with another important distinction reflected
in the rhetoric. In Operation DESERT STORM, the
other nations were described as “friends” or “coalition
partners,” not allies as in the previous wars.2 A few of
those coalition partners contributed major forces in
the Gulf (although the United States still provided the
preponderance); most seemed to be accepted as part
of the coalition less for any real combat capability they
could provide than to show the rest of the world that
the conflict was supported broadly internationally.
With no real international mandate for the current war
in Iraq, this “legitimizing function” of a coalition is
even more important.3
The political difficulties of building and maintaining
a coalition in this strategic situation are significant. If
the goal is to show international support, virtually any
applicant to the coalition will be accepted with open
arms—even if the United States and the applicant
country have fundamentally different purposes for
participating in the conflict. Some may join an operation
hoping for a quid pro quo from the United States in
other areas. They may still ask the United States to fund
their participation, but seek more important trade or
aid agreements as a precondition or as a result. Other
national interests—trade, ethnicity, and ideology, for
example—in a particular region also can drive nations
to join a coalition; when those interests conflict with
U.S. interests, the results predictably are suboptimal.
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One characterization of U.S.-led coalitions is that
“the United States does the killing; the other members
of the coalition do the healing.” That characterization
has some credibility as many nations find it more
politically palatable to contribute forces to a posthostilities situation or for some role other than combat:
peacekeeping, reconstruction, or training indigenous
forces. Building a coalition in post-hostilities situations
generally is easier than for combat, but the challenges
remain significant and similar. American funding—
whether supporting another nation’s operating forces
or provided in a different venue—can help to gather
coalition members, but those forces are more likely
to serve a legitimizing function than to add real
capability.
The operational challenges of fighting or otherwise
operating with a coalition force are no less daunting.
Language—even with English-speaking countries or
members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), where English is the official language—still
presents many barriers to efficiency and effectiveness.
These barriers become even higher with weapons,
communications systems, and other interoperability
considerations. Most of these technical issues are
surmountable. Probably the most demanding barrier
is much harder to overcome. National chains-ofcommand continue to operate—intentionally and
unintentionally—to stymie efforts by coalition leaders
to effect coordinated action. Even when forces in the
field want to execute coalition plans, obtaining national
permission can take an inordinate amount of time. The
result is frequently an uncoordinated operation—if the
operation proceeds at all.
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Lieutenant General (French Army, Retired)
Christian Delanghe.
Lieutenant General Delanghe noted that most
interventions since the end of the Cold War have
been done with a coalition and cited his experience in
suggesting three bases for successful coalition operations. While not claiming his list was exhaustive,
Lieutenant General Delanghe said that one of the
most important factors in coalition success is a good
consultation process between the nations involved.
Perhaps even more important is a common understanding of the strategic objectives for the intervention.
Finally, once strategic objectives are agreed upon and
solid consultation is established, the coalition needs a
good concept of operation, i.e., a coordinated strategy
that integrates all elements—not just the military
arm—of national power.
Consultation—for the involved nations—may be of
less importance when a lead nation has “coerced, bribed,
or bullied”4 other nations to join a coalition to give an
operation international legitimacy. In such a case, the
lead nation may be able to act essentially unilaterally,
although some adjustment of the coercion, bribing,
or bullying may be necessary to ensure acquiescence.
When the coalition is comprised of nations joined
together because of shared interests,5 consultation is a
much more important part of coalition maintenance,
but also can be a major hindrance to effective action in
operations. Without honest consultation for a sharedinterest coalition, the coalition will be unable to mount
effective operations easily and may very well fall apart.
Lieutenant General Delanghe also pointed out that even
when interests converge and a nation’s military leaders
want to act in accordance with coalition directives, the
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coordination of differing national processes can be
unacceptably slow in approving action. When either
the military or political leaders wish to act contrary to
the lead nation’s desires, bureaucratic roadblocks can
be used to stymie coalition action.6 The consultation
process must be crafted very carefully if the coalition is
not to be denied effectiveness while awaiting coalition
approval on various levels: military, alliance, and
political.
Finding common strategic objectives is key, but
doing so since the end of the Cold War is an increasing
challenge. During the Cold War, western nations
shared a general strategic objective of containing the
Soviet threat. In that war, the threat was a known
one and common to all; in addition, the threat could
be quantified mechanically. The number of tanks
and fighter jets in East Germany could be counted, as
could the number of Soviet ships at sea and nuclear
missiles pointed at the west. The common assessment
of the threat made coalition building easier, although
the nations at the nexus of the west and the Soviet
world were always torn. Lieutenant General Delanghe
likened today’s threat to a chemical process, where all
the ingredients of crisis are extant permanently and
occasionally explode. He elaborated further that the
process may even be alchemical, in that certain actors
are looking to change the nature of the ingredients.
According to Lieutenant General Delanghe, the fiveto six-million Muslim citizens of France were able
to act as “alchemists” in keeping France from acting
in a positive way—a way that reflected its enduring
national interests—in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.
Yet another example cited by this panelist was the
British/French/Israeli action in the Suez Canal in 1956.
The three partners entered the conflict with differing
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motives: the French to solve problems with the Algerian
war, the British to gain the Canal, the Israelis to address
a military threat. The strategic environment of the Cold
War was forgotten completely, but the real decisions
about the conflict would be taken in Washington and
Moscow, not Paris, London, Jerusalem, and Cairo. As
a result of these differing objectives and disregard for
the strategic calculus, the coalition encountered severe
difficulties and ultimately failed to achieve the disparate
national goals. The coalition actions also changed the
balance of power in the Middle East, giving the Soviets
increased leverage in the region and adversely affecting
the coalition members’ broader strategic interests.
Even when strategic objectives are commonly held
and effective and timely consultation processes are
established, goals may not be accomplished because of
coalition disagreement over strategy and operations.
The chosen strategy and concept of operations must
also take into account all the elements of national
power; the military is too often the only element used, at
least in quantity. The strategy and resulting operations
must cover all expected phases of the conflict and see
what combinations of the elements are most effective.
Economic, diplomatic, and informational elements
may be more effective than military in pre-hostilities
engagement. Conversely, ignoring the other elements
in favor of military power during the hostilities phase
can lead to open-ended commitments, as in Bosnia—
and perhaps Iraq—for the United States; the same was
true in Africa for France. Lieutenant General Delanghe
ended by emphasizing that a “coalition of coalitions”
may be appropriate when all elements of national
power are involved. As stated previously, some
nations may be unwilling to provide combat forces
for active hostilities, but will be willing to contribute
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reconstruction or peacekeeping forces. One coalition
may be necessary for the hostilities phase of an
intervention; another may address only the rebuilding
of the legal structure after the war; yet another may
work to ensure development of a fair electoral process.
The coalition leader or leaders must work each of
these “sub-coalitions” carefully, or the military will
be handed too many tasks—including ones for which
they are not the best candidates.
Colonel Pete Mansoor.
How a coalition is built affects how it works and
whether or not it stays together. Having commanded
a U.S. brigade under the tactical control of a Polish brigade when Moqtada al-Sadr called for an uprising by his
Mahdi Army in Najaf in April 2004, Colonel Mansoor
was able to provide first-hand observations on what it
takes to make a coalition effective in combat. His unit
was sent to Karbala because the rules of engagement
for Multi-national Division-Center South (MND-CS)
did not allow for offensive operations by any of the
units. All could defend themselves, as the Poles capably
did when attacked by the Mahdi Army, but were not
authorized to counterattack to regain ground once lost.
Other units had even stricter requirements: The Thais,
for example, were not even allowed to leave their
operating base once serious hostilities commenced.
No nation is immune from national political guidance;
even the United States had to restrict itself to operations
outside of certain exclusion zones around the Muslim
shrines in Najaf.
With these constraints, why was this ad hoc organization successful? According to Colonel Mansoor,
several factors were important:
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1. Senior U.S. Embeds. At various positions in the
Polish Brigade and at MND-CS, the United States sent
a senior leader to advise their coalition counterpart.
This leader was senior enough—with the requisite
skills and experience—that his advice had credibility
with the coalition partners. He also was able to provide
diverse types of external resources (e.g., aviation,
supplies, and medical evacuation) that enhanced the
ability of the coalition units to succeed in their missions.
Finally, because of his presence, he was able to work
on developing consensus in the coalition. He served to
explain the U.S. direction to the coalition leaders, but
also to explain to his U.S. chain of command how the
coalition leaders felt about a particular order.
2. Standardized Procedures. The Polish Brigade
included battalions from Poland, Bulgaria, and
Thailand and a Lithuanian platoon. Although
Thailand was not a member of NATO, the other major
contributors were and enforced the use of NATO
standard operating procedures. This included the use
of English as the lingua franca in coalition operations.
Although translated English still presents difficulties
on both sides of the equation, there was at least a basis
for common understanding. Familiar procedures for
reporting logistics requests and other routine functions
made operations simpler at all levels.
3. Previous Relationships. The Chief of Staff of
the Polish Brigade was a 2002 graduate of the U.S.
Army War College under the International Military
Education and Training (IMET) program; Colonel
Mansoor graduated from the War College in 2003.
Since they shared this particular experience, they were
able to begin their cooperation with a shared idea of
strategic issues. Habitual relationships between the
United States and the other NATO countries, including
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their time in the NATO Partnership for Peace, were
complemented by a similar relationship between the
United States and Thailand, built on a basis of 25 years
of joint training exercise COBRA GOLD. Although the
relationships may not have been personal, just because
the other coalition members had previously worked or
trained with American forces, they were able to operate
together more easily in hostilities in Iraq.
4. Sensitivity to Coalition Needs. Different
members of the coalition need a range of support from
the coalition leaders. Logistics support comes quickly
to mind as one of the ways that the larger coalition—
frequently the lead nation—can assist the individual
members. Intelligence support is also key, although
normally subject to restrictions on dissemination
outside of national channels. Less frequently
considered is the news media. National contingents
often are accompanied by national news media and
coalition leaders must be attuned to how they can
support the various governments by highlighting
the contributions of the national forces. The news
media support builds popular support that helps to
keep friendly governments in power and part of the
particular coalition.
Even the strongest of coalitions is stretched under
crisis. When the Madrid train bombings occurred in
March 2004, the Spanish government was voted out
of power under the resulting pressure and withdrew
its forces from the coalition in Iraq shortly afterward.
Conversely, the United Kingdom, when subjected
to its own terrorist attacks with the London subway
bombings in July 2005, stood as a staunch ally. The
attention paid to both nations by the U.S. Government
prior to and after the attacks was significant, but other
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political factors come into play when the citizens of a
coalition member are under direct attack. In such cases,
only the closest convergence of national interests—
which would probably need to be sustained by broad
popular support—will sustain the coalition.
Mr. Sebestyén L. V. Gorka.
In comments he described as deliberately provocative, Sebestyén Gorka diverged from the
panel’s focus on coalition building and maintenance,
preferring instead to discuss the broader issue of a
European perspective of the United States at war. He
first provided his answer to the question: “Is the U.S. at
war?” He explored the issue from the perspectives of
the law, politics, and the common man. Answering the
question in the negative, he then attempted to describe
where the United States was, if not in a war.
From the legal perspective, Mr. Gorka applied
traditional standards, using a definition that describes
war as a prolonged conflict between nation-states.
Applying this narrow definition strictly, Mr. Gorka
asserted that the United States is not at war. Some
of the conflict may have been against nation-states—
in Iraq and Afghanistan—but the fights there were
short ones that toppled the governments quickly. The
current fight against the insurgency in Iraq meets the
“prolonged” requirement; certainly there is no shortage
of evidence that the fight there will be an enduring
part of what the Quadrennial Defense Review report calls
“a long war.”7 However, there is no identified nationstate in opposition. The panelist also may have been
implying that major combat is another requirement
of his definition. If that were added to the rubric, the
Iraq counterinsurgency—with its short and scattered
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responses to car-bombings and other quick attacks—
would be further disqualified as a war.
The problem, of course, is with the definition. It
still works to identify some types of war, but needs
to be broadened to encompass the war in which the
United States and its partners are engaged. To a soldier
on the ground, a period of intense combat—no matter
how short—can seem to be a war. That broadest of
definitions can be discarded, though, in favor of one
that says war is the prolonged application of violence
against each other by competing entities. The nationstate part of Mr. Gorka’s definition falls short in an era
in which non-state actors are capable of attacks like
those of September 11, 2001 (9/11). The “prolonged”
part of Mr. Gorka’s definition still fits; there must be
some way to distinguish a war from a punitive border
raid or cruise missile attack. The rhetoric on the U.S.
side clearly states that the war is a long one. And the
multiyear attacks by al-Qa’ida8 further suggest that
this particular competing entity also takes a long view
of the war.
Mr. Gorka next addressed the question from what
he described as the realpolitik perspective. Realpolitik
describes foreign policy based on raw national interests,
not moral or ideological considerations. This may
not have been the best descriptor for the observation
he made, but that in no way attacks its accuracy. As
evidence that the United States is not at war, he points
to the lack of mobilization by the people. The line of
reasoning would not be that mobilization is sufficient
to define war, but that it is surely necessary for a nation
to be at war. Mr. Gorka points to the mobilization of
World War II to make his point, then refers to the draft
of the Vietnam War to say that those were wars, not
like the “war” of today. Unfortunately, World War II
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is a particularly bad analogy. That was clearly a war,
with the nation’s resources mobilized to a significant
extent, but it was a different type of war against a
different type of enemy. As written in the introduction
to this report, the Cold War would present a better
exemplar for comparison. As in this war, there was
no full mobilization, even in the military forces. But to
suggest that the United States was not engaged fully in
an existential war against the Soviet Union is ludicrous.
The definition of war should not be stretched beyond
recognition, but must adapt to the evolving nature of
war. At least from this perspective, Mr. Gorka may not
have proven his assertion that the nation is not at war.
His next perspective was that of the layman,
described by Mr. Gorka as someone who “doesn’t know
Clausewitz from any other tactical or strategic writer.”
This person, if he or she thinks about the concept of a
nation at war at all, would be guided by the fact that a
war has a beginning and an ending. Even the layman
would recognize, though, that terrorism always has
been around and will endure no matter how—and
perhaps precisely because—the powers of the world
array themselves against it. Because of this, the
layman would say that the United States is not at war.
According to Mr. Gorka, the layman also must have a
well-defined sense of the enemy if the nation is truly at
war. As evidence to the contrary, he points to comments
made by a U.S. dockworker about the recent imbroglio
over the Dubai Ports deal, where a friendly Middle
Eastern country was trying to secure the rights to run
port security operations along the eastern seaboard of
the United States.9 The dockworker said that he did not
understand how the United States could put its port
operations in the hands of a Middle Eastern country
when it is “those guys who are responsible for 9/11.”
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While a finely-tuned categorization of the enemy is
helpful in a war, the dockworker’s statements do not
necessarily answer the question of whether or not the
nation is at war. From the layman’s perspective, the
war may very well include a larger enemy, but the fact
of war is still true for him or her.
Mr. Gorka may not have been convincing in his
presentation of evidence that the nation is not at war,
but his provocative comments nonetheless left a sense
that the answer to the question is not clear. His next
attempt was at defining where the nation was, if not
at war. Reiterating his conclusion that the nation is
not at war, Mr. Gorka made a comparison with the
Cold War, saying that the threat of Osama bin Laden
easily can be called Marxist-Leninism “informed by
religion.” As with the Soviet Union, there is an idea
of global control, this time in a Muslim “caliphate.”10
As in the Cold War, there also is a sense of a zero-sum
game, where nations are “either for us or against us.”11
Despite those and other similarities, the terrorists and
insurgents fighting the United States today are different
from the Soviet Union in at least one regard: they do
not possess the capability to destroy the United States.
They are certainly capable of damaging attack, but not
of total destruction. They actively seek such capability
and would use it if allowed, which makes the question
of the Nation at war so important. If the Nation does
not perceive itself to be at war, the chances of bin Laden
and his ilk obtaining and using devastating attack
capabilities grows.
Mr. Gorka seemed to be saying that the United
States needs to wake up: if Americans do not believe
they are at war, they are putting the rest of the world in
danger. The rest of the world has its own responsibility,
of course, but is unable to gather the political will
to face the clear threat, so American leadership—
45

and unilateral action, when necessary—is critical.
He understands that the answer must not be only
military. The greater contribution must come from a
generational information campaign that transforms
the image of America in the Middle East to what it was
in Europe while America and its allies were facing the
Soviet Union. The United States was viewed then as a
“shining beacon” of freedom, liberty, and democracy.
That is not true in today’s Middle East. The average
resident of that volatile region may not want a bin
Laden caliphate, but he or she still responds positively
to what bin Laden says about the Palestinian issue and
about the encroachment of “western” globalization
on the values of the Muslim world. None of the steps
required in prosecuting the war are easy or quick, but
they must be taken as soon as possible.
In conclusion, Mr. Gorka pointed out that
comparisons with the Cold War can lead people to
think of the 1950s. He prefers instead to talk about 1905,
when Lenin and Trotsky were busy organizing the
Bolshevik revolution, but nobody took them seriously.
The United States must come to the realization that it
is in an existential war—different from other conflicts,
but still existential and still a war—and learn to fight it
with all the assets at its disposal. Solving the problem
of Islamic extremism may be impossible, but a solid
application of all the instruments of national power can
at least manage it so that answering a question about
the Nation being at war becomes easier.
Lieutenant Colonel Francisco Flores-Hernandez
(El Salvador Army).
Returning to coalition-building and maintenance,
Lieutenant Colonel Francisco Flores-Hernandez supported Colonel Mansoor’s comments about the value
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of a shared language in coalition operations. As part of
the Spanish Brigade in Iraq in 2003, Lieutenant Colonel
Flores-Hernandez enjoyed the ease of communicating
in a common language for combat operations, as well
as for logistics and other support. The value of the
common language became even more apparent when
the Spanish withdrew their forces in 2004 after the
Madrid train bombings. Relying afterwards on U.S.
and Polish units for command, control, and support
was much more difficult because of the language and
procedural barriers for a non-NATO country.
Lieutenant Colonel Flores-Hernandez’ most
important contribution to the panel discussion was
probably his commentary on why El Salvador joined
and stayed with the coalition. Although Lieutenant
Colonel Flores-Hernandez undoubtedly does not
speak officially for either his government or the
population of El Salvador, he spoke movingly about
the gratitude felt by the Salvadoran people for
American support during their 12 years of civil war
and in the ensuing reconstruction of El Salvador. This
translated into ready acceptance of the U.S. invitation
to join the coalition in Iraq. That gratitude, according
to the panelist, was buttressed by the Salvadorans’
commitment to supporting the spread of democracy,
a stated U.S. objective in Iraq and the Middle East.
When Salvadoran soldiers died and were wounded in
fighting in Najaf in 2004, the support for El Salvador’s
role in the coalition remained strong because of this
sense of gratitude and these shared objectives.
Other evidence suggests that the support of the
population is much lower12 than Lieutenant Colonel
Flores-Hernandez says, but the fact remains that El
Salvador continues to be part of the coalition in Iraq,
despite having been bloodied in combat. Yet to be seen
is whether or not the country will stay—as attested by
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Lieutenant Colonel Flores-Hernandez—the years the
Salvadorans know will be required to win against an
insurgency. And while his comments seem to ring true,
there remains the troubling fact that El Salvador—the
smallest country in Latin America—is the only Latin
American nation13 represented in the coalition in Iraq.
Countless others of those nations were helped by the
United States, even if only in the bipolar era of the Cold
War, when support was more to counter Communist
expansion than any alignment of national interests.
Although gratitude and shared interests may be critical
in coalition-building and maintenance, there must be
other factors that also come into play.14
In any event, Lieutenant Colonel Flores-Hernandez
was correct in his overall assessment of coalitions:
coalition-building must begin years before the coalition
takes the field. Engagement—diplomatic, economic,
and military—sets the stage for construction of a
coalition. Shared doctrine, language, and procedures
may make coalition operations easier and should
also be built early, but engagement is key to these,
too. Whether developing consensus or the means for
coercion, the time invested in maintaining ties with a
government and its people pays dividends when that
country’s resources—whether primarily for legitimacy
or for actual capability—are needed in a fight.
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PANEL II
COALITION BUILDING
Lieutenant General (Retired) Christian Delanghe
Introduction.
Since the end of the Cold War, most conflict situations in the world have been addressed by coalitions
rather than by a single nation. The process of building
a coalition normally begins with the identification of a
deteriorating or crisis situation by one or more nations
with an interest in the area involved. The motives that
drive the nation (or nations) to build or join a coalition
are numerous: to share costs, to increase the effect
of chosen actions (such as sanctions), to add needed
capability to the coalition forces, or to add international
legitimacy to a potential intervention. Recent coalition
operations have involved short periods of major
combat, but have generally been less concerned with
high-intensity warfare than with conflict prevention,
humanitarian assistance, and post-conflict stabilization
and reconstruction actions. That same trend is
expected to continue for the foreseeable future. These
complex operations pose specific challenges and
carry specific requirements for coalitions. The issue
at hand is no longer simply winning a war, but rather
crisis management, conflict resolution, and long-term
stabilization. The aim is not “victory” and the end of
the particular national security problem, but “success”
at managing the issue. The measure of success is not
the total defeat of an enemy; it is the normalization of
a country or a region.
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Once a coalition is formed, its success in operations
depends on at least three important aspects: a
consultation process that is responsive to operational
needs, a shared understanding of the strategic
environment (including strategic and operational
objectives), and a concept of operations that integrates
all elements of national power.
The Consultation Process.
In most cases, the nations intending to respond
to a deteriorating situation or to a crisis will engage
in high-level political consultations prior to making
any decisions. These consultations will be held by
a group of representatives from each nation and
each representative will have direct contact with the
appropriate national bodies. If not already decided,
a lead nation normally emerges at an early stage of
political discussions. The lead nation will seek to build a
coalition that will address its specific national interests,
but should seek and consider partners’ national
assessments, positions, and desired outcomes.
At the political level, the consultation process allows
a potential coalition to determine whether intervention
is required, as well as the foundation (whether
rationalization or justification) for any intervention.
The process is also important in deciding objectives and
the ways in which those objectives are to be pursued.
A shared and agreed understanding of the situation,
desired end state, exit strategy, and predictable risks
and costs is necessary to ensure robust cohesiveness
within any coalition.
The consultation process must be iterative and
flexible enough to respond to changing operational and
strategic circumstances, but still must be conducted
through existing national processes. Political leaders
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do not always give clear—or any—guidance to forces
in the field, but sufficient contact must be maintained
with political authorities to allow them to communicate
guidance, if desired.
Common Understanding of the Strategic
Environment.
During initial stages of coalition building, potential
coalition members must exchange their national views
on the situation and their understanding of the strategic
environment. A shared assessment of the situation
must be obtained through the comparison of different
national assessments, after also taking into account any
relevant inputs from international organizations (IOs)
and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). This
enables potential coalition members to understand
different national perspectives and, in particular, to
assess the thresholds of acceptability of the situation at
hand. The objective is to identify overlapping interests
and develop a desired end state that is not only the
lowest common denominator between the nations, but a
common objective for all. Based on their national vision
of the area under consideration, on their understanding
of what the situation there is and could become, and
on the means they are willing to commit, potential
coalition members have to agree on what they want
to achieve. Understanding the strategic environment
is a fundamental element of a successful intervention.
Strong situational analysis and understanding of the
strategic environment within the country and region—
as well as the global international context—are crucial
elements of any intervention.
The 1956 French-British-Israeli “Suez Expedition”
is an excellent example of faulty analysis of the
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geopolitical context. The actors completely failed to
take into account the broader geopolitical context of the
Cold War and failed to realize that the key decisions in
the situation were going to be made in Washington and
Moscow, not in the capitals of Europe. The coalition
partners did not perceive that their colonialist attitudes
would gain no support from the United States and
did not take into account the possible risk of nuclear
escalation (in rhetoric, at least) their intervention could
entail.
A coalition is—by definition—vulnerable to
tensions, and it is essential to ensure that the coalition
has common strategic objectives. The Suez Expedition
is again an excellent illustration of this point. Although
France, Great Britain, and Israel shared the common
goal of removing Egyptian President Gamal Abdel
Nasser from power, their underlying motivations
diverged significantly. France aimed at isolating the
Algerian rebellion by eliminating its main source of
external support. Great Britain wanted to maintain
its control over the Suez Canal. The Israelis sought to
conduct a preventive action before an Arab coalition
led by Nasser could become strong enough to try to
conquer Palestine.
Because of these different underlying aims, the
members of the coalition disagreed during the military
planning phase. The French wished to arrive in Cairo
quickly and therefore make Alexandria the coalition’s
point of entry; the British insisted on entering the
country at Port Said, the mouth of the canal; meanwhile,
the Israelis wanted to deal a significant defeat to the
Egyptian military before proceeding. These differences
of opinion considerably delayed planning—long
enough for Nasser to act effectively on the diplomatic
front, consolidating support from the Soviet Union and
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ensuring that the coalition would be unable to reach its
political objectives.
Coordinating and Integrating All Elements
of National Power.
Successful coalition intervention requires the
integration of all instruments of national and
multinational power during all phases of the
operation: preliminary actions, military intervention,
stabilization, and reconstruction. Given the complex
environments in which most operations take place,
the success of a coalition no longer depends on the
application of military power alone. It has become
essential to make use of all instruments of national
power when intervening abroad: during coercion or
engagement exercises, for counterterrorist operations,
or during the stabilization and reconstruction period.
To minimize the duration of the military involvement
and to facilitate transitions from one phase to another in
a campaign, militaries should develop mechanisms to
interact effectively with long-term players in the other
agencies of national power. This requires interagency
coordination—conducted multinationally—from the
advance planning phase through the execution phase.
The concept of operations must encompass the
whole spectrum of political, diplomatic, military,
informational, and economic actions. The activities
and capabilities of the multinational interagency
community (including all relevant governmental
ministries, as well as IOs and NGOs) must be closely
coordinated with the work of military planners
to permit the incorporation of their perspectives,
capabilities, and support requirements. This acts to
improve the overall coherence and effectiveness of
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the operation. The general concept of operations must
include a position on conflict-termination issues. Crisis
resolution will not occur simply because the situation
is no longer deteriorating or when military operations
are completed.
In reality, a complex international intervention
may require the construction of several coalitions: a
military coalition, of course, but also different types
of ad hoc coalitions organized to conduct activities
such as political development, humanitarian relief,
instituting the rule of law, building electoral capability
and capacity, human rights protection, weapons
inspection, and various reconstruction and economic
development activities. Each coalition would have
its own organization, leadership, and group of
participants. The coordination between these coalitions
or subcoalitions has to be assured at the political level
by a “contact group” set up by major contributing
nations. This “coalition of coalitions” must be in place
very early during the consultation and planning
process.
The intervention in Kosovo is a good example of
the importance of combining various instruments of
power. All political, diplomatic, military, information,
and economic instruments were used during
this intervention, both during the short military
phase and in the much longer stabilization and
reconstruction phase. The Balkans Contact Group, a
political coordinating body, facilitated consultation
and coordination among the governments involved.
Planning for various nonmilitary aspects of the
stabilization and reconstruction phase began early and
took into account the roles of the European Union, the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), various
United Nations (UN) bodies, and the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
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A coordinated strategy, issued at the political and
strategic level, is necessary to assure coherence and
convergence of the mission, the mandate, the means,
and the situation on the ground, and initiates the
coordinated planning of all national instruments of
power. This convergence ensures that the coalition
will have appropriate troop levels, equipment, rules of
engagement, etc.
The early years of the UN mission in Bosnia are
perhaps the most tragic example of incompatibility
between the situation on the ground and the mandate
and rules of engagement. It demonstrates that an
intervention in a so-called peacekeeping operation
can, in fact, be a way for Western political leaders to do
nothing while presenting a face-saving appearance of
action. This type of situation is particularly hard on the
military and ought to be avoided. As learned the hard
way, deploying to a crisis or conflict zone where the
situational reality is disconnected from the mandate
and the means, with no coherent plan or vision of
strategic objectives or desired end state, can only be
disastrous.
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PANEL III
THE DOMESTIC CONTEXT:
THE RESERVE COMPONENTS AT WAR
General.
At first glance, the choice of the Reserve Components1 of the military as a venue for looking at the domestic context of a nation at war seems unusual. The
choice may even have confused the panel’s moderator,
Dr. James Carafano: He identified selection of the
Reserve Components as “absolutely the right choice”
to talk about “the military component [technically, not
the focus of the panel] of a nation at war.” Although
“absolutely the right choice” is a judgment call, various
aspects of the military context of the Nation at war
certainly could be addressed through analysis of the
Reserve Components’ role in the war and would be a
valuable addition to the debate on the main topic of
a nation at war. Domestic context, though, implies a
broad analysis of the impact of the war on the American
population. A domestic content panel should not look
exclusively at the military, but at the “home front” to
analyze popular support of the war or what sacrifices
the people were making because of the war’s conduct.
The panel would look at issues like those that George
Packer mentioned in The Assassins’ Gate:
The home front of the Iraq War was not like World War
II, and it was not like Vietnam. It didn’t unite Americans
across party lines against an existential threat (September
11 did that, but not Iraq). There were no war bonds,
no collection drives, no universal call-up, no national
mobilization, no dollar-a-year men. We were not all in
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it together. Nor did it tear the country apart. As soon as
the war began, the American antiwar movement quietly
folded up its tent and went home. . . . Iraq provided a
blank screen on which Americans were free to project
anything they wanted, and because so few Americans
had anything directly at stake there, many of them never
saw more than the image of their own feelings. The
exceptions, of course, were the soldiers and their families,
who carried almost the entire weight of the war.2

These issues deserve separate in-depth analysis and
public discussion, but a look at the Reserve Components
is not necessarily the antithesis of a study of popular
support. Believers in what is known as the “Abrams
Doctrine”3 would contend that analysis of the Reserve
Components inevitably leads to a measurement of
popular support for any conflict. The impact on the
reserves—more than the impact on the more-insular
active forces—reflects broadly the impact on the
citizenry. The choice of the Reserve Components as the
focus of the domestic context panel seems somewhat
more prescient in that light.
Images of the Nation at war usually include
mobilization of the nation’s reserve forces. That image
almost certainly is produced by the Nation’s experience
in World War II, although more recent conflicts in Korea
and Vietnam adjusted that paradigm significantly. Just
as they have for all the deployments of the U.S. Army
since the end of the Cold War, the Army Reserve and
the Army National Guard—although certainly not
fully mobilized—are just as certainly carrying a large
load in the Global War on Terrorism, especially in Iraq.
The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves
recently reported to Congress that, “Following the
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, unprecedented
numbers of reservists and national guardsmen have
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been involuntarily recalled to active duty and have
served for longer periods than at any other time since
the Korean War.”4 That involvement does not come
without costs. The capability to respond to disasters
like Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana or forest fires in
Montana is diluted by the National Guard deployment
to Iraq and Afghanistan. Although current statistics5
suggest that the situation has reversed itself, recruiting
and retention have been continuing challenges for both
the National Guard and the Army Reserve (as well as
for the active forces).6 The very nature of reserve service
has changed; the force now is considered an operational
reserve, not the traditional strategic reserve.7
Describing the Reserve Components as the
center of gravity of the military in the 21st century,
Dr. Carafano framed the subject by saying that the
success of the U.S. military in the next few decades
will depend strongly on the health of the Reserve
Components. Three factors will determine that health.
First, the military will either get more money . . . or
it won’t. Barring the politically unpopular step of
limiting entitlements, the current trend of spending 4
percent of the gross domestic product is about the best
the military can expect. If defense spending decreases,
the Army will depend on the “cheaper” Reserve
Components—cheaper in peacetime, not necessarily
in war or other operations—but the reduced dollars
available will limit readiness and capability of the total
force, especially since much of that money will have to
be spent on manpower costs. Second, the military will
change . . . or it won’t. According to Dr. Carafano, the
military will need to change to make military careers
remain “consistent or congruent with the civilian
sector.” Some 21st century phenomena—more women
in the workplace, telecommuting, changing careers,
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people working longer—will need to be reflected in
the military structure if the military and its Reserve
Components are to succeed. If the personnel structure
of the total force does not accommodate and reflect this
change in the civilian sector, the Reserve Components—
dependent on citizen-soldiers—will lose their vitality.
Finally, the military will include a larger active force
—or it won’t. The Reserve Components are acting
as an operational reserve because of the continuing
need for more active troops. If that trend continues,
the Nation may decide simply to increase the size of
the active component, with corresponding reductions
in the Reserve Components.8 If, however, the Nation
sees the need for active troops waxing and waning in
some type of sine wave, maintaining healthy Reserve
Components will be an essential part of any national
security strategy. That construct of the future has not
yet been decided.
Brigadier General David Burford
(Army National Guard [ARNG]).
Acknowledging the shift from a strategic to an
operational reserve, Brigadier General Dave Burford
described some of the differences in the reserve force
since the start of the Global War on Terrorism. When the
terrorists attacked on September 11, 2001, the Reserve
Components—along with the rest of the Army—were
based on a symmetrical threat that was expected to start
a war overseas with enough notice for time-phased
mobilization and deployment, if and when needed.
That force also was organized in a linear fashion, in
contrast to the modular form being established today
to provide capabilities that can be used against an
unpredictable enemy. With its modular organization,
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the current force is better prepared for an asymmetric
threat that may attack anywhere, including in the
continental United States, giving no real opportunity
for a lengthy mobilization and deployment timeline.
For the National Guard, the mission of support to the
various states presents an additional overlay to their
federal mission.
Although some of Brigadier General Burford’s
presentation simply described the National Guard and
some of the programs underway to improve the force,9
he did make three important points. The first related
directly to the conflict between the state and federal
missions of the Guard. No better example exists than
the response to Hurricane Katrina to show the challenge
of accomplishing state missions while that state’s
National Guard forces are deployed elsewhere on a
federal mission. Up to 40 percent of the National Guard
forces—and their equipment—from Louisiana and
Mississippi were on active duty in Iraq when Katrina
hit their homes.10 Wartime equipment shortages—
compounded by fielding decisions that traditionally put
less-capable equipment into the Guard formations—
limited the National Guard response even more.
Despite those challenges, there were “. . . over 50,000
National Guardsmen engaged in the recovery...” from
the disaster within 96 hours after Hurricane Katrina
cleared New Orleans. Although the affected governors
might have felt better with their own forces at hand,
the response shows just how much residual capacity
still exists within the National Guard. Tapping into
that residual may require some extraordinary efforts,11
but the Global War on Terrorism apparently has not
pushed the National Guard to a breaking point if it can
still respond to a natural disaster in such numbers and
so quickly.
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Brigadier General Burford briefly mentioned
the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model.
ARFORGEN is part of an effort to put some
predictability into the lives of Reserve Component
soldiers by development of a cycle that would deploy
them no more than once every five or six years.
Manning, equipping, and training levels within the
force also would be adjusted to bring units to maximum
readiness on the same cycle. Brigadier General Burford
focused on the fact that the cycle is only a goal; soldiers
still can be mobilized and deployed more frequently
if strategic or operational requirements demand it.
Left unstated were questions about how the lower
readiness of units in the early years of the ARFORGEN
cycle might impact on the readiness of those forces to
accomplish either state or other federal missions. The
National Guard, although pleased with the increased
predictability, also might find itself unhappy with
a reduced number of training and equipping dollars
provided to the Reserve Component units in those
same early years.
Brigadier General Burford’s final point hit upon
homeland security. In his comments, he simply stated
that homeland security should not be assigned as
a mission for the National Guard, but that making
it a role might make more sense. Semantics aside,
homeland security is such an all-encompassing
activity that it requires the involvement of the whole
federal government and multiple agencies of local and
state government. Consequence management alone
can quickly overwhelm response capacity locally or
regionally within the United States; adding just the
responsibility for critical infrastructure protection
makes the problems even more difficult to manage.
Assigning the National Guard the mission of homeland
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security would force it to reorganize and equip for the
mission, and would deprive the Nation of its use in
other strategic and operational crises. The National
Guard always will have a role in homeland security,
but should not be optimized for that role. Optimizing
the Guard for that mission would deprive the Nation
of some more-flexible forces that would be better
capable of responding to other crises at the strategic
and operational level.
Brigadier General Michael Squier (ARNG, Retired).
Brigadier General Mike Squier brought a historical
perspective to his discussion of the Reserve Components. As a senior leader of the Army National Guard at
the National Guard Bureau for many years, he worked
through the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 1997
“fistfight” between the active Army and its Reserve
Components. He also was around for the “culminating
point” of QDR 2001, when more reason was applied
and the components worked as a team after identifying
the need for “more Army” than was available at the
time.
As one of the architects of the current Army
National Guard force, Brigadier General Squier spoke
with some pride about the capabilities of the force,
but saved his greatest compliments for the “can do”
attitude that he believes permeates the entire force. He
then spoke realistically about the problems created by
that “can do” attitude. According to him, the National
Guard got caught up in the zeal to “get into the game”
after the attacks of 9/11 and National Guard soldiers
and units suffered as a result. The recruiting and
retention challenges experienced in the past couple of
years followed from decisions made about utilizing the

67

Reserve Components more than most Reservists and
Guardsmen desired. Cross-leveling of soldiers from
one unit to another also affected retention decisions,
but the greater effect was organizational. Units with
new personnel added just before deployment suffer
from loss of unit cohesion. Cross-leveling occurs with
equipment, too, to ensure that deploying units have
the best and the right amounts of their authorized gear.
That is the right decision for the deploying units, but
a severe adverse impact can be felt on the units that
remain behind, stripped of manpower and equipment
needed for training or operations. Thus far, the plans to
reconstitute reserve forces look good on paper, but the
huge associated bill undoubtedly will force changes,
limiting the Reserve Components’ ability to perform
either state or other federal missions.
To address these issues, Brigadier General
Squier suggested looking closely at how the Reserve
Components are planned to be employed, and
specifically reexamining the roles and missions of the
reserves. Although some disagreement continues to
exist, in QDR 2001 the reserves’ roles were defined as
expanding Army capabilities in time of need, enhancing
Army capabilities (often possible because Guardsmen
and Reservists bring civilian professional and trade
skills and associations with them into uniform), and
providing a sustainment capability for long-term
operations. Those roles seem to remain valid for the
near- and mid-term future, but that paradigm could be
changed if the Nation decides to pursue a larger active
duty force, for example. Brigadier General Squier
did not provide any insight into just what other roles
and missions might be appropriate for the Reserve
Components, but he did caution against wholesale
discarding of the reserve forces. Although they are
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expensive in operations because of predeployment
training and equipping requirements, the Guard and
Reserves are still cost-effective forces over the long
term. He also cautioned against changing the laws
affecting mobilization without understanding the intent
of those laws. Guardsmen and Reservists understand
their responsibility to answer the Nation’s call in time
of crisis, but if changes to mobilization processes
result in more frequent mobilizations, there will be
an accompanying impact on recruiting and retention.
Brigadier General Squier also suggested asking why
there was such a need to cross-level equipment and
personnel for deploying units. The reason is because
reserve units have not been resourced for success. The
bill is significant, but the force can be more readily
employed if appropriately manned, equipped, and
trained.
Brigadier General Squier buttressed Brigadier
General Burford’s comments about ARFORGEN and
homeland security. He described ARFORGEN as
useful in identifying requirements, but warned against
using it to restrict the flow of money to the Reserve
Components. Without adequate funding, the Guard
and Reserve will not be ready when needed. He also
agreed with Brigadier General Burford that homeland
security is not a National Guard mission, stating
emphatically that “. . . the Guard is not . . . the federal
response force for homeland security.” This seems
somewhat contradictory to his image of the Guard as
“the force that never says no,” but is understandable in
the context of missions added without accompanying
resources. Probably recognizing that the Nation’s
civilian infrastructure is the better place to assign the
homeland security mission, he challenged the panel
and the audience to define the role that the military
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should play in homeland security. The mission of
homeland security can be assigned to the National
Guard, but there will be associated costs. Some of those
costs are in equipping and training, but a greater cost
may be the impact of not having a deployable reserve
force—either operational or strategic—when needed
to augment active capabilities.
Major General Robert Ostenberg
(U.S. Army Reserve [USAR]).
Major General Robert Ostenberg, like other panelists, discussed homeland security in the context of military support to civilian authorities. The case used for
discussion was Hurricane Katrina. In his remarks, he
compared the natural disaster of Katrina to the effects
of a terrorist attack. The 1,300 deaths there and the $96
billion in damage (including the loss of approximately
300,000 homes) are comparable in many respects
to the results that could be expected after a terrorist
attack with a weapon of mass destruction in one of
the Nation’s major cities. The 9/11 attacks killed more
people, but the physical impact12 could be considered
much smaller than the damage to New Orleans alone.
The metaphor is a good one; after a terrorist attack or
after a natural disaster, the military—particularly the
National Guard—can be expected to be involved in the
response. After a terrorist attack, the response is called
consequence management, but the effect is much the
same. The metaphor breaks down, though, if broader
arguments are made about homeland security based
only on consequence management/disaster relief.
Homeland security covers preventive measures, too,
such as critical infrastructure protection, not “just”
consequence management.
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As did the previous two panelists, Major General
Ostenberg pointed out that the homeland security
and disaster relief missions will take more capacity
and capability than are resident in the military,
active or reserve. Specifically for disaster response
(and—by implication—consequence management), he
said that the first responders need to come from the
Nation’s cities. When the cities’ response capabilities
become overwhelmed, their leaders should call on
state resources first; the governors should then call on
federal resources if the magnitude of the event requires
it. What he didn’t mention was the fact that not all
disasters (or terrorist attacks) allow for such a neat and
linear process. Just as Hurricane Katrina immediately
overwhelmed city and state resources, a terrorist attack
can do the same thing, particularly if a weapon of mass
destruction is somehow unleashed in an American
city. In such cases, the federal force must be leaning
forward, not waiting for some beleaguered local or
state politician to call for help. Despite the complaints
of slow response to Hurricane Katrina, the federal force
anticipated some or much of the need. Guardsmen from
the region, experienced in responding to hurricanes,
were naturally mobilized, but Guard forces from
across the Nation—including far away Wyoming,
Ohio, Vermont, and many others—were also among
the responding forces. Some events—like a Category 5
hurricane or a terrorist attack of similar magnitude—
are so unprecedented as to deny any real opportunity
for adequate prior planning and preparation. In such
cases, some “ad hoc-racy” must be expected. The
natural patriotic response of all Americans—not just
the military or those in the government—to volunteer
in such cases will help, but the response and recovery
nonetheless will be slow, at least in the eyes of those
who most need the help.
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On the subject of cross-leveling, Major General
Ostenberg noted a shift from the early days of the
Global War on Terror, when units were told to
“come as you are.” As the war has progressed, there
is no longer any need to send units that are not fully
manned, equipped, and trained, but he cautioned
against “gold plating” units by sending them with
more people and equipment than needed. Sending too
many people now makes it harder to sustain required
manpower levels for the long war. He recognized
the stress on the Army Reserve, but emphasized that
significant potential remains, at least in quantity of
people. The challenge is not just numbers of people;
it also is making sure that the right skills are part of
the package. Reclassification and retraining actions are
underway to address some of these issues in various
military occupational specialties, but they have not yet
been enough to avoid units being deployed with up to
70 percent of their strength being “fillers,” people not
originally assigned to the unit.
Major General Donna L. Dacier (USAR).
Major General Donna Dacier started her comments
by mentioning some of the ways the Army Reserve has
adapted to meet the needs of the regional combatant
commanders. Three of those ways are several years
old: the move to reduce the number of nontactical
organizations and the soldiers in them, the formation
of multiple-component units (multi-compo units—
consisting of units with some combination of elements
of the ARNG, the USAR and the active force), and the
USAR effort to change its force structure to reduce
the number of high-demand, low-density units. Each
of these initiatives may have been accelerated in
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execution since the onset of the Global War on Terror,
but nonetheless have been around in concept for quite
some time. All could probably trace their origin back
to reductions in the total force either taken or planned
prior to 9/11.
The first was used in all components to increase the
number of tactical units by eliminating “unnecessary”
organizations involved in generating and projecting the
force, replacing them in some cases with contractors or
government civilian employees. The second could be
touted as a more economical use of assets, but also was
necessitated by the continuing need to “make do with
less” caused by post-Cold War and post-Operation
DESERT STORM reductions in the size of the force.
There may be no way to eliminate all high-demand,
low-density units, but they have been around for years,
again a result of a focus on tactical units, specifically
the combat units. To keep the fighting edge on the
force, “superfluous” units like civil affairs, military
police, and psychological operations units were cut or
put into the reserves without due regard for how often
they would be utilized in the post-Cold War world.
While it is easy enough to identify these problems in
the USAR,13 the same problems abound in the ARNG
and the active force. The shame is just that it took the
Global War on Terror to fix or to accelerate fixing these
old problems.
The one true innovation Major General Dacier
covered was the use of the USAR Division (Institutional
Training) for training of Iraqi security forces. The DIV
(IT) was designed to augment active training programs
in peacetime, then to provide backfills in the event of
large-scale deployment of the active force. Instead,
as the program to build the Iraqi police and military
accelerated in late 2004, a DIV (IT) was mobilized to
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deploy to Iraq to assist in that effort by providing
individual staff for the multinational training command
and training teams to the Iraqi army and police forces.
This was an excellent example of the particular flexibility
of the USAR, which—unlike the ARNG—easily can
mobilize and deploy individual soldiers, not just units.
If criticism were to be leveled at this action, it would
mention timeliness.14 The same action could have
been taken with the training of Afghan security forces
in 2002, which would have freed Special Operations
Forces from the training mission.
Like the others, Major General Dacier covered the
stressors afflicting the military, explaining that some
stress in the early days of the current war seemed
to be self-induced by leaders and planners who did
not possess the insight needed to put together force
structure needed for the long war. She did emphasize
that “breaking point” stress on the military is a problem
that transcends the Reserve Components and even the
total Army; it is an issue that reaches deep into each part
of the Department of Defense and must be resolved at
that or higher levels.
Major General William Nesbitt (ARNG).
After saying he would avoid redundancy with the
other panelists’ comments, Major General William
Nesbitt was only partially successful in that effort,
as is probably to be expected due to the nature of
the subject. Like the other panelists, he covered the
stressors on personnel and equipment. For the former,
he asserted that the deployment stress on Reserve
Component personnel is greater than for the active
force. All of the components generally put “boots on
the ground” for twelve months in theater, but for the
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Reserve Components, that is in addition to the lengthy
mobilization and predeployment training process that
can add another 6 months to the time that a Guard or
Reserve soldier is away from his or her family. That
may be somewhat misleading, though, as—by Major
General Nesbitt’s own admission—active soldiers tend
to be deployed more frequently. In congruence with
the other panelists, he called for a better mobilization
process to limit the total time away from home, but
also suggested that the use of the Reserve Components
in the operational reserve role means that they need to
be better trained and equipped before mobilization.
Although he said his opinion only reflects a personal
perspective, Major General Nesbitt argued that the
National Guard “. . . is not in danger of breaking.” He
also opined, though, that the Guard cannot sustain
mobilization of approximately 100,000 Guardsmen as
in 2005, but can sustain “. . . in the neighborhood of
20,000 to 40,000 over the long haul . . . .” In the context
of an authorized end strength of 350,000, the former
number seems to make sense, but the latter may not.
Even under the ARFORGEN cycle of one mobilization
and deployment every six years, the number of soldiers
available each year—assuming the “spaces” in the
structure are all filled with “faces” of soldiers—would
be over 58,000.15
In talking about equipping the National Guard,
Major General Nesbitt withdrew his comment about
not being in danger of breaking. His comments about
the equipping levels of the National Guard are hard
to dispute. The equipment may not be substandard, as
he charged, but fielding priorities do allot the better
equipment more broadly across the active force.16 For the
same reasons, equipment shortages are more prevalent
across the reserve force; the ravages of wartime losses
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have aggravated this situation, made even worse for
some units by equipment cross-leveling that leaves
some nondeploying units unready. Major General
Nesbitt pointed out that the Reserve Components
are no longer functioning as a strategic reserve, but
are still budgeted that way. That is in part due to
inadequate allocation of the gross domestic product to
defense. That is compounded by the fact that the Army
gets less than 25 percent of the Defense budget, but is
“. . . carrying most of the load . . .” in the Global War
on Terror. From the National Guard perspective, that
is made even worse by the active force—with only
27 percent of the total Army strength—spending
approximately 79 percent of the (pre-supplemental)
budget. At least one of his statistics may be misleading:
47 percent of the force is active and can be expected to
consume more of the budget than the 53 percent of the
force that is in reserve and not doing the same level of
training and operations. Nonetheless, his depiction of
the Guard and Reserves as “. . . kind of at the bottom
of [the budgeting] food chain . . .” is fair. That will only
get worse—at least for the early years of the cycle—
with implementation of ARFORGEN.
As at least a partial solution, Major General Nesbitt
recommended that Congress consider a dedicated
appropriation for the ARNG, much like is done for
the Special Operations Forces. According to him, this
would be more likely to ensure that the Guard receives
adequate resources and would force the active force
to stop using the Guard like a “teller machine” when
a budgetary shortfall is encountered. The active
leadership can be expected to oppose this because
of the limitations on total force readiness it would
produce. Friction between the Guard and the federal
force also could be expected to ensue, even if some of
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the funding came from the Department of Homeland
Security.
Major General Nesbitt added some specific
comments about the ARFORGEN model, describing it
as good for predictability for individual soldiers, but
not good for the sustained readiness of the force. On
the high point of the cycle, the model would provide
forces that are ready: trained, equipped, and manned
appropriately. The problem is the other years of the
cycle, when ARFORGEN will create various levels of
unreadiness to accomplish the Guard’s normal state
missions and unexpected missions in both the state
and federal arena.
Contradicting his fellow panelists, Major General
Nesbitt stated that the Guard was not only capable of
providing rapid response forces in support of homeland
security, but they have been doing so for some time.
Whether stated as a Guard role or mission, the Guard—
because of its state mission and its proximity to affected
communities—will be involved intimately at least in
consequence management for any large-scale terrorist
attack. As with the other panelists, he ignored the
“non-consequence management” aspects of homeland
security, but did argue for more accessibility of “other
Reserve Component units” (presumably USAR) to the
governor when a catastrophic event occurs. That has
been addressed at least partially by the development
of joint force headquarters in the states.
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further increased in June 2006 to 42. Increased cash bonuses also
complement the call that patriotism has on potential recruits. An
increased recruiter force also undoubtedly has an impact. With
continuing low unemployment, such measures are necessary to
meet recruiting goals. Tom Vanden Brook, “Military on pace to
meet recruiting goals for this year,” USA Today, July 10, 2006,
available
at
www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-07-10military-recruiting_x.htm, accessed on July 13, 2006.
7. This may be a false dichotomy, because the Reserve
Components must be capable of fulfilling both roles: as the
strategic reserve and as the operational reserve. The Commission
on the Guard and Reserves defines the strategic reserve as “. . . a
pool of replacement manpower and capability to be employed in
a large-scale conflict with a peer or near-peer military competitor
. . .” Use of the reserves in an operational context—as in Operations
IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM—defines the new
paradigm. The Commission then goes on to say, “Policymakers
must strike an appropriate and sustainable balance between the
operational and strategic use of the reserve components that will
be necessary to achieve national security objectives in a long war.”
Punaro, et al., p. 22-23.
8. The USAR leadership in the past has said that falling below
their current authorized end strength would make viability of
the force problematic. The constitutionally-protected National
Guard would probably survive, but might have to use as force
structure justification the federal homeland security mission,
complementing its traditional state role in disaster response.
9. Brigadier General Burford spoke specifically about the state
and federal missions of the National Guard, saying that was one
of the only real distinctions between them and the Army Reserve.
He also briefly mentioned two programs to improve manning of
the force. The first is a program to make “every soldier a recruiter”
and to give them bonuses for getting friends to join and to complete
training. The second was about the initiative to provide a trainees,
transients, holdees, and students (TTHS) account. Formation of
this account will not increase National Guard readiness, but will
improve the accuracy of reporting and is long overdue. The active
force has had a TTHS account for years.
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10. Bryan Bender, “Demands of Wars Since 9/11 Strain National
Guard’s Efforts,” The Boston Globe, September 2, 2005, available at
www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2005/09/02/demands_
of_wars_since_911_strain_national_guards_efforts/, accessed July 17,
2006.
11. Ibid.
12. The national psychological impact of the terrorist attacks
arguably is greater.
13. The Chief of the Army Reserve, Lieutenant General Jack
Stultz, confirmed in testimony to the Congressionally-mandated
Commission on the Guard and Reserves that some of the issues
faced by the mobilized Reservists and Guardsmen were not new,
although he said new problems have arisen because of the Army’s
heavy reliance on them in Iraq and Afghanistan and because of the
failure to predict the long war. John W. Gonzalez, “New Strategy
Urged to Retain Reservists,” Houston Chronicle, July 20, 2006.
14. Any criticism of this innovation also would have to ask why
Reservists—instead of better qualified active forces—were used
for this mission. The Reservists could have been used to backfill
training programs from which active forces had been drawn. That
discussion is beyond the scope of this report.
15. This assumes that the “spaces” of the force structure
are filled with “faces” of actual soldiers, which is never a good
assumption. However, even if the active force’s TTHS account of
13 percent is applied and subtracted from the Guard end strength,
the ARFORGEN model would still produce over 50,000 soldiers
for deployment every six years.
16. New equipment is distributed to units based on deployment
plans. Since most active forces deploy earlier, they generally
have newer equipment on hand. Both for political reasons and
for warfighting readiness, some of the newer equipment also is
allotted to high-priority Guard and Reserve units.
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KEYNOTE ADDRESS
BUILDING A DEFENSE FORCE
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
Dr. William J. Perry
Without addressing specific theaters in the Global
War on Terrorism, former Secretary of Defense
William J. Perry provided some general guidance and
a framework for evaluating the extant strategy. His
general guidance stemmed from time he spent with
the various Services’ senior enlisted personnel while
he was the Secretary of Defense and was very simple:
Remember the soldiers.1 During his time as Secretary,
Dr. Perry met regularly with enlisted personnel. While
they may have raised a whole pantheon of issues,
several of them stuck with the Secretary on strategic
matters.
First, the soldiers—and Dr. Perry—said that
training must be protected. Too often, training suffers
as budget crises force tradeoffs in requirements. The
soldiers recognized that the U.S. military is the best
in the world because of that training and told him not
to cut it because of fiscal pressures. Other things—
e.g., force structure, technology, pay—must also be
protected, but one of the real keys to success with the
modern military system is training.2 As seen with the
war in Iraq, that training must be focused on the right
kind of battle, but a force without adequate training
tends to be a force in name only.
Second—and related to the first—soldiers told the
Secretary to sustain education. Dr. Perry’s comments
revolved around education benefits—e.g., the
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Montgomery G.I. Bill—but also could have referred to
the individual education programs for soldiers while
they are on active or reserve duty. That education
teaches them how to think and provides the skills—
especially critical for leaders—that enable them to
succeed in unfamiliar surroundings with only vague
guidance.
The soldiers next gave the Secretary guidance on
deployments. As part of an all-volunteer force, they
knew that it was their lot to deploy—often into harm’s
way—when the nation’s leaders required it. They
simply asked him to make sure that each deployment
was important enough to warrant the sacrifices asked
of the soldiers—and they reminded him to ensure
that the soldiers being deployed were supported fully
by the Nation generally, but also particularly by the
Department of Defense.
Finally, the soldiers asked the Secretary to remember
their families and to ensure that they—not the soldiers
themselves—had the best possible quality of life. None
of these points seem particularly earth-shattering, but
the Secretary correctly emphasized them as what must
undergird any effective strategy.
After his general guidance, Dr. Perry launched into
a description of a fairly basic framework for building
a defense force. Steps included evaluation of both
the threat and the existing friendly force (which he
identified as the “legacy force”); development of a
strategy, to include basing, budget and alliance needs;
and subsequent development of plans of action to
implement the strategy. He next provided some case
studies for evaluation. He identified World War II as
perhaps the easiest because there were basically no
budget limits. The start point for the American forces
was not at all high, but the strategy developed—to
overwhelm the enemy on the ground in Europe and
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at sea and on the ground in the Pacific—required full
mobilization of the nation’s resources, particularly the
human and economic ones.
The Cold War was much more challenging. The
Soviets, seeing the success of overwhelming U.S.
mobilization in World War II, decided to do the same
thing. American leadership, convinced that the U.S.
economy could not match the Soviet mobilization,
opted for deterrence and containment, counting on
treaties and a healthy nuclear force to keep the peace.
Secretary Perry skipped the Korean War and its sad
example of how dependence on that nuclear force so
weakened U.S. ground forces that the nation’s leaders
initially were unable to use them effectively in sustained combat. Similarly ignoring the war in Vietnam,
Dr. Perry focused next on the 1970s, when the United
States decided to use technological advantages to offset
the Soviet forces. From this stemmed various major
programs that produced capabilities such as stealth,
precision guided munitions, the Global Positioning
System, the Airborne Warning and Control System,
and the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar
System. Dr. Perry identified this “offset strategy” as
the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) or at least the
RMA’s underpinnings.
As the Cold War ended, the threats changed and
included “loose nukes,” failed states, and major
regional conflicts, not global nuclear war. The RMA
continued to be applied, though, as a way to minimize
the costs of war. This may have been the first indicator
that the strategy was being driven—at least in part—
by current programs and capabilities. It may also have
been an indicator that equating the RMA with the offset
strategy was the wrong thing to do. An offset strategy
looks at ways to counter an enemy’s strengths with
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friendly forces’ strengths or—better yet—to attack an
enemy’s weaknesses with friendly strengths. While
the technological aspect should have been included,
the offset strategy also should have looked at other
ways to overcome enemy strengths. The post-9/11
enemy certainly was looking at the United States with
an eye toward attacking its weaknesses. Although
Dr. Perry did not say so explicitly, the force that the
United States possessed when attacked on 9/11 was
optimized somewhat for a major regional conflict, not
the type of war which was thrust upon it. The U.S.
and its military were dominant in the world, with
generally strong alliances and solid finances, but they
were vulnerable to terrorist attack and had failed to
see the shifting paradigm, despite numerous warnings
before 9/11. Fighting the war with a heavy force was
appropriate in several aspects—and that capability
needs to be maintained—but the more likely scenario
is one in which the United States is confronted on an
asymmetric battlefield where the enemy uses lawfare3
and information operations to make points that the
United States thus far has been unable to counter
effectively. The offset strategy that Dr. Perry described
is still valid, but has to be seen as much more than
simply the technology-centric Revolution in Military
Affairs.
ENDNOTES - PERRY
1. All enlisted personnel—soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
Marines—are included in Dr. Perry’s comment. The term soldier
is used in this report as emblematic of all of them.
2. For a compelling argument about the importance of training,
see Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in
Modern Battle, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005.
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3. “Lawfare” suggests the situation where a foe, unable to
address an issue symmetrically, turns to the field of international
or domestic law to achieve its military goals. The term is used
extensively in the Panel V discussions and is specifically addressed
in endnote 6. of the Panel V summary (p. 141.)
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PANEL IV
THE ECONOMIC CONTEXT:
GLOBALIZATION VERSUS
NATIONAL SECURITY
General.
Accurately calculating the costs of the Global War
on Terrorism is a major challenge. Some estimates focus
strictly on military expenditures; others add the costs
of U.S. aid. Others look at commitments only from
the planned budget, but not at supplemental funding.
Another covers current obligations, but not future costs
of increasing intelligence capabilities, replacing worn
equipment, and providing pensions and payments
for those wounded and killed. Estimates range from
half-a-trillion dollars to over two trillion dollars for the
ultimate cost of the Global War on Terrorism, including
the Iraq War and the Afghan War. By any measure,
the Global War on Terrorism—and not just the war in
Iraq—has been costly, placing huge demands on the
defense budget, the federal budget, and the national
economy.1 Any study of the Nation at war should
include a look at the cost of the war and the ability of
the Nation to pay that price. The economic health of
the Nation—and the world—is critical to providing the
means to execute the strategy to achieve desired ends.
And from the perspective of the American people, the
shape of the economy is not good.2
Curiously enough, the economics panelists made
little direct mention of the Global War on Terrorism
except for a couple of comments thanking U.S.
servicemen for their sacrifices in this time of war.
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Instead of costs and budgets and ends-ways-means
mismatches, the panel chose to look almost exclusively
at globalization, with a heavy dose of concerns about
China added to the mix. In his opening remarks, the
panel moderator stated that the purpose of the panel was
to “try to build a bridge between the notions of national
security and globalization.” Much of the ensuing panel
discussion might have been as relevant before 9/11 as
afterward, but the effects of globalization—and the
impact of China on the U.S. and global economy—are
nonetheless important factors in the economic health
of the United States and, hence, its ability to wage war.
To some, the international interdependence resulting
from globalization removes some of the motivation
for one country to go to war with another; for others,
globalization’s creation of international “winners
and losers” provides powerful incentive for war,
particularly one that would be fought asymmetrically.
Is the globalization of commerce antithetical to national
security? The answer is not clear, particularly in an era
in which one of globalization’s disaffected “losers”
might be able to find and use a nuclear weapon. The
panel provided some insight into the interrelationship
between globalization and national security. That may
appear not to tell if the Nation is at war or not, but does
provide good information on how prepared America
is to fund this war—or the next.
Dr. Edward M. Graham.
Kicking off his presentation, Dr. Edward Graham
listed two major concerns about international
exchanges between the United States and the rest of
the world. First was the significant trade deficit, which
he described as approximately $800 billion in 2005.
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Many people look at the $1.8 trillion (approximately
15 percent of the gross domestic product) imported in
2005 and wring their hands about the trade imbalance.
They tend to forget that the United States is not only
a “voracious importer,” but also a “. . . very, very
effective exporter” of goods and services, with exports
of approximately $1.0 trillion for the same year. After
defining foreign direct investment (the equity of foreign
investors in operations under their direct control in the
United States), Dr. Graham pointed out that the amount
of foreign direct investment3 is of the same order of
magnitude as the cost of imports: approximately $1.7
trillion.4 Nonetheless, the United States is a creditor
in this area because of approximately $2.0 trillion
dollars invested similarly by U.S. investors in overseas
locations.
In somewhat of an aside, Dr. Graham mentioned
one purchase of services made by foreigners: education.
For example, about 55 percent of the students in U.S.
science and engineering graduate programs are foreign.
Linking this point to the previous panel on immigration,
Dr. Graham said that the foreign students would like
to see the post-9/11 student visa restrictions eased, at
least for countries like China which were not involved
in the 9/11 attacks.
Acknowledging that the statistics he was presenting
are less than interesting in their own right, Dr. Graham
said the point is that all this international exchange—
whether students in the United States, trade deficit,
or foreign direct investment—provide tangible and
intangible benefits to the United States. Although a
parent pays high out-of-state tuition costs for a son or
daughter, foreign students paying higher tuition fees
at U.S. universities and colleges make those academic
institutions more affordable for American students.
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Exposure to American culture is an intangible benefit,
but very important as pro-American attitudes are
developed in many of the foreign students. The
size of the trade deficit is daunting, but the fact that
certain commodities are purchased overseas should
be of less concern than many Americans think.
Commodities produced more cheaply overseas result
in less expensive items for U.S. consumers. The lower
cost of production overseas allows American firms
to concentrate on developing goods and services in
which they have a distinct advantage. This concept, of
course, has limits. Many—certainly not all—products
can be made overseas with negligible impact on U.S.
national security. Some products, though, are critical to
national security and overseas control of the means of
production could be contrary to U.S. national interests
in time of conflict or crisis. One way to ameliorate this
effect is by diversification. If certain national securityspecific items are made in a number of countries, the
risk that all of them would shut down production
during a crisis is more remote.
Alternatively, foreign direct investment offers
a way out of the conundrum. While some may still
look with distaste on foreign ownership of U.S.-based
factories, it is still better to be dependent on foreignowned production based in the United States than on
production in the same foreign countries. In the former
case, factories and other proprietary materials can be
nationalized under the Trading with the Enemy Act,5
as happened with the explosives industry in World
War I and with rubber in World War II. What Dr.
Graham did not mention was the huge international
political cost this would incur, making it an option of
last resort—at best.
In closing, Dr. Graham asserted that the huge U.S.
external debt is unsustainable, but that it is caused in
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part by a low U.S. savings rate. In one of the few panel
references to the Global War on Terrorism, Dr. Lange
said that the other major factor in the external debt is
the very large government fiscal deficit, the result of tax
cuts and significant government expenditure increases
since 9/11. Trade deficits and the amount of foreign
direct investment in the United States should not be
addressed on the same track with the government
deficit, which is, at least partially, a domestic issue.
Blaming the Chinese—as seems to be the wont in
Congress—simply does not work. Although Americans
may feel better if foreign debt is owed to the United
Kingdom than to China, the fact is that the Chinese
simply are responding to American demands.
Mr. John D. Lange.
In many respects, the dollar—since being taken
off the gold exchange standard in 1970—has been
little more than a commodity, traded on international
markets like any other commodity, from hog bellies
to semiconductors, and subject to trading and
manipulation by others for their own purposes. One of
the effects of globalization and free trade is the rapid
flow of various nations’ commodities—especially their
currency, enabled by electronic transmission—around
the world. As a nation’s currency becomes resident
in other countries’ banks, that nation loses some level
of control over its own money, which is particularly
worrisome when the money is concentrated in one
nation, and that nation is not a traditional ally. Although his subsequent comments made the event seem
less likely, Mr. John Lange talked initially of a very
real risk of a collapse of the U.S. dollar because of the
large amounts of American dollars now held overseas,
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particularly in China. The enormous fiscal and current
accounts deficits were described as a “double tsunami”
waiting to envelop the American economy with the
potential for significant decreases in the value of the
dollar and major increases in interest rates. As the dollar
goes down, interest rates rise (which will be particularly
troublesome for homeowners or businessmen with
adjustable rate mortgages). The costs of other currencies
also rise, making import costs soar. U.S. treasury bonds
become less attractive to investors, domestic or foreign.
As the dollar continues downward, other changes can
be expected: invoicing in U.S. dollars probably will
stop, creating some international financial instability
before another nation—perhaps less than friendly to
the United States—steps into the breach with its own
currency. Consumer prices will begin to rise, and the
inflationary spiral will begin. These events occur in
any downward slide of the dollar; a collapse of the
dollar would accelerate the processes and worsen their
results.
Fortunately, there are some dampers that will act
against any slide of the dollar. Not to be outdone by
how easily Dr. Graham bandied about measurements
of trillions of dollars, Mr. Lange mentioned the foreign
exchange market of approximately $2 trillion daily.
The first damper is the inertia inherent in a market
of that size. Even the $400 billion that China holds in
U.S. dollars can be absorbed if China decides to begin
selling its holdings. Buyers would have to be other
holders of euros or yen, who would be facing the same
loss of confidence in the power of the dollar and would
be trying to divest themselves of their own stores of
U.S. currency. Buyers could be found, but the laws of
supply and demand would act to keep the price below
what China—if concerned about the value of its own
treasury—would be willing to accept.
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A second damper is more direct: coordinated
intervention. This is an attempt to match the increased
supply of dollars for sale with an artificially-induced
demand. Whenever the market is being disrupted by
a sell-off, the United States and its friends intervene.
At an agreed-upon hour, they begin buying massive
amounts of dollars, making speculators—individuals
or nations—more wary about their chances for profits
in currency dealings. Mr. Lange described the process
and opined that it would work today, but he did not
address changes in the international system since he
used coordinated intervention to good effect in the
past. His collaborator in some of the past interventions
was the Bundesbank; today he would have to work
through the European Central Bank, which probably
would be more prone to inaction because of the
conglomeration of nations which would have to be
consulted first. And he did not cover the remaining
international—particularly European (French and
German)—hostility over the war in Iraq. Nations that
would cooperate with the U.S. Treasury Department
during the Cold War may be much less likely to do so
in the current environment. Coordinated intervention
requires friends with similar interests. He did recognize
one of the challenges of coordinated intervention: It is
impossible to control a two-trillion-dollar market, even
with infusions of “$400 million in 20 minutes”.
If the selling of dollars is done for political
purposes—to hurt the United States, not for profit—
the selling nation may be willing to accept tremendous
losses to destabilize the U.S. currency. In that event, the
United States still has an option: ordering U.S. banks to
stop trading with the Bank of China (or whichever other
nation has initiated the action). As with coordinated
intervention, being effective in shutting down a nation’s
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bank requires allies; it will be much less likely to work
if it is applied only by the United States. As with Dr.
Graham’s threat of nationalization, this draconian
action should be attempted only as an absolutely last
resort, but having this “arrow in the quiver” makes a
destabilizing sell-off less likely.
Dr. Leif Rosenberger.
As might be expected from a representative of
Pacific Command, Dr. Leif Rosenberger focused on
China. He first presented what could be considered
a case study of how a “loser” in globalization might
turn out not to have been hurt as much as anticipated.
For that study, Dr. Rosenberger took the case of textile
manufacturers in China and Bangladesh. The latter—
and some other poor countries—had been protected
for years by an agreement that gave them guaranteed
U.S. and European Union (EU) markets. Without that
guarantee, the Chinese textile price was unbeatable.
When the agreement expired, Bangladeshis feared for
the loss of an industry that accounted for 80 percent
of their exports. In a separate action—for unrelated
reasons—at about the same time, China eliminated a
millennia-old agriculture tax, making farming a more
profitable enterprise. Unintentionally, this reduced the
flow of workers from rural areas to the urban centers,
making it much harder for textile manufacturers to
find the cheap labor they needed to maintain their
prices. Although at least some of the Chinese textile
exports to the United States increased tenfold in the
short-term, the offsetting action of elimination of the
agriculture tax very quickly returned the competitive
edge to Bangladesh and the other poor countries. What
Dr. Rosenberger failed to mention, though, was how
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often offsets like this occur. Offsets do occur, of course,
but the odds that two disparate actions will produce
offsetting actions in different countries probably are
low. More likely is a scenario in which one country
gains an edge over another, and the second country’s
industry simply withers on the vine. An offsetting
decision may be made, but the results would affect
a third country, not the one wounded by the first
action.
Dr. Rosenberger next made a long argument that
shared prosperity in Asia is good for all concerned. He
seemed to be saying that increased trade between China
and Japan and Australia, for example, makes conflict
between any two of them less probable. The same
would be true for trade between China and Taiwan: As
their mutual interests in prosperity coincide, the risk of
cross-straits war reduces. Unfortunately, that shared
prosperity also ties the hands of those desiring to act.
Some would argue that a war on the Korean peninsula
is much less likely because of the economic impact it
also would have on China and Japan. However, the
term “rogue actor” fits Kim Jong-Il better than most,
so American and Korean soldiers stationed in Korea
continue to be prepared for a no-notice war. If that war
(or war between Beijing and Taipei) started, America
could find its access to the region denied by those
countries too worried about the effect on their trade
with China. That near-term effect may not be the worst
result. China’s growing influence in the region would
be part of a zero-sum game with the United States.
American influence would decrease proportionately,
and the growth of a peer competitor would be possible
much sooner than many pundits predict.
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ENDNOTES - PANEL IV
1. For a look at the varying estimates (and their bases), see
Anthony Cordesman, “The Uncertain Cost of the Iraq War”
(working draft), Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and
International Studies, May 10, 2006, available at www.csis.org/
media/csis/pubs/060509_iraq_war_costs.pdf, accessed on July 27,
2006.
2. “Almost two-thirds [of Americans] say the U.S. economy is
getting worse, not better, and well less than half are willing to rate
the economy as excellent or good.” Frank Newport, “Americans
Still Dour on U.S. Economy,” Gallup News Service, July 17, 2006,
available at poll.gallup.com/content/default.aspx?ci=23782, accessed
on July 26, 2006.
3. This includes both de novo investment (as when Toyota buys
land and builds a factory in the United States) and acquisition of
U.S. firms (as the abortive attempt in 2005 by the China National
Offshore Oil Corporation to buy UNOCAL—the Union Oil
Company of California).
4. With approximately 18 percent of the U.S. manufacturing
base owned by foreign investors, Dr. Graham said that the
influence is pervasive. Some of these organizations (e.g., Britishand Dutch-owned Shell Oil and Belgian-owned Food Lion) have
been in the United States so long that they often are considered to
be American companies.
5. Available at www.treasury.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/legal/
statutes/twea.pdf, accessed July 27, 2006.
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PANEL IV
GLOBALIZATION AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY:
AN OVERVIEW OF SOME BASIC ISSUES
Dr. Edward M. Graham
Introduction.
“Globalization” has become a household term in
the United States only during the past 10 years or so,
and for many Americans, the term brings on fear of job
loss and/or U.S. economic decline. That it does so is
unfortunate for at least two reasons. First, globalization
is a process that has affected the economy of the
United States since at least the end of the 19th century
(yes, the 19th, not the 20th!) and, moreover, over this
whole course of time, the U.S. economy certainly has
not suffered on account of the process. Second, for the
overwhelming majority of Americans, globalization is
bringing net benefits, not harm, to them personally.1 The
benefits include goods and services that can be bought
at lower prices and greater product variety than would
be the case had there never been any globalization.
(Would most Americans, for example, really want to
go back to a time when Toyotas, Hondas, and Nissans
were not available in addition to Ford, General Motors,
and Chrysler vehicles, or to pay much higher prices—
and possibly have to give up altogether—the DVDs,
flat-panel TVs, compact cell phones, laptop computers,
and other high-end electronics products that now are
mostly imported into the United States?).
The benefits also include, for many—albeit not all—
Americans, better job prospects at higher wage rates
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than would be available in the absence of globalization.2
This is especially true for highly educated persons or
those who otherwise are technically skilled. It is true,
however, that some Americans, especially at the lowskill end of the labor spectrum, do suffer net losses
(either reduced wages or loss of job opportunity) as a
result of globalization, and account should be taken of
such persons.3 The total losses are, according to serious
measurement, significantly less than the gains from
globalization,4 but the losses do tend to be concentrated
upon persons who are at the lower end of the
economic scale in the United States. This concentration
is unfortunate; it almost surely exacerbates income
inequality in the United States. More could be done
to alleviate the suffering of those who are adversely
affected by globalization in this country. Moreover,
it curiously is true that Americans tend to weight the
costs of globalization more heavily than the benefits,
and this weighting in public attitudes, in turn, gives
more weight to the “negative” or “anti-globalist” side
of the debate over globalization than pure economic
considerations might suggest are appropriate.5
Globalization also does present some special issues
specifically relevant to national security. The essence
of globalization is greater interdependence among
national economies, including the U.S. economy, such
that some goods and services consumed in the United
States that once might have been produced in the
domestic economy by firms owned by U.S. nationals,
now are produced abroad and imported or perhaps
made in the United States but by foreign-owned firms.
The non-domestic location or ownership of production
enables cost reductions or greater product variety,
as already noted, and for certain goods and services
these factors actually can enhance national security,
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e.g., by freeing resources needed to produce an item at
home and enabling these resources then to be used to
produce goods or services of greater value for security
purposes.
But, even so, most Americans would not be
comfortable if certain goods and services of high
strategic importance were to be produced overseas
or by foreign nationals operating in the United States.
This is especially so if, in time of conflict, control of this
production were to enable foreign powers hostile to the
United States to gain access to technologies or other
information that, if retained exclusively in the Nation
or under national control, would give the United States
some sort of strategic advantage over these foreign
powers. This is true particularly where the information
or technology remaining exclusively under domestic
control is otherwise vital to national security. Also, in
some cases, there might be an opposite concern, notably
that foreign control of certain activities enables a foreign
power to withhold information from Americans where
this information is of import to national security.
Moreover, even if control of the production of the
goods or services did not impart such technology or
other information, Americans might be uncomfortable
if a foreign location of production were to render the
goods or services vulnerable to short supply in the
event of conflict.
Thus, there can be a significant security-related
tradeoff between the benefits of globalization (e.g.,
lower costs or greater product variety) and the risks
of supply interruption or loss of strategically-sensitive
information, including technology, that can ensue from
globalization. It is important not to exaggerate the
risks, however. One thinks of the example of the U.S.
textile and clothing industry, which in the early 1990s
mounted an advertising campaign claiming that U.S.
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policy allowing increased imports of clothing would
put at risk the domestic industry, such that in time of
war U.S. soldiers would have no battlefield clothing to
wear.
This claim, in fact, was bogus in the extreme for
three reasons. First, while much of U.S. demand for
clothing indeed was being met by imports, a substantial
U.S. apparel industry remained in place (and still
does). Indeed, one consequence of globalization has
been that, while certain U.S. sectors indeed shrink,
other sectors expand and, moreover, few—if any—of
the shrunken sectors disappear altogether. Second,
battlefield clothing is a highly specialized sub-sector
of the total apparel industry, and there was never
any danger whatsoever that this sub-sector would
disappear due to import competition. Third, even
had U.S. domestic production of (non-battlefield)
military clothing been shut down (it was not), most
such clothing needs could be provided by imports
from any of at least a dozen friendly nations. (Very
high tech battle gear, even in this last instance, would
continue to have been produced at home.) Thus, and in
a word, the textile industry was using “threats to the
U.S. national defense” as a front in a demand for plain,
old-fashioned protectionist policies against imports
(ones which, in fact, the industry already had secured,
so what was being sought at that time was still more
protectionism).
“National defense” has been advanced as a reason
for protectionism in other sectors, where defense-related
arguments for protection against imports again have been
bogus, or at least largely so. One thinks, for example, of
the steel industry, which consistently has claimed that
imports of steel pose a risk to the U.S. national defense,
even though the domestic industry has retained far
more capacity than is needed for defense production.
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In this case, it also is true that many traditional uses
of steel for military goods are disappearing, thanks to
new technologies, e.g., whereas armor once was made
100 percent of steel, modern armor consists largely of
composite materials not containing steel. Indeed, it is
possible in the future to envisage armored vehicles for
which only a limited number of parts, and perhaps
even none at all, are made of steel. Moreover, to the
extent that imports of certain goods create security
risks, in many cases those risks can be mitigated by
means that are less costly than import protection. For
example, if the risk is disruption of supply in times
of conflict or national emergency, strategic stockpiles
of the relevant material can be created. If the risk is
that the principle supplier is located in a country that
might prove to be an “unfriendly” in time of conflict,
alternative suppliers in more friendly countries can be
developed. Also, it must be remembered that, even in
times of war, many goods and services can continue
to be imported more economically from overseas than
produced domestically (international trade in certain
strategic goods flourished during World War II, for
example), and this is especially true for those goods or
services that can be obtained from multiple and diverse
sources.
Let us explore some of these facts and issues just
introduced in more detail. We will begin by looking
at some measures of the extent and consequences of
globalization.
How “Globalized” is the U.S. Economy,
and What Does this Mean for National Security?
Table 1 below indicates U.S. imports and exports,
broken into goods and services, for each of the
years 2005 and 1985. The numbers mostly speak for
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themselves, indicating the extent to which both imports
and exports, as a percent of gross domestic product
(GDP), have grown during the 20 years from 1985 to
2005. Imports thus were 9.7 percent of GDP in 1985 but
had grown to 16 percent in 2005. But U.S. exports have
also grown, from just under 7 percent of GDP in 1985
to more than 10 percent in 2005. Indeed, what surprises
some persons is that U.S. exports of goods have grown
as a percent of the national economy, although not by
as much as imports of goods. Such persons often tend
to think of “globalization” as a one-way street, whereby
domestic U.S. markets are captured increasingly by
imports while U.S. exports stagnate. This, in fact, has
not been so.
Indicator

Imports into
the U.S.
Of which:
Goods
Services
Exports from
the U.S.
Of which:
Goods
Services

Amount
($ billions)
1985

Percent of U.S.
GDP
1985

Amount
($ billions)
2005

Percent of U.S.
GDP
2005

411.0

9.7

1995.8

16.0

338.1
72.9

8.0
1.7

1674.3
321.6

13.4
2.6

289.1

6.9

1272.2

10.2

215.9
71.2

5.1
1.7

892.6
379.6

7.1
3.0

100.0

12487.1

100.0

Memo: U.S. GDP 4220.3
in current $

Note: Data do NOT include factor income.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; data available
on-line at www.bea.gov.

Table 1. Indicators of Globalization of the U.S.
Economy Exports and Imports of Goods and Services.
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Indeed, one category of U.S. exports—exports of
services— actually has been the fastest growing item in
Table 1; these exports jumped from 1.7 percent of GDP
in 1985 to 3.0 percent in 2005. In spite of this, many
trade policy specialists believe that the potential for U.S.
exports of services is greater than the figures in Table 1
indicate, and this potential is one reason why the U.S.
Government has placed priority on negotiation of “free
trade agreements” with a number of countries wherein
service sector opening is emphasized. Moreover, the
U.S. Government has supported continuance of work
in the World Trade Organization (WTO) on the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), an agreement
that came into force in 1995, but which most trade
policy analysts believe is “incomplete.”6
It is true that U.S. exports consistently have been
less than U.S. imports during the past 25 years or
so, creating a trade deficit, and this is the result of
macroeconomic factors. In recent times, the two such
factors that have most affected the U.S. trade deficit are
the Federal fiscal deficit and the low U.S. savings rate,
especially at the household level. An analysis of how
these factors create the U.S. trade deficit and why in the
long run this deficit almost surely is unsustainable are
contained in Mann and Plueck (2005).7 A consequence
of the large U.S. trade deficit is a continuing need for
international inflows of capital to finance the deficit.8
Were, at some point in the future, foreigners to
become reluctant to invest in the United States in the
amounts required to finance the trade deficit, the likely
consequence would be a very sharp depreciation of the
dollar. Such a depreciation eventually would “correct”
the trade deficit (that is, bring the value of U.S. imports
more into line with the value of exports) because prices
of imported goods to Americans would increase—and
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hence Americans would cut back their imports—and,
also, foreign prices of U.S. exports would decline,
causing foreigners to buy more American-made goods
and services. However, a precipitous decline of the
U.S. dollar almost surely would require rises in U.S.
interest rates (risking a recession) and, moreover, a
dollar decline would reduce the wealth of Americans
relative to the rest of the world.
Moreover, some analysts fear that a rapid decline of
the U.S. dollar could trigger an international financial
crisis. Thus, analysts do worry that the several
international “imbalances” caused by the U.S. trade
deficit could have serious effects on U.S. and world
economies sometime in the future. Even so, the United
States seems unprepared to take any action to correct
the imbalances, or at least that appears to be the case
at the time of this writing, and this could prove in the
future to create a major problem.
Globalization is not just about international trade,
however; a big piece of “globalization” has to do with
the spread of foreign-controlled economic activity
via international operations of multinational firms.
The standard measure of this activity is foreign direct
investment (FDI), which technically is the equity
component of international investors (i.e., the “parent”
firms of multinational firms, where the “parent” is the
home nation or headquarters firm9). A problem is that
foreign direct investment is a financial concept, not
a national income concept; it really makes no sense,
then, to calculate a ratio of FDI to GDP, as we have
done for international trade (imports and exports)
above. Imports and exports are components of national
income or national consumption, but FDI is not.
A better measure is value added by foreigncontrolled firms to the national economy. GDP, in

104

fact, is simply the sum of value added by all economic
activity, and thus value added by foreign-controlled
firms as a percentage of GDP is a number that makes
sense. The problem is that value added by foreigncontrolled firms is not a data item that is commonly
collected; indeed, even for the United States—and
we are a nation that collects a lot of data pertaining
to our economy—such data go back only a relatively
few years. (Multinational firms, by contrast, have been
around since the late 1800s.) Table 2 presents some
such data for the United States for 1997-2003, where
the 2003 data are the most recent available at the time
of this writing. The data indicate value added by
foreign firms in the economy both as a whole and in
the manufacturing sector.
Year

1997

1999

2001

2003

Total value added by foreign-controlled firms
($ billions)

313.7

397.3

417.1

486.3

Above as a percent of total U.S. GDP
Value added by foreign-controlled firms in
U.S. manufacturing ($ billions)
Above as a percent of total U.S. GDP

3.8

4.3

4.1

4.4

169.3

219.1

200.5

227.7

2.0

2.4

2.0

2.1

Above as a percent of U.S. mfg national
income

14.1

19.0

18.3

20.1

Memo: U.S. Mfg National Income as a percent
of U.S. GDP

14.4

12.4

10.8

10.3

8304.3

9268.4

10128.0

10971.2

1195.8

1150.3

1094.1

1133.4

Memo: U.S. GDP ($ billions)
Memo: U.S. Mfg National Income ($ billions)

10

Source: U.S. Commerce Department, Bureau of Economic Analysis. Data available on-line
at www.bea.com.

Table 2. Value-added by Foreign-controlled
Firms in the U.S. Economy.
A number of points can be made from the data of
Table 2. First, the line “U.S. manufacturing national
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income as a percent of U.S. GDP” tells the story that
the manufacturing sector as a whole in 1997 accounted
for only 14.4 percent of the U.S. economy, but that
this percent had declined to 10.3 percent by 2003.
Some of this decline doubtlessly is cyclical, because
manufacturing sectors are more sensitive to business
cycles than other sectors, and 2001 and 2003 were years
of economic slowdown, but much of it does seem to
be a long-term trend. But, second, value added by
foreign-controlled firms in the U.S. manufacturing
sector actually climbed somewhat in those years, from
2.0 percent of GDP in 1997 to 2.1 percent in 2003. It
follows that value added by foreign-controlled firms
in the U.S. manufacturing sector increased their share
of U.S. manufacturing national income in those years,
from 14.1 percent in 1997 to 20.1 percent in 2003.
Is this latter worrisome? One way to look at this
issue is that foreign-controlled firms do account, then,
for about one-fifth of all domestic U.S. manufacturing
activity. They also account for a fast-growing share of
this activity. On the other hand, of course, four-fifths of
U.S. manufacturing activity is under domestic control.
Moreover, in light of the fact that manufacturing is a
declining sector in the United States, it seems reasonable to claim that foreign-controlled activities in
this sector are contributing not to its decline (as has
been asserted), but rather to its preservation! Some
implications of this for the U.S. defense industrial base
are discussed in the final section of this essay.
Third, overall, foreign-controlled business activity
in the United States accounts for a rather small share of
the total U.S. GDP; this share was 3.8 percent in 1997,
but it did grow to 4.4 percent in 2003. In fact, the share
seems rather stable; in 1985, it was 3.5 percent.11
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Trying to Put All of This in Perspective.
A number of further points can be made pertaining
to globalization and the U.S. economy and globalization
of the world economy, ones that hopefully provide
some perspective on these two important sets of issues.
First is simply this: that, at the end of the day, for all
of the talk about “globalization,” the vast majority
of economic activity in the United States remains
basically domestic in nature. Thus, for example, of
annual “absorption” (net expenditures on goods and
services by domestic residents, including on imports)
in the United States in 2005 of $12.889 trillion,12 only
13 percent consisted of goods and services produced
outside the country, while 87 percent consisted of goods
and services produced in the United States. If one were
to be asked then, “How much of the U.S. economy is
‘globalized’?” a sensible answer would be “about 13
percent.” Moreover, as just noted, of all goods and
services produced in the United States, more than 95
percent is produced in business firms that are under
domestic control, and less than 5 percent in business
firms under foreign control. The point, of course, also
can be made that the U.S. economy is significantly more
integrated internationally, i.e., “globalized,” in 2005
than was the case only 20 years ago, and, also of course,
the economy is much more “globalized” than it was
40 or 50 years ago. Even so, the United States remains
a large economy that is, at the end of the day and by
almost any measure one can think of (and in this essay
we have examined a number of such measures), less
dependent upon foreign economies than some of the
rhetoric surrounding “globalization” might suggest.
At the same time, it must be remembered that the
trend towards “globalization” of the world economy
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is a phenomenon that affects all major nations of the
world. There is some tendency for certain economic
nationalists in the United States to talk as though
“globalization” is something that affects the United
States singularly. This is, with a moment’s thought,
simply not possible. Rather, almost by definition,
increased integration of the world’s economies implies
mutual interdependence, not dependence that extends
in one direction only. Here is an interesting fact in this
latter direction. There has been concern expressed,
as noted earlier, about the high degree of control of
domestic business activity by foreign investors in the
United States. As we have noted, this degree of control
is less than alarmists might have one think. But it also
is true that firms that are both based in the United
States and under domestic control hold more activities
outside the United States than foreign firms hold in the
United States. For this comparison, the stock of foreign
direct investment is a relevant measure. Foreign direct
investment in the United States totaled $1,709 billion at
the end of 2004, the latest data available. This is a large
number of course, but direct investment abroad by
U.S.-based firms at the end of 2004 was $2,367 billion.
Thus, if the United States is becoming more
dependent on the economies of other countries
(and if the message here is “we are becoming more
dependent, but let’s not exaggerate”), the economies
of other nations also are becoming more dependent
on foreigners (where, of course, from the point of
view of another country, the United States itself is a
“foreigner,” indeed, the biggest one). For example,
if one takes a close look at the economy of China,
where China is the nation most consistently identified
as a possible challenger to U.S. power in the coming
decades, this economy, in fact, is far more dependent
upon foreigners than is the U.S. economy.13
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An interesting fact is that nationalists in all nations,
and not just the United States, decry the increased
dependence upon other nations that currently is being
witnessed worldwide. For example, the rapid growth
of China, which, in turn, enables Chinese leaders to
dream of a future in which their nation is a global
power, is being driven in very large part by firms
in that nation that are under foreign control. Thus,
some Chinese nationalists wonder, and wonder quite
loudly, would it not be better for China if China could
somehow expel these firms and put a greater share
of its economy—especially in the high technology
sectors—under purely domestic control.
The answer to this last question, in fact, is probably
“no.” In thinking about this, this author thinks about
his recent purchase of a laptop computer. The price,
after a rebate from the manufacturer (Hewlett-Packard)
was $800 plus change. The computer itself was made in
China, but from components imported from the United
States (CPU), South Korea and/or Taiwan (memory),
Singapore (hard drive and DVD), and other locations.
The benefits of globalization are embodied highly in
this machine (the last time I bought a laptop had been
7 years earlier; I had paid over $2,000 for a machine
that had considerably less capabilities, not to mention
a much smaller screen), but this type of product also
has enabled China to become a major producer and
exporter of advanced electronic products. Would this
have been possible without massive foreign investment
in China? Probably not! It is exactly because China has
become part of the global economy, via this investment,
that it has been able to modernize, grow, and turn itself
into a rising power. But that I paid less than half what
I did 7 years ago for a better product also might not
have been possible without this investment. Thus, my
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new laptop represented a “win/win” for China and
the United States; I, as an American, benefited, but so
did China and a number of other countries as well.
Some Last Thoughts on Globalization
and National Security.
The points raised in the previous section
notwithstanding, there are activities that Americans
would, for national security reasons, want to remain
on U.S. soil and/or under domestic U.S. control. The
production of advanced weapons systems, for example,
surely is one of these. But how “far down the line”
does production “on U.S. soil and under U.S. control”
actually go? Do we care if major components of these
systems (e.g., memory chips, flat panel displays, etc.)
are sourced from abroad or from non-U.S. controlled
firms?
The answer to the latter is probably “no, we don’t
care” if the component in question is produced in
a number of places or by a number of firms, so that
the United States is not dependent excessively upon
just one or a small number of production locations or
producers. But what is the threshold where either of
these numbers becomes too small? It can be difficult to
say. One issue in this matter is whether or not, in times
of national emergency, a domestic alternative source
of supply could be established and how quickly. If a
domestic alternative could be quickly established, we
might be willing to deal with a very small number of
suppliers; but if domestic entry were to be difficult, we
might still not worry if the number of foreign suppliers
were sufficiently diverse that the risk of a complete
cutoff of supply was to be negligible.
Implicit in the above is that the component not
embody a technology that uniquely is held in the United
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States, and where that technology conveys a defenserelated advantage to the U.S. military. But in assessing
whether such a technology figures, it is important to
distinguish between one that is truly unique and one
that, at the end of the day, is not. Here is an example
of what this author would argue is the “wrong case”
to be made for preservation of a U.S. technological
capability: “We don’t want to be dependent upon
foreigners for this type of product.” When this line of
argumentation is made, it is often the case that not only
does the relevant technology not reside uniquely in the
United States, it is often the case that the leading edge
of the technology has shifted to foreigners (e.g., in the
production of memory chips, Samsung, a South Korean
firm, at the moment seems to be the most advanced
producer of these). In such a case, what the “wrong
case” thinking can lead to is this: The U.S. military buys
from a domestic source where, in fact, a foreign source
not only can supply the same product at a lower price,
but can supply a better version of the product than can
the domestic source. This makes no sense whatsoever
unless, perhaps, there is some possibility of a criticallyshort supply in the event of a national emergency.
The main point, then, is this: There, indeed, are
some activities that, for security purposes, should be
maintained domestically and under domestic control.
But there are many wrong reasons for designating a
particular activity as one of these. Indeed, there are
situations where to maintain domestic supply under
domestic control could be costly and not provide any
security benefit to the United States. What activities
should not be under foreign control, then, is a difficult
question. In fact, with respect to foreign takeovers of
U.S. firms, there is in place a review mechanism, under
the Exon-Florio provision of the Defense Production
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Act, that is meant to make this sort of determination.
Has this provision worked well? In fact, the ExonFlorio provision and the inter-agency committee that
implements the law have been subject during the
past year to considerable congressional scrutiny and
criticism, most of it misplaced (the review process, in
fact, has worked quite well)14. There are those members
of Congress who would pass legislation to modify the
review process and perhaps to force the process to take
seriously bogus arguments for maintaining domestic
control of activities that could, without damage to
U.S. national security, be maintained under foreign
control.
A final word: What if a technology exists that is
security-sensitive but is also dominated by a foreign
firm? What is the best course of action for the United
States to take then? This author would suggest that the
best option is to encourage that firm to produce those
products that embody that particular technology right
here in the United States. If foreign control of a securitysensitive technology is simply a fact of life (and in some
instances it will be; the United States cannot be best at
everything, as much as we might like it to be!), it is
better to have the relevant production facilities on U.S.
soil than elsewhere. This is true because, in times of
war or other national emergency, the U.S. Government
can seize control over the facilities if necessary, under
either the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (IEEPA) of 1977 or, more drastically, under the
Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917. Indeed, the
latter act was used to seize German investments in
the United States during World War I. At that time,
German firms in the chemicals sector dominated the
technology of high explosives, and this dominance
early in World War I conveyed significant advantages
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to the Germans. But the German industry had invested
abroad and especially heavily in the United States.
The net result was that we, too, had access to these
technologies when we needed them to use against the
Germans. This might not have been the case had the
German investments in the United States never been
made, perhaps as the result of misguided legislation
to restrict foreign ownership in strategically-sensitive
sectors had such legislation been passed in, say, 1905.
Of course, no such legislation was passed, and the U.S.
war effort in 1917-18 benefited accordingly. And may
the obvious lesson not be forgotten.
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PANEL IV
THE ECONOMIC RISE OF CHINA:
COMMERCIAL THREAT OR BLESSING?
Dr. Leif Rosenberger
Is China a commercial threat? Or is China a
commercial blessing due to what can be called shared
prosperity? To address these questions, analysis of the
following four case studies can be helpful:
• The rise and fall of China’s commercial threat to
Bangladesh;
• A comparison and contrast of the ChinaAustralia economic relationship with the U.S.Australian economic relationship;
• The U.S. trade deficit with China; and,
• The China-Taiwan economic relationship.
Bangladesh.
A decent start is exploration of China’s commercial
threat to Bangladesh from January 1, 2005—the day
something called the Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA)
expired. MFA was a system of textile quotas for poor
countries like Bangladesh. It gave textile producers
guaranteed export markets with the European Union
and the United States. After the MFA was eliminated,
countries like Bangladesh, Cambodia, and Indonesia
were afraid they could not compete head-to-head with
China. Why not?
For the 6 years between 1998 and 2004, China
had price deflation in textiles and other low-end
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manufacturing. Simply put, the “China price” was
unbeatable. Those poorer countries benefiting from
the MFA worried they would not be able to compete
with China. A number of people told them, though,
“Don’t worry; be happy. It will take China a long
time to capture new market shares after January 1,
2005.” Market events proved them wrong. In the first
quarter of 2005, China’s cotton shirt sales to the U.S.
skyrocketed 1,250 percent from the same period in 2004.
Similarly, China’s cotton trouser sales in the United
States increased 1,500 percent from the same period in
2004. Bangladesh, in particular, was on the ropes, on
the verge of losing an industry that accounted for 80
percent of its exports and had lifted 13 percent of the
country’s poor households out of poverty.
The 9/11 Commission Report says, “When people
lose hope, the breeding grounds for violent extremism
are created.” As hope became a scarce commodity
in Bangladesh following the MFA expiration and
its unpredicted impact, violent extremist groups
moved into the vacuum, blaming the United States
for globalization and its adverse effects. Although
incorrect, the perception of U.S.-caused social and
economic injustice was pervasive. Violent extremists
in Bangladesh were planning to exploit this ill-advised
but pervasive perception of social and economic
injustice. Again, some pundits said, “Don’t worry; be
happy. We’ve beefed up the capacity of the Bangladeshi government to counter terrorism. All is well.”
Of course, building capacity to counter terrorism was
necessary, but not sufficient. (If success at capacitybuilding was a silver bullet, there would be no terrorism
in Israel—because God knows the Israeli military has
no shortfall in capacity.)
At this point, the socio-economic demand for violence was rising. Frustrated people were at risk of buy116

ing the propaganda of violent extremists. Unfortunately, in August 2005, the worst fears were played out
when Bangladesh suffered through 500 bombings in
one month. But at a time when things looked especially
bleak in Bangladesh, things were changing in China
that would reverberate in every nook and cranny in
the international business world and would reduce the
demand for violent extremism in Bangladesh. Social
unrest was rising in the Chinese countryside. In 2005,
there were 87,000 public disturbances, a 13 percent rise
over 2004. In an effort to placate at least some of its
apparently restive populace, Beijing in September 2005
announced that the agriculture tax would be eliminated
in 2006. This unprecedented step—the agriculture tax
dates back over 2,000 years—would benefit 730 million
Chinese farmers. Many Chinese farmers opted to stay
on the farm as the elimination of the tax improved their
lives in rural China, but that produced an unintended
consequence. It meant fewer migrant workers were
leaving the countryside and looking for work in the
cities.
Now imagine the person running a textile factory in
Shanghai. He now has a shortfall of workers knocking
on the doors looking for work. How will he attract
more textile workers? The supply-demand curve
suggests that higher wages would be required, and in
2005, there was a double-digit rise in Chinese wages.
And the rising wages did not just happen in the textile
industry; wages rose across the board in Chinese lowend manufacturing. As a result, Chinese manufacturing
competitiveness declined in 2005, and China is no
longer the producer of lowest cost in low-end manufacturing. Who benefited from rising production costs in
China? Textile factories in Bangladesh, along with those
in India, Cambodia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. In
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Bangladesh, textile factories are over-booked, the way
China used to be.
Now imagine the recruiter or propaganda specialist
for a violent extremist group in Bangladesh. He has
been bashing the United States and globalization. With
orders for textiles pouring into Bangladesh factories,
bashing globalization loses its punch. As the number
of textile jobs rise in Bangladesh, textile workers now
see globalization as a blessing, not a curse. Job creation
in Bangladeshi textile factories helps to reduce the
socio-economic demand for extremist violence.
The China-Australia and U.S.-Australia
Economic Relationships.
Juxtapose the effect of globalization in a poor
country like Bangladesh with a relatively rich country
like Australia. Is China’s economic rise a commercial
threat or a blessing to Australia? The answer to this
question—at least commercially—is a “no brainer.”
Australia’s economic ties with China are booming,
with Sino-Australian merchandise trade skyrocketing
248 percent between 2000 and 2005. In contrast, the
United States is losing its economic high ground with
Australia, with U.S.-Aussie trade being virtually flat,
only growing 13 percent in the same time frame.
Beyond commerce, though, the answer is more
difficult to discern. At a strategic level, China’s shared
prosperity with Australia can be seen as positive: Their
shared prosperity gives both China and Australia a
stake in stability and makes war less likely. But Pacific
Command plans for worst-case scenarios. What if war
breaks out between China and Taiwan? In that case,
China’s shared prosperity with countries in the region
increases the risk for the U.S. military, which may be
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denied operational access to bases and places in Asia—
including Australia—because of their economic and
other links to China. In other words, China’s military
strategy of access denial is enhanced by their shared
prosperity with Australia. Some evidence suggests
that this effect already is being seen: Back in August
2004, Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer
publicly told Beijing that Australia was not bound to
help the United States defend Taiwan in the event of
a China-Taiwan military conflict. Today—20 months
later—Australia’s trade with China dwarfs its trade
with the United States. Australia has significant
incentive to bend over backwards not to antagonize
China and not to jeopardize this highly-prized
economic relationship.
But Australia is not alone. Even Japan—with
longstanding security ties with the United States
and with ongoing political strains with China—now
trades more with China than with the United States.
The United States undoubtedly can expect some
operational military support from Japan in a ChinaTaiwan scenario. But the nature and extent of Japanese
support to the United States arguably would be less
than if Japan had nothing to lose and had virtually
no economic equities to weigh with China. Japan’s
booming exports to China are critical to sustaining
Japan’s long-awaited recovery, so Tokyo will think
twice before jumping on the U.S. bandwagon against
China in a China-Taiwan conflict. That would be
especially true if Taiwan were to trigger the war. Of
course, there would also be considerable pressure
from the U.S. business community to make sure any
China-Taiwan conflict does not trigger a larger U.S.China war. That community—with billions of dollars
invested in China—is not the only one in the United
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States that would want to avoid expansion of the war:
U.S. consumers benefit from low-cost Chinese goods
they buy at Wal-Mart.
U.S. Trade Deficit with China.
In contrast to Australia’s positive economic
perceptions of China, the United States sees China
as much more of a commercial threat. U.S. Senators
Lindsey Graham (R-SC) and Charles Schumer (D-NY)
argue that China’s foreign exchange rate against the
U.S. dollar is 20 percent to 30 percent undervalued,
which underprices Chinese exports. The two Senators
view China’s 2.1 percent revaluation in July 2005 as
a drop in the bucket. Their bill would raise tariffs by
27.5 percent on all Chinese-made goods coming into
the United States unless China strengthens its yuan
(or renminbi) currency by a comparable percentage
against the U.S. dollar. China also could be designated
a currency manipulator, triggering immediate U.S.China foreign exchange rate talks. This is just one of
the laundry list of economic problems that need to be
discussed at the highest levels of both governments.
That said, much of the U.S. bashing of China for
its $200 billion trade surplus is ill-advised. If the U.S.
trade deficit with all of Asia for the past decade is
examined, not much has changed. What has changed
is the breakdown of U.S. trade with Asia. The United
States used to have relatively high trade deficits
with many countries in Asia. Now many of these
trade deficits have fallen as the U.S. trade deficit has
risen with China. Why? It is all about supply chain
management in international business. For instance,
Japanese and South Korean companies have moved
their final assembly of products to China. It stands to
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reason that the U.S. trade deficit with China would rise
now that final assembly is in China.
Interestingly enough, the United States asked
Beijing to open China to foreign direct investment
(FDI), and the Chinese did so—far more than Japan or
South Korea have done. Yet some people in the U.S.
Government are bashing China for what are really
international business decisions to relocate to the
cheaper production opportunities there. In addition,
those U.S. Government bashers of China who point to
the Chinese trade deficit as a threat to the United States
need to learn more about the nature of these so-called
Chinese exports. About 60 percent of these “Chinese
exports” are made by foreign-funded or whollyowned companies based in China. The percentage
is even greater—at 80 percent to 90 percent—if the
analysis is narrowed to high-technology exports. A
Chinese political leader might very well ask, “Is foreign
domination of Chinese exports—especially in the hightech sector—such a good thing for China?” Finally, if
the Chinese yuan is so undervalued, the same complaint
should be heard from the many Asian countries with
foreign exchange rates that they keep at least loosely
tied to the U.S. dollar to boost their export-led growth.
But only the United States is complaining. Why? For
starters, much of Asia is running a trade surplus with
China. Nevertheless, the odds are rising that the United
States will use trade sanctions against China.
The China-Taiwan Economic Relationship.
A few words about the China-Taiwan economic
relationship also are warranted. That relationship
should be viewed as a continuum with economic
nationalism at one extreme and shared prosperity at
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the other extreme. Unfortunately, Taiwan is moving
in the wrong direction toward economic nationalism,
putting Taipei on a collision course with Beijing and
Taiwan businessmen.
Taipei now has strict regulations on Taiwanese
investment on the mainland. For instance, Taiwanese
companies can not invest over $100 million on the
mainland. If Taiwanese companies want to invest
more, Taipei demands that those companies make
financially unattractive investments in Taiwan. At first
glance, Taiwan’s new regulations seem to threaten
China’s economic security if Taiwanese companies
abandon investment on the mainland. That is because
Taiwanese companies have been at the forefront of
China’s economic growth. Over 60,000 Taiwanese
businesses now operate on the mainland. Officially,
Taiwan’s business investment on the mainland is $48
billion. However, Taiwan’s central bank puts this
figure at $70 billion and private estimates of Taiwan’s
investments suggest that the total may run over $100
billion.
Taiwanese companies simply may not submit
to the measures; they are considering taking drastic
actions. Many Taiwanese businesses are considering
cutting ties altogether with Taiwan and moving their
headquarters to China. If so, Taiwan’s heavy-handed
micro-management and economic nationalism would
backfire, resulting in a loss of tax revenue to Taiwan’s
treasury.
This certainly would forestall any increase in
Taiwan’s military budget. Such a scenario would
widen the military gap between China and Taiwan.
Just for starters, China’s economy is four to five
times larger than Taiwan’s economy. Additionally,
China’s economic growth has been about twice that of
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Taiwan’s for the past decade, and the U.S. Department
of Defense says China is spending a larger percent of its
gross domestic product (GDP) on defense than Taiwan.
Pacific Command has been trying to get Taiwan to
increase its military spending from 2.3 percent of GDP
to 3 percent of GDP. If Taiwanese businesses move en
masse to the mainland and stop paying taxes to Taiwan,
the government will be challenged to continue its
defense—and other—spending. The U.S. government
needs to dissuade Taipei from this reckless zero-sum
game, to move away from economic nationalism and
toward shared prosperity with the mainland.
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PANEL IV
THE DOLLAR AS A COMMODITY
OF STRATEGIC NATIONAL INTEREST
Mr. John D. Lange
Providing adequate economic support for a nation
at war requires a strong currency, but the dollar is
buffeted by deficits, among other economic currents.
What are the risks of a collapse of the dollar? And what
can be done to prevent it?
Risks of a Collapse of the Dollar.
The United States has enormous fiscal and balanceof-payments deficits which are unsustainable. They
are like a “double tsunami” that reduces the value of
the dollar while simultaneously reducing the incentive
for other nations to buy dollars. Barring unforeseen
circumstances, this “double tsunami” will weigh on
the value of the dollar sooner or later. China alone
is holding $400 billion in U.S. Treasury debt and
accumulating more. Should China and other foreign
holders of U.S. debt have enough, they eventually will
decide to stop buying American dollars and even may
start to sell dollars for other currencies. If China cannot
find ready buyers, the price of the dollar will decline.
What happens then? At least four things, each of them
major political problems for the White House:
1. The Japanese yen and the euro will rise in value.
So will the Chinese yuan (or renminbi), the Korean won,
etc. The cost of imported goods will soar.
2. The U.S. Treasury will find a suddenly shrinking
market to finance its fiscal deficit. The interest rate on
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Treasury bonds will soar and so will other rates of
interest. Monthly mortgage payments on homes will
rise sharply for those homeowners with adjustable rate
mortgages.
3. Businesses will pass the increasing cost of their
operating capital to consumers in the form of higher
prices. In short, the United States will have significant
inflation.
4. Oil is priced at the well-head in dollars. So
are airline tickets and much of the world trade in
other goods and services. If the dollar collapses and
confidence in U.S. Treasury bonds evaporates, that
will not last. The global economic community may be
set adrift or—perhaps worse—the currency of a nation
with values antithetical to those of the United States
will replace the dollar.
Preventive—or Compensatory—Steps.
The foreign exchange market has some
transparency, so it is easy enough to discern that China
holds nearly half-a-trillion dollars in the market. While
that is clearly a large amount, the daily turnover—
purchases and sales—in the foreign exchange market
is approximately two trillion dollars each day! The
foreign exchange market is active almost 24 hours each
day and very deep. Although they would be unwilling
to pay the premium price China desires, buyers in
the market will meet any dollar sell-off by China. The
Chinese would be stupid to sell too much too soon and
trigger a major loss in the value of its savings in foreign
assets, but governments occasionally do what seem to
others to be stupid things. If China decides that a large
sell-off—even at great expense to themselves—is the
right thing to do, the United States still has a first line
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of defense. It is called coordinated intervention, a term
especially familiar to macroeconomists and one which
should be familiar to all national security strategists.
The Treasury has conducted coordinated foreign
exchange market intervention before. In the 1990s, the
dollar was weak and weakening beyond fundamental
economic justification. The downward trend was
fueled by speculators using rumors and faux analysis
to foment sell-offs. Germany and Japan agreed with
the United States that it was time to do something.
Over a 2-year period, the United States found moments
when the market was quiet and when the short-term
debt positions of the speculators were vulnerable.
At the same moment in the day, the Bundesbank sold
massive amounts of deutschmarks (DM), the Bank of
Japan sold yen, and the U.S. Treasury sold DM and yen
from the Exchange Stabilization Fund. For example, in
20 minutes one morning, the U.S. Treasury sold $400
million in DM and yen. Germany and Japan took similar
steps at the same time. Even in a market measured in
trillions of dollars per day1, that got the attention of the
speculators.
So what if this game does not work the next time?
What if China sells massive amounts of dollars to
destabilize the United States for political reasons?
China must know that the United States has a trump
card. While it has never been necessary before, the U.S.
Treasury—acting in concert with the European Central
Bank and the Bank of Japan—could and probably
would forbid banks to buy dollars or dollar assets from
the Bank of China. A draconian measure, this would
be tantamount to defaulting on U.S. Treasury debt,
with all that implies. That would be done only under
extreme financial duress, but—like many things in this
business—no options are off the table.
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ENDNOTES - LANGE
1. In the intervention period cited (1993-96), the daily turnover
was $1.5 trillion per day. E-mail message from Mr. John D. Lange,
received August 23, 2006.
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PANEL V
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND NATIONAL
SECURITY CONTEXT:
COMPETING LEGAL ISSUES
General.
In at least one narrow legal sense, America is not at
war: There has been no constitutionally-required Senate
declaration of war against any of the current foes of the
Nation. As with the various non-declared wars fought
since World War II, that distinction appears to be of
little significance. President George W. Bush might
have been able to follow the lead of former presidents
in circumventing the attempt by Congress to limit
presidential authority to lead the nation to war,1 but
explicit congressional authority has been granted for
broad action against terrorists2 and specifically against
Iraq.3
The long-term degradation of Congress’ role in
declaring war is a valid subject for in-depth discussion,
but is generally a U.S. domestic issue. When war has
not been declared, though, questions of international
law—and morality—arise very quickly4 and usually
revolve around two parts: jus ad bellum and jus in
bello. The former asks if the reasons for going to war
(casus belli) are legitimate; the latter asks if the war
is being fought in a proper way. A less well-known
part, jus post bellum, asks about the justice of the peace
settlement, to include the trying of war criminals. The
American view of all three parts of the theory has been
assailed internationally and domestically for the wars
in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Although some question
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of proportionality still can be asked, responding to
the 9/11 terrorist attacks by deposing the Taliban in
Afghanistan should be allowed under just war theory
as a response to an unprovoked attack. The attack into
Iraq has less international legal justification, especially
since it now seems clear that intelligence about weapons
of mass destruction in the country and the nexus
between Iraq and al-Qai’da or other terrorist groups
was grossly overstated. Although they may be rare
exceptions to the rule, recent revelations of possible
war crimes by American soldiers and Marines in Iraq
leads to questions about how justly the war is being
fought. The line between jus in bello and jus post bellum
may be crossed, but the treatment of enemy detainees5
in Afghanistan and Iraq is another cause for concern.
Similarly, the planned trials of the detainees may not
be following international precedent or U.S. law.
In his remarks introducing the panel, Colonel
Dave Gordon said that the United States long has
been a proponent of the rule of law and should
continue to provide an example of adherence to that
standard (“Americans should be the good guys”). The
challenge, of course, is doing so even in a war in which
the enemy regularly and egregiously violates the laws
of armed conflict. Failure to maintain the moral high
ground, though, has an adverse impact in the court of
public opinion, both domestically and internationally.
Describing the law as a “front” in the current war,
Colonel Gordon introduced the term “lawfare” and
described it as when “legal matters are used by our
opponents as a way of attacking us and degrading
our position in public opinion. . . .” As an example,
he cited the mistreatment of detainees at Abu Ghraib
prison in Iraq. According to Colonel Gordon, this was
an aberration, and those responsible were investigated
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and punished appropriately, but the enemy seized
upon it as evidence of bad faith by the United States
and U.S. unwillingness to “play by its own rules.”
He also cited the tendency of the enemy to publicize
legitimate—though unfortunate—collateral damage in
Afghanistan and other places as evidence of wanton
attacks on civilians by U.S. forces. Although the
definition has some merit, these examples are better
used as illustrations of information warfare. Other
definitions6 and examples of lawfare may provide
greater fidelity on the conundrum facing America
when the rule of law—which the United States
traditionally supports—is used to limit its ability to
fight foes that ignore the law except when it is to their
advantage. In lawfare, a foe—unable to address an
issue symmetrically—turns to the field of international
or domestic law to achieve its military goals. A better
example might be the use of the International Court of
Justice to condemn the building of a defensive fence
by Israel.7 In this forum, the plaintiffs attempted in
court to eliminate a barrier that they could not remove
militarily. Another good example is the potential
use of cases in the International Criminal Court as
political tools to limit U.S. military action.8 Although
the term may not be defined precisely, lawfare—used
by both U.S. foes and friends, as well as by the United
States itself—undoubtedly will continue to be a part
of the geostrategic environment. As the 2005 National
Defense Strategy says, “Our strength as a nation state
will continue to be challenged by those who employ a
strategy of the weak using international fora, judicial
processes, and terrorism.”9
The issue of lawfare is related to another
conundrum: whether to address terrorism as a law
enforcement issue or as a military/warfare issue. The
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answer undoubtedly is some combination of the two
approaches, but this and the other issues raised by the
panelists suggest that the role of the law in the Global
War on Terrorism (GWOT) needs to evolve. As Colonel
Gordon articulated, that is normal when a conflict
enters uncharted territory.
Dr. Michael F. Noone.
Dr. Michael Noone addressed what he termed
GWOT anomalies: actions taken by U.S. operatives
(military and covert) that do not adhere to the rule of
law,10 and for which the administration has offered no
compelling justification. Dr. Noone asserted that the
U.S. military has lost the moral high ground—both
internationally and domestically—by these extralegal activities, but believes that some of that ground
can be regained by providing public justification for
the changes in customary law that are required by the
changing circumstances of the GWOT. That justification
has to be more than the British offered for its “Special
Air Service dirty war” against the Irish Republican
Army (IRA). Their response was essentially, “These
are big boys’ games, played by the big boys’ rules.”
Dr. Noone spent the majority of his time explaining
why traditional analysis of the discrete legal problems
of the GWOT has not been satisfactory. Much of the
international legal community points to the United
Kingdom’s (UK) “troubles” in northern Ireland and
asks why the United States would not treat its own
terrorist problems similarly. That is probably at best a
false dichotomy: The IRA was a domestic threat with
a hierarchical structure, whose members wanted to
avoid capture and who generally eschewed attacks
that would produce large numbers of casualties. They
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also had no expressed interest in acquiring and using
weapons of mass destruction. The distinctions in alQai’da—geographic dispersion, cellular structure,
disregard for their own safety, willingness to inflict
maximum numbers of casualties among civilians—are
remarkable. Some of these differences, though, simply
make law enforcement difficult or inconvenient,
neither of which offer adequate justification for
extraordinary extra-legal methods. The problem is
that law enforcement is ineffective in today’s conflict
environment. The American and international legal
systems are built on the concept of justice that convicts
perpetrators of crimes, not on preventing crimes (except
in the sense that convicting one perpetrator might deter
another). There is little or no prophylactic effect if a
law enforcement philosophy is applied to the GWOT.
Justice requires due process, but the presentation
of evidence in a regular criminal court of law easily
could compromise intelligence sources and collection
methods. Unreasonable searches are prohibited unless
a subject is suspected of acting as the agent of a foreign
government. Finally, and perhaps most important, the
post-trial penalties that normally follow conviction in
criminal court are ineffective in achieving their normal
goals: deterrence of others’ similar behavior and
removal from society until rehabilitation occurs. Such
penalties do not convince suicide bombers to change
their minds.
The 1998 bombings of two of its embassies in
Africa led the United States to adopt a new standard,
sometimes called “law enforcement plus,” exemplified
by the extra-legal action of calling for the killing
of Osama bin Laden if he could not be arrested or
otherwise captured. In normal criminal law, the violator
of the law still is protected by the law, both domestic
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and international. Human rights law, in particular,
might not have allowed the taking of bin Laden’s life
except in self-defense. Like the Bush administration a
few years later, the Clinton administration offered no
specific public justification for the action with regard to
bin Laden, but the changed threat assessment after the
1998 bombings seemed to warrant the extraordinary
step taken.
Under the law of armed conflict, the law generally
does not protect the violator; in fact, it authorizes
at least some level of reciprocity when violations
occur. Because there is still some application of law
enforcement standards, the post-9/11 philosophy
might be characterized as “belligerency minus.”
There is still some effort to act in accordance with
law enforcement requirements, but the laws of armed
conflict are applied more frequently, as in the killings
in Yemen in 2002. The individuals killed—including a
U.S. citizen—were identified as belligerent combatants
and their deaths were allowed under the law of armed
conflict. This, of course, has some penalty: If they are
combatants, they should be afforded protections as
prisoners of war when captured, and some of their
actions (except war crimes) as a combatant may be
immunized.
Dr. Noone was not arguing that the steps taken
by the United States were inappropriate; instead, he
seemed more than willing to accept that the changed
circumstances of the GWOT required changes in the
law. He insisted, though, that some public justification
of those extra-legal steps is required. The U.S. domestic
population seems to accept those extra-legal actions,
seeing the tradeoff with their own security. While the
domestic audience also could appreciate the debate, the
public justification is most needed with the internation-
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al community, which sees America arrogantly refusing
to justify the extra-legal steps being taken simply
because it can act with impunity. Dr. Noone suggests
that the appropriate forum for the discussion is
Congress, which should “live up to its constitutional
obligations to make laws for the U.S. Armed Forces
and to monitor their execution.” In suggesting this, Dr.
Noone ignored the fact that the Congress generally has
been put on the sidelines by the consolidation of much
power in the office of the President, a trend that started
well before the 9/11 attacks, but that has accelerated
since. Nonetheless, Dr. Noone believes that it would
be easy to convene a panel of specialists in the law
of armed conflict to answer questions about what is
wrong with that law today and how to relook the law
in light of the current situation. He believes that the
panel would suggest no major changes—probably no
changes at all in treaties and only moderate changes
in customary law—but that the hearings would go a
tremendous distance in achieving democratic domestic
support and much-needed international support.
Rear Admiral (Retired) Jane G. Dalton.
At the beginning of her presentation—after a brief
interlude to say that the Global War on Terrorism could
have been more appropriately named—Rear Admiral
Jane Dalton said that the international community was
clearly supportive of the American decision to go to
war following the attacks of 9/11. Accordingly, she
questioned how the international community could
now conclude that the war against al-Qai’da and
international terrorism is over simply because the alQai’da leadership has fled Afghanistan. Although
much of the leadership may have been routed there,
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al-Qai’da still actively seeks ways to attack the United
States, so the threat and the rationale for the GWOT
still exist. Unfortunately, the problem the international
community has with the GWOT is with Iraq, not
necessarily Afghanistan or al-Qai’da. Although Rear
Admiral Dalton did not address the war in Iraq, the
current administration’s position is that the war there
is part of the GWOT. International support of the war
against al-Qai’da may still exist; it is the war in Iraq that
so much of the rest of the world finds ignominious.
After first stating that changing international treaties
would be next to impossible—because of both lawfare
and hyperbolic reactions to proposed changes—Rear
Admiral Dalton seemed in general agreement with Dr.
Noone’s ideas about the need to adapt the customary
aspects of international law. In her comments, she
identified the need for international support in this
effort. Since changes to customary law evolve through
state practice, there is no need to negotiate treaties –
or find universal international consensus – to change
customary law. Nonetheless, customary law changes
develop slowly and require general consensus through
the practice of those states most particularly affected
by the law in question. Changes cannot be applied
unilaterally, but not all nations have to agree for the
United States to have a firmer foundation for its extralegal actions.
In the remainder of her presentation, Rear Admiral
Dalton provided several maritime examples of where
customary law should be adapted. The first point
covered the boarding of ships. If a warship’s commander
believes a ship is engaged in piracy, he legally can board
the ship to search for evidence and to stop the activity.
Despite efforts to get terrorism internationally branded
in the same way as piracy, no similar right exists for
boarding ships suspected of supporting terrorism or
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violating nonproliferation regulations. This may reflect
the difficulty in distinguishing one man’s terrorist
from another man’s freedom fighter. The United States
nonetheless should assert the right—under the rules of
self defense—to board those ships. Protests by nations
like the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea—which
called such actions a “brigandish naval blockade”—
perhaps cannot be ignored in diplomatic channels, but
should not gain much traction with other nations.
Another maritime example covers hospital ships,
which are protected as vessels of mercy. Current
treaties are interpreted to permit the crews of hospital
ships to carry small arms for defense of themselves
and their patients, but not to carry other armaments.
Unfortunately, the brutal enemy the United States
faces today has shown no proclivity to respect that
convention. The United States probably needs to assert
the right to provide better armaments to those ships,
while still maintaining their protected status.
The concept of a “war” on terror has resulted in
some apparent incongruities in U.S. practice. One
example is seen in the U.S. Navy action to replace active
duty sailors on U.S. warships with civilian mariners. If
the war on terrorism is not really a war and the U.S. is
not engaged in an international armed conflict, then it
does not matter whether civilians on warships operate
the propulsion plant, navigate the ship or serve on
boarding parties to take down a terrorist platform. But
if the U.S. is engaged in a war, then replacing active duty
sailors with civilian mariners may call into question
whether the civilians are taking a direct part in armed
conflict, thus risking their protected status as “civilians
accompanying the force”. Although the enemy in the
GWOT has shown no tendency to respect that right,
the United States probably should stop this blurring
of the line between combatants and noncombatants.
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Enforcing the law of armed conflict is undoubtedly
easier when the enforcer is above reproach. Detainees
being held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, under the rules
of war may rightly claim that the state of war cannot
be applied unevenly: either a state of war exists and
civilians should not be engaged in direct participation
in armed conflict, or the Nation is not at war and the
status of the detainees might have to be reexamined.
Professor Charles Garraway.
The fear of lawfare might be compared to the fear
of individual or organizational lawsuits. Some people
or organizations so fear lawsuits that they become
immobilized. Others accept some prudent risk and
continue to pursue their goals. Professor Charles
Garraway suggested that the perception is that Europe
is already in the immobilized category, while the
United States is carefully maintaining its freedom of
action. As a Briton, he presented a view from across the
transatlantic divide, saying that there are some areas of
legitimate concern, but that at least some of the debate
is just “hot air.”
His first example was the furor over the International
Criminal Court (ICC), which of course pre-dates the
current war. Professor Garraway contended that the
effect on U.S. and UK operations has been nil. The two
nations have approached the matter quite differently,
though. The UK chose to support the ICC, but to make
sure that no British soldier ever stood before it. The
U.S. position effectively is the same: No American
soldier will ever appear before the ICC. The United
States, though, chose not to support the idea of the
court. That position at least was partially the result
of past experiences when ad hoc courts with similar
mandates found themselves—wittingly or not—used
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for political purposes. For example, the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia received
a request to prosecute the Supreme Allied Commander
in Europe, General Wesley Clark, for war crimes
in connection with the attack on Yugoslavia, citing
“overwhelming evidence that the attack was unlawful
and that the conduct of the attack on civilian objects
. . .” breached the Geneva Conventions.11 Indeed, even
the ICC already has been used for political purposes—
or lawfare—when Saddam Hussein recently petitioned
the court to “investigate alleged violations of law
regarding his treatment by U.S. personnel.”12 Professor
Garraway argued that the ICC has little interest in
picking a fight with a major power, which he described
as the court’s “heavyweight backers.” Nonetheless, the
potential exists for the court to be used by the Nation’s
foes in an exercise of lawfare.
Professor Garraway also described the debate
about which law to apply: human rights law or the
law of armed conflict. Again, the transatlantic divide
is exemplified. While most accept that neither human
rights law nor the law of armed conflict normally can
be applied exclusively, many Europeans believe in
the primacy of the former. The U.S. administration
believes in the primacy of the law of armed conflict.
Professor Garraway came down in favor of the law
of armed conflict because it takes into account the
reality of conflict, but also argued that the law needs
to be updated to include specific circumstances of the
GWOT. If the U.S. administration persists in ignoring
this need, legal uncertainty will continue to pervade
military action from strategic to tactical levels.
Identifying it as his fundamental issue, Professor
Garraway—alone among the law panelists—rather
explicitly answered the question about whether or not
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the nation is at war, saying, “In the traditional sense,
this is not a war. In the legal sense, it doesn’t fit with
the definitions of armed conflict to which the existing
international law treaties apply.” Complementing
the reference to the Constitution earlier, he cited the
applicable articles of the Geneva Conventions and said
that it fits the definition of neither international conflict
nor non-international conflict. Nonetheless, it is not
difficult to see that the GWOT presents a new paradigm
for armed conflict. Given that, the rules for that new
model of warfare must be defined. “Cherry picking”
rules that provide a benefit and ignoring those that are
inconvenient leads to a legal morass. That legal morass
affects not only U.S. Armed Forces; it also adversely
affects America’s ability to form coalitions.
In closing, Professor Garraway quoted the eloquent
words of John Reid, the UK Secretary of State for
Defence:“Our values of law, democracy, restraint, and
respect are at the core of our national beliefs and even
if, as some suggest, they create a short-term tactical
disadvantage, they represent a long-term strategic
advantage.” A concerted effort by great legal minds
is necessary to establish the parameters of the war
in which the nation finds itself. While leadership is
required, the effort cannot be a unilateral one. Broad—
although undoubtedly not universal—acceptance of
those parameters is key.
ENDNOTES - PANEL V
1. The War Powers Act of 1973, Public Law 93-148, 93rd
Congress, “Joint Resolution Concerning the War Powers of
Congress and the President,” November 7, 1973, available at www.
cs.indiana.edu/statecraft/warpow.html, accessed on August 9, 2006.
2. “[T]he President is authorized to use all necessary and
appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons
he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the
140

terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored
such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future
acts of international terrorism against the United States by such
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PANEL V
JUSTIFYING THE AMERICAN WAY OF WAR
Professor Michael F. Noone
There are legal consequences for a nation at
war. These consequences are both domestic and
international since legal doctrine acknowledges that
belligerency—a state of war—permits governmental
behavior which would be forbidden in peacetime.
The U.S. Government therefore must be prepared to
offer legal justification for actions in its Global War on
Terrorism which otherwise would violate legal norms.
It is doing so, slowly and reluctantly, in the domestic
realm as individual cases are adjudicated and appealed
in the U.S. court system, where the government claims
that a state of war justifies extraordinary measures.
It has not, in any coherent way, justified its apparent
deviations from the law of war. Three recent Executive
Branch documents—the President’s National Security
Strategy of the United States, the 2006 Quadrennial
Defense Review Report, and the unclassified version of
the Joint Chiefs’ National Military Strategic Plan for the
War on Terrorism—were issued at the highest levels
of the U.S. Government, but fail to acknowledge or
respond to claims that U.S. forces have violated the
rule of law in waging the war. The Executive Branch’s
refusal to justify past actions is troubling. That it
intends to continue some controversial practices—
kidnapping and targeted killing, for example—without
offering legal justification should cause grave concern.
Perhaps the government’s silence can be attributed to
the fact that traditional legal doctrines—human rights
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and humanitarian law—intended to address the legal
issues raised by the Global War on Terrorism (or “Long
War”) have proven to be inadequate.
The pre-9/11 U.S. response to Islamic terrorism has
been described as “Law Enforcement Plus.” In 199798, the National Security Council (NSC) directed that
bin Laden, who had been indicted, should be captured
and held for trial. If he could not be captured—because
he had sought refuge in Afghanistan, which refused to
extradite him—the NSC authorized his killing. Human
rights law forbids killing criminals simply because they
cannot be arrested and tried. No matter how heinous
their crimes, human rights law starts from the premise
that a person’s right to life is absolute unless there is
immediate need to act in self defense. A human rights
regime would call for the Executive Branch to follow
a law enforcement model similar to that followed by
the British during the Irish “Troubles.” Unfortunately,
Islamic terrorism is quite different from the warfare
practiced by the Irish Republican Army (IRA). The
former relies on the infliction of mass casualties
and seeks—and would employ—weapons of mass
destruction. The IRA never sought mass casualties
as an end in itself. The IRA was essentially domestic,
focused in Northern Ireland; Islamic terrorism is
transnational. The IRA was tightly structured and, as
has been learned recently, could be and was penetrated
at the highest levels. Islamic terrorism is loosely
organized and difficult to penetrate. Finally, the IRA
had a negotiable agenda, and Islamic terrorism does
not. There are important differences between U.S. and
United Kingdom (UK) legal institutions as well. IRA
terrorists had no fundamental right to a jury trial; they
were tried before special courts whose judges were
concerned neither with jury intimidation nor with the
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elaborate U.S. evidentiary rules designed to protect
jurors from information which could prejudice their
decision. Moreover, U.S. legal doctrine fails to make
the clear distinction between criminal and political
motivations, which is a fundamental characteristic
of the British system. Faced with an implacable alien
enemy committed to maximizing civilian casualties
with weapons of mass destruction and capable of
mounting complex attacks, the Executive Branch sought
and was granted authority to initiate armed conflict—
no matter how contested that authority may be—from
Congress, the United Nations (UN), and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In doing so, the
paradigm changed: from criminal justice and human
rights law to war and the Law of Armed Conflict. That
paradigm can be described as “Belligerency Minus.”
The terms “law of war,” “law of armed conflict
(LOAC),” and “humanitarian law” essentially are
synonymous, although each is intended to emphasize
a different aspect of the phenomenon. LOAC has two
significant components: treaty law, characterized
by rules, arrived at by negotiation and compromise,
and exemplified in the Geneva Conventions; and
customary law, characterized by standards, arrived
at by state practice and exemplified in the Martens
Clause (named after the Russian delegate to the Hague
Conventions), which provided “that in cases not
included in the Regulations . . . the inhabitants and the
belligerents remain under the protection and the rule
of the principles of the law of nations as they result
from the usages established among civilized peoples,
from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the
public conscience.” Unlike Human Rights Law, LOAC
traditionally has relied on reciprocity: either that
assured by treaty obligation or assumed by common
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usage. LOAC treaty law resembles human rights
law in one respect: Both are characterized by rules
which are composed of a protasis (“if”), a statement
of circumstances which calls a rule into play, and an
apodosis (“then”), which describes the consequences
of the rule’s application. Thus, if a prisoner satisfies the
Geneva Convention’s criteria for prisoner of war status,
then he or she is entitled to the treaty’s enumerated
protections. Typically, the customary LOAC is based
not on rules, but on standards. Standards call for
balancing and are sensitive to individual circumstance.
Thus, “unnecessary” suffering, killing, or destruction
must be avoided. The United States has argued that
treaty law does not apply in its war on terror because
terrorist groups are nonstate actors who have agreed
neither to the treaties nor adopted their standards.
Nor, the United States claims, does customary law
apply, because it also assumes reciprocity and a
general adherence to “the usages established among
civilized peoples.” Furthermore, neither the human
rights nor LOAC regimes offer acceptable punitive
mechanisms for terrorists’ violations of international
norms. Potential suicide bombers are not deterred by
routine criminal justice penalties (bound by human
rights strictures): incarceration or even death. The
LOAC merely can threaten international obloquy of an
organization or individual war crimes penalties similar
to those imposed in domestic legal systems.
Since neither legal regime offers adequate solutions,
it is not surprising that the Executive branch has
refused to offer a principled and coherent rationale
for its apparent deviations from international legal
norms and that the British Minister of Defense recently
called for reexamination and revision of the Geneva
Conventions. His proposal—apparently focused on
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changing treaty law language—is unrealistic. The
United States has, for more than 30 years, refused to
accept language in proposed Protocols I and II amending and “clarifying” the Geneva Conventions. However,
it would be relatively easy for LOAC experts to identify
gaps in treaty and customary law, created by changed
conditions, and to suggest principled solutions to the
legal problems posed by those conditions.
Was the November 2002 Predator missile ambush
in Yemen (a neutral country) of six suspected alQai’da operatives as legally justified as the 1943
ambush of Admiral Yamamoto? Can those two cases
be distinguished from the Soviet/Bulgarian London
assassination of dissident Georgi Markov? Or from the
European Court of Human Rights ruling that the UK
had violated the human rights of three IRA terrorists
when its forces killed them in Gibraltar? The United
States has lawyers capable of answering those questions
in a venue more suitable than the Department of
Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel or the Department of
Defense General Counsel’s Office. Congress, charged
with the constitutional obligation to make laws for the
administration of the armed forces and thus with the
duty to oversee the application of those laws, should
undertake hearings which address these questions.
Has the Executive Branch adequately established
that it remains engaged in hostilities with an entity or
movement which constitutes a state of war? If there is
no belligerent state, can there be enemy aliens subject
to internment or expulsion from sensitive areas? Do
Hague prohibitions of assassination, proscription,
and outlawry apply? Do Hague restraints—which
assume reciprocity on weapons and tactics, e.g.,
perfidy—apply when these restraints are not honored
by opponents as a matter of policy? If a state of war
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exists, what obligations does the United States have to
captured persons who are not entitled to prisoner of
war status? How is the termination of hostilities to be
decided? These questions, addressed by Congress and
answered in a democratic fashion, would assure U.S.
forces and neutral observers of America’s continued
commitment to the rule of law. If America is to re-take
the moral high ground, public engagement in this kind
of principled discussion is essential.

148

PANEL V
THE NATION AT WAR
Rear Admiral (Retired) Jane G. Dalton
Since September 11, 2001 (9/11), the topic of
the “Nation at War” has been, and remains, one of
considerable discussion and disagreement among
lawyers, policymakers and the general public. Whether
one agrees with the U.S. position that the nation is
truly “at war” in the jus ad bellum/jus in bello context
or not, the subject raises many legal issues that bear
discussing. This section focuses on just a few of those
topics, primarily those related to maritime law.
First, one criticism of the Global War on Terror is
that the United States is attempting to wage war on
an abstract concept—one that cannot be defined or
identified in any concrete sense. The truth is, however,
that the United States and its coalition partners are not
fighting an abstraction. Perhaps it would have been
more precise for the President to have announced
a “global war on the transnational, networked
organization of al-Qai’da and its affiliate organizations
that are committed to the ultimate destruction of the
United States and other free societies the world over”—
the GWOTNOAQAOCUDUSOFSWO. The acronym
certainly does not have the same cachet as the simpler
GWOT, but it reflects the fact that the country is fighting
an organized, identifiable enemy that has attacked the
United States, the United Kingdom, Spain, Indonesia,
Jordan, and many other countries, and killed well over
4000 innocent men, women, and children.
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks there was little,
if any, doubt in the international community that the
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United States had been the victim of an armed attack
that entitled the United States and its coalition partners
to respond with armed force in self-defense. The United
Nations (UN) Security Council (in Resolution 1368),
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (by
invoking Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty) and the
Organization of American States (OAS) (by invoking
Article 3(1) of the Rio Treaty) all made that perfectly
clear, and the outpouring of support for Operation
ENDURING FREEDOM was overwhelming. It thus
appears somewhat disingenuous that many of those
same supporters now announce that the war is over
simply because Afghanistan largely has been freed
from the tyranny of the Taliban and al-Qai’da, while
the leaders of the organization simply have moved
their headquarters and are conducting armed attacks
from another undisclosed location or locations.
That approach reflects a very narrow view of jus ad
bellum and the inherent right of self-defense. The Final
Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on
the United States (the 9/11 Commission Report) made clear
that misconstruing the scale of terrorism is dangerous
and has cost the United States and its allies dearly. The
Report opined that “an unfortunate consequence” of
the superb criminal investigative and prosecutorial
efforts in the aftermath of the first World Trade Center
bombing in 1993 was “that it created an impression
that the law enforcement system was well-equipped
to cope with terrorism.”1 Law enforcement is certainly
one of many instruments of national power available
to the President to combat terrorism, but it is not the
sole and exclusive instrument when dealing with an
enemy that is committed to the ultimate destruction of
the United States and other democratic societies worldwide.
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The problem with the approach of many critics
is that they have not proposed an alternative other
than the 19th-20th century concept of war as a conflict
between two nation-states played out on defined
battlefields by massed armies wearing uniforms and
firing guns. United Kingdom (UK) Defense Secretary
John Reid, in a speech at the Royal United Service
Institute think-tank, reportedly called for “sweeping
changes” to international law, including the Geneva
Conventions, to counter the threat of global terrorism.
“The legal constraints upon us have to be set against
an enemy that adheres to no constraints whatsoever.”2
John Reid, of course, was criticized immediately by
Human Rights Watch, which implied that he sought
to change such rules as “the basic principles of not
torturing people”3—the sort of hyperbolic reaction that
leads to doubt whether there could ever be a successful
renegotiation of law of armed conflict treaties in a
reasoned and thoughtful manner.
Accordingly, it seems the only available alternative
is to adapt the 19th and 20th century rules to the realities
of the 21st century war on global terrorism. Those rules
and concepts are flexible enough to be adapted to the
21st century—but doing so will require some creative
thinking and a willingness to adapt. Several examples
of where that is happening in the maritime context will
be illustrative.
First is command of the commons. The U. S. Navy
always has been one of the premier advocates of
“freedom of the seas” and “freedom of navigation.”
At first blush, then, the concept of “command of the
commons”—command of the seas (including under the
surface of the seas), air, space, and cyberspace—could
appear to be inconsistent with the Navy’s traditional
viewpoint. The U. S. Air Force has identified command
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of the commons as “the” key military enabler of the
United States. That approach is not unrealistic when
one considers that both the National Strategy for
Maritime Security4 and the National Defense Strategy5
identify the global commons—particularly the oceans
and cyberspace—as “ambiguous.”
Ambiguity means that the same global commons that
give life, food, resources, and means of communication
also provide conduits for threats to national security
and offer vast expanses conducive to anonymity
and surreptitious activity. The oceans, for example,
provide an immense maritime domain of enormous
importance to the security and prosperity of all nations
and all peoples, but they also provide a “vast, ready and
largely unsecured medium for an array of threats by
nations, terrorists, and criminals.”6 So it is particularly
important to be able to operate in, through, and from
the commons—and to “command” the commons in
the sense that the nation is able to identify and counter
threats emanating from the commons.
The U.S. Navy recently has been involved in
aggressive efforts to counter piracy at sea off the African
coast. There is a well-established legal regime under
customary international law, and reflected in Part VII
of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, that authorizes
warships to board and inspect any ship at sea, flying
any nation’s flag, if there are reasonable grounds to
believe the ship is engaged in piracy. In this situation,
the law is clear and fully adequate to address concerns
about threats emanating from the global commons.
There is another area, however, where the law is
not so clear. The authority to board vessels suspected
of supporting terrorism, or of shipping weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) components or precursors
by sea to terrorist organizations or rogue states, is not
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addressed in the Law of the Sea Convention, or in any
other international legal instrument. More precisely,
that authority was not addressed prior to 9/11. The
2002 National Security Strategy announced the American
intention to convince the international community to
view terrorism in the same light as piracy and the slave
trade—and to interdict shipments of WMD-enabling
technologies and materials.7
Unfortunately, the administration was not entirely
successful in this regard. A series of UN Security
Council resolutions after 9/11 identified terrorism
as a threat to international peace and security and
reaffirmed the inherent right of individual and
collective self-defense, but never went so far as to
equate terrorism with universal crimes such as piracy
or the slave trade—and certainly never authorized the
use of “all necessary means” to combat terrorism or to
interdict the shipment of WMD on the high seas or in
international airspace. In what could be considered a
minor victory, UN Security Council Resolution 1390 of
January 28, 2002, decided that all states should prevent
the use of their flag vessels or aircraft to provide
arms and related materiel to al-Qai’da and associated
terrorist groups. But for the most part the resolutions
simply stressed the need for improved coordination
and information exchange, and called upon states
to enforce and strengthen domestic legislation and
international cooperation.
So it was that after the unfortunate incident in
December 2002 with the un-flagged freighter So San
carrying Scud missiles and fuel to Yemen, the Bush
Administration announced the Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI), in May 2003. The PSI is a global effort to
create a dynamic, creative and more proactive approach
to the problem of air and sea shipment of WMD, their
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delivery systems and related materials. It relies on a
series of bilateral agreements with cooperating nations,
exercises to test and train expedited procedures
for obtaining consent to search another state’s flag
vessels, and strengthening domestic legislation and
international instruments. Some have criticized PSI’s
legitimacy—calling it a “brigandish naval blockade”
and “vigilante attacks on the high seas.”8 Nevertheless,
UN Security Council Resolution 1540 of April 28,
2004, “welcomed” “multilateral arrangements which
contribute to nonproliferation”—a subtle reference to
the PSI. Over 70 nations are cooperating with the United
States on PSI, which has had publicly-announced
successes in preventing the shipment of material and
equipment to Libya and Iran.9
The United States has introduced a number of other
international initiatives to enhance national security
in the global commons, such as the Long-Range
Information and Tracking regime, which would enable
tracking vessels as far as 2,000 nautical miles from
the U.S. coastline. Furthermore, in October 2005, the
International Maritime Organization adopted significant antiterrorism and nonproliferation amendments to
the 1988 UN Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation.
These amendments include a comprehensive framework
for boarding suspect vessels at sea, establishment of
expedited boarding procedures, and bringing certain
terrorist-related and nonproliferation offenses (such as
the unlawful transport of WMD) within its ambit. 10
Make no mistake, however: Given the right
circumstances, the inherent right of national selfdefense, under customary law and as reflected in Article
51 of the UN Charter, would support the interdiction of
Osama bin Laden or other terrorists, or WMD, at sea or
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in the air, based on reliable and actionable intelligence.
Such an action would be an example of adapting 19th
and 20th century rules to the realities of the 21st century
war on global terrorism. The President should use all
the diplomatic, economic, law enforcement, and other
tools at his disposal, but if military action is the most
appropriate action in a given situation, then military
action is a lawful tool for the President to employ.
The U.S. Navy is facing a number of other issues
where the correct answer may turn on whether the war
on terrorism is an actual “war.” For example, when
Admiral Vern Clark was Chief of Naval Operations,
he challenged the Navy to maximize the use of active
duty sailors in warfighting positions. The Military
Sealift Command proposed replacing sailors with
civilian mariners in a number of key positions onboard
warships—positions such as navigation, engineering,
and deck operations. Currently, half the crew of USS
Mount Whitney is civilian. The ship serves as the flagship
for the U.S. Sixth Fleet, NATO’s Joint Command Lisbon,
and NATO’s Naval Striking and Support Forces. This
Navy practice would be a candidate for examination if
a review as called for by Secretary John Reid were ever
conducted.
The other services also are wrestling with the issue
of civilians in the battlespace—operating unmanned
aerial vehicles, providing perimeter or distinguished
visitor security in combat zones, and maintaining
sophisticated weapons systems. The issue is whether
or not these civilians have lost their protected status as
“civilians accompanying the force” by taking a “direct”
part in armed conflict.
If the war on terrorism is not really a “war” and the
United States is not engaged in an international armed
conflict, then it does not matter whether civilians on
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board warships operate the engineering plant, navigate
the ship, or serve as small-boat coxswains for boarding
parties engaged in a take-down of a terrorist platform.
It is certainly true that the United States is not at war
with a nation-state party to the Geneva Conventions,
and there is no expectation that the adversary would
provide Geneva protections to anyone. But it seems
somewhat incongruous for the United States to detain
several hundred “enemy combatants” at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba, for engaging in warlike acts against the
United States, while denying that civilians involved
in seizing a terrorist ship are directly participating in
armed conflict.
The Navy’s solution to this dilemma was to introduce legislation that would have placed the civilian
mariners in a reserve status, from which they would
have been recalled to active duty prior to the ship
engaging in international armed conflict. That legislation
was not passed, and the Navy is now assessing the
extent, if any, to which civilian mariners can be used
in traditional armed conflict onboard warships such
as those planned for the Maritime Prepositioned Force
(Future).
Another 20th century maritime-related legal
doctrine that needs review in light of the global war on
terrorism relates to military hospital ships, which are
granted extraordinary protections under the Second
Geneva Convention of 1949. Those protections depend,
however, on the ships being used solely to assist, treat,
and transport the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked.
To guarantee that hospital ships will not transmit
intelligence or engage in offensive military operations,
the Geneva Convention approach is to ensure they are
incapable of engaging in those activities. Thus, article
34 forbids the possession or use of a “secret code”
for communication—meaning hospital ships cannot
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use encrypted communications systems. Concerning
weapons, article 35 provides that the crews of hospital
ships may be armed for maintaining order and for
defense of themselves and their patients—a provision
understood to mean that the ships themselves cannot
carry armaments, but that their crews may carry small
arms for self-defense.
In the post-USS Cole, post-9/11 world, these
requirements simply are unacceptable. The San Remo
Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed
Conflicts at Sea, prepared by a group of military and
legal experts and published in 1995, attempted to be
forward-leaning by opining that hospital ships may
be armed with “deflective” means of defense, such as
chaff and flares, but not with means that could be used
in offensive fashion, such as anti-aircraft guns.11
Chaff and flares, however, would be decidedly
ineffective against a determined suicide attack like
that launched against USS Cole. While there is merit in
taking a cautious approach to deploying hospital ships
bristling with “defensive” armaments, the realities of
the war on terrorism require that hospital ships and their
crews be provided with crew-served weapons such as
machine guns and grenade launchers, and even with
the Phalanx close-in weapons system and other stateof-the-art defensive anti-air and anti-surface weapons.
Surely it is possible to devise some method of ensuring
the integrity of hospital ships (such as by placing
international observers on board) other than denying
them armaments necessary for force protection against
pirates and terrorists.
Sea-basing is another maritime concept that will
challenge accepted notions of “warfighting.” It is part
of Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Mike Mullen’s
vision of a 1,000-ship Navy. Not merely a Navy/
Marine Corps program, sea-basing will support all
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services, coalition partners and other interagency
organizations. One of 21 “Joint Integrating Concepts,”
sea-basing reflects a vision of how to aggregate, sustain,
and project combat power at sea. It is defined as the
rapid deployment, assembly, command, projection,
reconstitution, and reemployment of joint combat
power from the sea, without reliance on land bases
within the Joint Operations Area.
How does sea-basing work? Basically, large, floating
military bases are staged 12 nautical miles off the
coastline and project people, machinery, armaments,
and materiel ashore to conduct an assigned mission—
whether the mission is counterterrorism or disaster
relief. In Admiral Mullen’s vision of the 1,000-ship
Navy, no single nation would have that many ships,
but the world’s navies and coast guards would work
together to fight wars, defeat pirates, deter illegal drug
traffickers and terrorists, and deliver humanitarian
assistance—moving rapidly from place to place as
required . . . all as part of the “long war” of winning
hearts and minds to defeat the conditions that sustain
terrorist ideology.12
Interestingly, in this area, 19th and 20th century
rules completely support the freedom of the seas to
conduct military operations in international waters
without the consent or prior knowledge of the coastal
state. Some recent expansive views of coastal state
rights in the 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone
(EEZ), however, would hold that such operations are
not permitted. China, for example, asserts sovereignty
over air and sea operations in the EEZ. As noted, in this
case the existing laws are consistent with U.S. projected
operations. However, the United States and its coalition
partners must be vigilant to ensure traditional high
seas rights and freedoms do not atrophy from lack of
use or misuse.
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Finally, a word about detainee operations. One
does not typically think of detainee operations as
a Navy or maritime issue. Given the U.S. Navy’s
long-term association with Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,
however, Secretary of the Navy (now Deputy Secretary
of Defense) Gordon England was named as the
Designated Civilian Official for the Combatant Status
Review Tribunals (CSRTs) and the Administrative
Review Boards (ARBs) conducted for the detainees at
Guantanamo Bay. One of the most frequent criticisms
lodged against the United States in the Global War on
Terrorism is that the enemy combatants are being held
“indefinitely,” without trial or other due process. That
was a second criticism raised by Human Rights Watch
against Secretary Reid’s reported call for a renegotiation
of the Geneva Conventions.13 Yet through the CSRT
and ARB processes, almost 250 detainees have been
released from detention in Guantanamo Bay, either
because they were determined no longer to be enemy
combatants or no longer to pose a threat to the United
States.
Furthermore, the terrorists consider themselves
enemy combatants in a global war. One of the July
2005 London bombers stated, “We are at war, and I am
a soldier in that war.”14 A number of the Guantanamo
detainees also readily acknowledge they were, and
continue to be, combatants against the United States.15
The Department of Defense has detained and
screened around 83,000 individuals in Afghanistan,
Iraq, and elsewhere. The vast majority are freed shortly
after initial questioning. There remain about 14,500 in
custody, primarily in Iraq, consistent with the Fourth
Geneva Convention concerning security detainees.
Less than 700 individuals have been transferred to
Guantanamo Bay. The government already has released
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about 245 Guantanamo detainees to 12 countries—
and, unfortunately, the government has been wrong
about 10 percent of the time. About a dozen have been
captured after they returned to the battlefield to wage
war against the United States.16
The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg
made clear that since the 18th century, captivity during
time of war “is neither revenge nor punishment, but
rather is solely protective custody, the only purpose of
which is to prevent the prisoners of war from further
participation in the war.”17 What is the alternative to
detaining these individuals as enemy combatants—to
let them go? It hardly seems to be in the interest of
humanity at large to release individuals who intend to
return immediately to the fight and kill more innocent
men, women, and children. Certainly, this is an area
where a review of the Geneva Conventions would be in
order, though, as mentioned earlier, there is probably
little hope of success in that regard.
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PANEL V
COMPETING LEGAL ISSUES:
A EUROPEAN VIEWPOINT
Professor Charles Garraway
Introduction.
Robert Kagan, in his seminal article entitled “Power
and Weakness”, written in 2002,1 stated that “on major
strategic and international questions today, Americans
are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus.” He
referred to the “transatlantic divide” and sought to set
it in a historical context, referring to Europe moving
from the horrors of the first half of the 20th century
into a “Kantian paradise” while the United States is
left to sort out “the dangerous Hobbesian world that
still flourishes outside Europe.” The question he asks
is whether the point has now been reached where, in
military terms, the United States will do the fighting
and Europe the cleaning up. Put another way: Does
the real division of labour consist of the United States
“making the dinner” and the Europeans “doing the
dishes”?
It is becoming popular now to talk about the
“transatlantic divide.” Another example is Jeffrey
Kopstein, who discusses the subject in “The
Transatlantic Divide over Democracy Promotion.”2
In that article, he compares the European preference
for “order over freedom,” contrasting this with the
United States rhetoric about the spread of democracy,
particularly the January 2005 speech of President Bush
arguing that promoting the freedom of other countries
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was now an “urgent requirement of our nation’s
security and the calling of our time.”3
I myself have written previously on the “transatlantic divide.”4 This arose from a presentation made
at the International Conference on Current Issues
in International Law and Military Operations, at the
U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, in
June 2003. Three years on, with increasing arguments
on the relevance—and indeed the applicability—of
international law to current military operations, it
perhaps is necessary to revisit the issue and look
at the differing views of the United States and its
European allies. Differences there certainly are, but as
I stated in my earlier article, “what is needed is greater
communication between the parties and a willingness
to talk with each other rather than at each other.”5
Is it correct to argue that the European nations
are now so bound by constitutional and other legal
constraints that they cannot effectively contribute to
high intensity conflict? Is the increasing emphasis on
the law in its relation to military operations justified
or is it an attempt to bind the powerful Gulliver
with Lilliputian cords? In an address to the Air and
Space Conference and Technology Exposition 2005,6
Brigadier General (now Major General) Charles
Dunlap, U.S. Air Force, referred to this as “lawfare”
and “an asymmetrical form of warfare.” He defined
lawfare as “the strategy of using or misusing law as a
substitute for traditional military means to achieve an
operational objective.” While pointing out that this can
work both positively and negatively, he went on to say
that “most adversaries are using Lawfare . . . as a form
of asymmetrical warfare by manipulating a value of
our societies, which is respect for law.”
My purpose is to look at those areas of law where
there is dispute or disagreement between the United
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States and Europe and to examine exactly where
those disagreements are in the hope that this may
generate a debate and contribute to the resolution of
these disagreements. I will not look at constitutional
constraints as these are, on both sides of the Atlantic,
effectively self-imposed. I will, however, look at
two issues that I consider serious. The first is the
application of human rights; the second is the differing
interpretations of the law of armed conflict. I will then
look at an issue that I consider fundamental and that
underpins the whole impasse: the differing views on the
“campaign (or war) against terror.” However, before I
move on to these subjects, I need to deal with one area
that has been raised frequently in debate, but is—in
my view—a complete red herring: the International
Criminal Court.7
International Criminal Court.
In 1998, in Rome, a Diplomatic Conference adopted
the Statute for an International Criminal Court.8
Unfortunately, there remained major disagreements
on a number of key issues and as a result, it was not
possible to achieve a consensus text in negotiations.
A compromise text was put forward on a “take it or
leave it” basis, and it was this text that was adopted
by a large majority after a vote. Sadly, one of those
countries voting against it was the United States. The
United States had played a major—and very positive—
role in the negotiations, and it must be acknowledged
that many of the key areas of the Statute benefited from
U.S. expertise in both subject matter and drafting. This
is particularly true in relation to the crimes that fall
within the jurisdiction of the Court.
After Rome, the United States initially seemed
to adopt a position of benevolent neutrality, though
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maintaining its objections. The line seemed to be
“don’t mess with us, and we won’t mess with you.”
The delegation continued to play a major role in the
drafting of the subsidiary documents, including the
Rules of Procedure and Elements of Crimes, the latter
being primarily a joint Swiss-U.S. venture. Indeed, on
almost his last day in office, President Clinton signed
the Rome Statute, although indicating that the United
States still had some fundamental problems that needed
to be resolved before there could be any question of the
United States becoming a Party to the Court.
President Bush, on gaining office, took a different
line and launched a policy of strong opposition to
the Court. On both the domestic and international
stage, he took steps to ensure that the Court could
not in any circumstances take jurisdiction over any
American citizen and, in a letter to the United Nations
(UN) Secretary General, the administration sought to
“unsign” the Treaty.9
As a result of these actions, many in the U.S. military
community see the International Criminal Court as a
major threat to U.S. operations—and this concern has
spread to the United Kingdom to some extent. On July
14, 2005, six former Chiefs of the Defence Staff launched
a debate in the House of Lords expressing concern over
the impact that on-going investigations in Iraq into the
conduct of operations were having both on the morale
of the British Army and on the chain of command. The
International Criminal Court was blamed for much of
this.10
In fact, I would suggest that the International
Criminal Court has had no effect at all on operations in
Iraq—or elsewhere. Furthermore, it is not responsible
for the level of inquiries carried out. The problem lies
elsewhere as I will outline later. It has always been
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United Kingdom policy to investigate allegations of
misconduct by British forces (as it is in the United States)
and that has not changed. What may have changed is
the greater public awareness of these investigations,
caused partly by greater civilian involvement. But that
cannot be laid at the door of the International Criminal
Court.
It is official British Government policy that no
British service person will ever appear in front of the
International Criminal Court.11 However, in seeking
to achieve this policy objective, we have approached
the matter from a different angle. We have indeed
become a Party to the Court and intend to rely on the
principle of “complementarity” laid down in Article
17 of the Rome Statute. This key principle was one of
those that benefited from U.S. input at the negotiating
stage and is worth examining in full. The text of Article
17 of the Statute states:
Article 17—Issues of Admissibility. (Emphases below added
by the author.)
1. Having regard to paragraph 10 of the Preamble and
article 1, the Court shall determine that a case is
inadmissible where:
(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by
a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the
State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out
the investigation or prosecution;
(b) The case has been investigated by a State which
has jurisdiction over it and the State has decided
not to prosecute the person concerned, unless
the decision resulted from the unwillingness or
inability of the State genuinely to prosecute;
(c) The person concerned already has been tried for
conduct which is the subject of the complaint, and
a trial by the Court is not permitted under article
20, paragraph 3;
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(d) The case is not of sufficient gravity to justify
further action by the Court.
2. In order to determine unwillingness in a particular
case, the Court shall consider, having regard to the
principles of due process recognized by international
law, whether one or more of the following exist, as
applicable:
(a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken or
the national decision was made for the purpose
of shielding the person concerned from criminal
responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of
the Court referred to in article 5;
(b) There has been an unjustified delay in the
proceedings which in the circumstances is
inconsistent with an intent to bring the person
concerned to justice;
(c) The proceedings were not or are not being
conducted independently or impartially, and they
were or are being conducted in a manner which, in
the circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent
to bring the person concerned to justice.
3. In order to determine inability in a particular case,
the Court shall consider whether, due to a total or
substantial collapse or unavailability of its national
judicial system, the State is unable to obtain the
accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or
otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings.

The test is a very high one and the default position,
as is made clear by Article 17(1) is “inadmissibility.”
Of course, the final decision rests with the Court, but
if the Court is to be truly international, no State can
have a veto. Attractive as it might have been to give the
five permanent members of the UN Security Council
such a veto—effectively exempting their personnel—
that was utterly unacceptable to the rest of the world.
If the United States thinks that it is the only major
power likely to come under scrutiny, the example of
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Russian operations in Chechnya comes to mind. These
are already the subject of human rights investigations
under the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human
Rights, as we shall see later.
The United Kingdom began by passing domestic
legislation ensuring that every offence in the
International Criminal Court Statute became (if it
was not already) an offence under our domestic law
in all our various jurisdictions.12 This enables us to
investigate and, where appropriate, try before our
domestic courts, both military and civilian, any cases
that might be within the jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court. While this does not, and cannot,
give us an absolute guarantee of exemption, the bar
imposed on the Prosecutor by Article 17 is a very high
one—and one on which he must satisfy a three-Judge
Pre-Trial Chamber, and subsequently, a five-Judge
Appeals Chamber. Put another way, he must obtain
the agreement of a minimum of five judges in the two
Chambers. We have a British Judge in the Court who, in
the normal course of events, would educate his fellow
Judges on the UK judicial system. It must be considered
highly unlikely, to put it mildly, that the Court could be
persuaded that, in a particular case, the British judicial
system had so moved from its fundamental principles
that it was being used with one of the intents described
in Article 17 (2). If we reach the stage of Article 17 (3),
then I would suggest that the United Kingdom is in
real trouble!
The fear in the United States is primarily one of
politically-motivated prosecutions. However, this
works both ways. The Court is going to need to rely
on its heavyweight backers for support as it has no
real capabilities of its own on the ground. Politically,
it is not in the Court’s interests to pick a fight with a
major power. If it were minded to do so, particularly
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on political grounds, then it would be in the process
of self-destruction. With British personnel operating
within the Court structure, we would have ample
warning of any such fundamental shift in the Court’s
philosophy and our own participation would have
been called into question long before matters got that
far.
Thus, on legal grounds and political grounds, we
have no fear of the Court but our objectives are exactly
the same as those of the United States: to ensure that
matters are dealt with in our own domestic courts.
We do so by applying our ordinary procedures and
standards, and thus the International Criminal Court
has had no effect whatsoever on ongoing operations.
Although we have adopted all the International
Criminal Court offences into UK domestic law, the
conduct which they reflect always would have been
prosecutable, though perhaps under different titles.
Investigations therefore always would have been
undertaken where such conduct came to light. Nothing
has changed.
Human Rights Law.
Where there has been a change is in the growing
influence of human rights law. Here, there is a marked
difference between the United States and Europe, a
divide that is likely to get more pronounced before it
gets better. There are two major areas of difference.
First, the U.S. position is that the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights only applies
to “individuals within its territory and subject to its
jurisdiction.”13 The wording is taken directly from
Article 2 (1) of the Covenant and the issue is the use
of the word “and.” The U.S. view is that this is a twopart test, and thus the obligations imposed on the U.S.
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by the Covenant do not extend beyond the territorial
boundaries of the United States. This position
was confirmed recently in the official reply by the
Administration to the Report of the Special Rapporteurs
on Guantanamo.14 The argument put forward is that this
is the literal reading of the words of the Covenant, and
the negotiating history supports such a limitation. The
detailed arguments are well-outlined in a commentary
on the International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion
on the Wall, written by Michael Dennis, a legal adviser
to the State Department.15 The counter argument is
that times have moved on and that, whatever was the
position when the Covenant was drafted in 1966, or
even when it came into force in 1976, it generally is
accepted that the words should be read disjunctively.
This view is supported by General Comment 31 of the
Human Rights Committee.16
For the United Kingdom and other European
States, this argument is, to a considerable extent,
only of academic interest. The European Convention
on Human Rights refers to “everyone within their
jurisdiction.”17 The territorial reference has been
removed. But what does this phrase mean? In Europe,
the European Court of Human Rights exists to interpret
the Convention and can issue judgements which are
binding on the 41 Member States of the Council of
Europe who have ratified the Convention. This issue
of the meaning of “jurisdiction” has been raised in a
number of cases and, while the full extent of any extraterritorial effect is perhaps still unclear, what is beyond
peradventure is that, while the Convention is primarily
territorial, it can, in exceptional circumstances, be
applied extra-territorially. The leading case to date
was that of Banković,18 in which the Court recognised
only exceptionally extra-territorial acts as constituting
an exercise of jurisdiction:
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. . . when the respondent State, through the effective
control of the relevant territory and its inhabitants abroad
as a consequence of military occupation or through the
consent, invitation or acquiescence of the Government of
that territory, exercised all or some of the public powers
normally to be exercised by that Government.19

The Court has indeed gone further in some other
specific cases, accepting, for example, the application of
the Convention to the acts of Turkish agents in Kenya
during the capture of Ocalan.20
The wording of Banković is interesting and the test
laid down somewhat obtuse. The British courts have
been wrestling with this in domestic cases arising from
the occupation of Iraq. While the British courts have
been reluctant to concede that military occupation
necessarily brings into full force all the relevant
provisions of the Convention, its partial applicability
seems not to be in doubt. The question therefore is not
whether the Convention applies but to what extent.21
Where this is particularly important in relation
to military operations is that the Court has held in
numerous cases that subsumed in the nonderogable
right to life enshrined in Article 2 of the Convention
is the right to an effective investigation where life has
been taken by State officials. This has been applied
also to conflict situations, as in the Turkish operations
to counter the Kurdish insurgency in the east of the
country and, most recently, in a series of cases arising
from Russian operations in Chechnya, including
Khashiyev v. Russia, Akayeva v. Russia,22 Isayeva v.
Russia (No. 57947/00), Yusupova v. Russia, Bazayeva
v. Russia,23 and Isayeva v. Russia (No. 57950/00).24
It is, if anything, this concern over the application of
the human rights norms to military operations that
has caused the greater attention to investigations
172

being undertaken in respect of deaths arising from
such operations in Iraq. It brings into sharp focus
the second point, which is the application of human
rights law in situations of armed conflict and the
relationship between human rights law and the law of
armed conflict. Again, there is a difference between the
European and American positions, though here it may
more be a matter of emphasis rather than substance.
What seems to be agreed is that the law of armed
conflict is the lex specialis in time of armed conflict.
There is clear authority for this from the International
Court of Justice25 and it does not appear to be in dispute.
What is in dispute is what this means. The U.S. position
is linked to its earlier position on extraterritoriality:
In armed conflict, the law of armed conflict prevails
and overrides human rights law to the extent that the
latter is almost de minimis. To the Europeans, while it is
accepted that the law of armed conflict is the primary
law applicable in conflict situations, the coexistence of
human rights law is considered a “given.” This is again
based on the slightly different language between the
International Covenant and the European Convention.
While the International Covenant has no direct
reference to “war” or “armed conflict,” the European
Convention does. Thus Article 15, the derogation clause
of the Convention, makes a number of references. It
states:
Article 15—Derogation in Time of Emergency. (Emphasis
added)
1.

In time of war or other public emergency threatening
the life of the nation, any High Contracting Party
may take measures derogating from its obligations
under this Convention to the extent strictly required
by the exigencies of the situation, provided that
such measures are not inconsistent with its other
obligations under international law.
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2.

No derogation from Article 2, except in respect of
deaths resulting from lawful acts of war, or from
Articles 3, 4 (paragraph 1) and 7 shall be made under
this provision.

3.

Any High Contracting Party availing itself of this
right of derogation shall keep the Secretary General of
the Council of Europe fully informed of the measures
which it has taken and the reasons therefor. It shall
also inform the Secretary General of the Council of
Europe when such measures have ceased to operate
and the provisions of the Convention are again being
fully executed.

What is important to note is that death caused by
lawful acts of war requires a derogation. Furthermore,
it is for the Court itself to decide whether the measures
taken in derogation are “to the extent strictly required
by the exigencies of the situation.” The Convention
clearly envisages that it will continue to apply in time
of war, though subject to such derogations as the Court
may approve. There is no reference in the Court’s
jurisprudence directly to the law of armed conflict as lex
specialis, though it is to be anticipated that, where there
was a clear divide between the two bodies of law, the
Court would indeed apply the lex specialis argument.
However, it is notable that in the Chechnyen cases
mentioned above, there is no mention of the law of
armed conflict, and the cases were decided wholly on
human rights law arguments. There was no derogation
there, but there is clearly the risk of a collision between
the two legal systems if the Court is not careful. In
those particular cases, the result probably would have
been the same under either legal system. However,
in the Banković case, involving the attack on the TV
station in Belgrade during the Kosovo campaign, it
was argued that the deaths of the civilians in the attack
were a breach of the right to life in Article 2 of the
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Convention. Could the respondent states have argued
that these were deaths “resulting from lawful acts of
war” without invoking a derogation? If not, would
those States be limited to arguing the issue purely on
human rights grounds?
The danger here lies in the fact that the law of
armed conflict is exactly that: the law of armed conflict.
It recognizes the reality of armed conflict and has
developed in a pragmatic way balancing the needs of
the military with humanitarian considerations. That
fine balance does not appear in human rights law,
which is designed fundamentally for times of peace.
The relationship between the two legal frameworks
is going to be the challenge of the next generation. To
maintain a position that, in armed conflict, human
rights law is replaced by the law of armed conflict
is simply not an option for the European states and
is likely to be seen as a step backwards by many
states racked by internal conflict. However, to permit
human rights law to dominate in an area where its
requirements have not been crafted to take into account
the realities of the situation may in turn lead to the
ridicule of the law. As human rights law in principle
governs the behaviour of states towards those within
their jurisdiction, it is an attractive weapon for nonstate
actors to use in propaganda campaigns. It is perhaps
the classic example of “lawfare.” However, if a conflict
arises between human rights law and the law of armed
conflict, giving primacy to human rights law will not
be in anybody’s interests—least of all the victims of
war who will again fall prey to new legal uncertainty.
The Law of Armed Conflict.
However, even if we accept the argument that the lex
specialis is applicable, that does not decide the problem,
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as it remains to be decided exactly what makes up that
lex specialis: the law of armed conflict. While this is a
large subject on which books have been written, I wish
to limit my examination of this to one area where,
again, an apparent divide has developed between the
United States and Europe. That relates to Additional
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 drafted
in 1977.26 This treaty, drafted in the aftermath of the
Vietnam War, always was controversial. It contained
elements within it that caused considerable concern to
Western nations, particularly the extension of the law
relating to international armed conflict to conflicts in
which:
. . . peoples are fighting against colonial domination
and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the
exercise of their right of self-determination, as enshrined
in the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration
on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations.27

This and other provisions relating to the principle of
distinction led Douglas Feith to describe it as “Law in
the Service of Terror.”28 It was thus no surprise that
President Ronald Reagan in his Letter of Transmittal to
the Senate on January 29, 198729 declined to recommend
that the Senate grant advice and consent to Additional
Protocol I, describing the protocol as “fundamentally
and irreconcilably flawed.”30
However, that was not his sole comment. The
Protocol itself contains 102 articles, many of which
codify existing customary international law and many
others of which, while perhaps creating new law, were
inserted with the active encouragement of the United
States delegation.31 President Reagan thus also referred
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to the Protocol as containing “certain sound elements”
and to “the positive provisions of Protocol I that could
be of real humanitarian benefit if generally observed
by parties to international armed conflicts.” He went
on to state:
We are therefore in the process of consulting with our
allies to develop appropriate methods for incorporating
these positive provisions into the rules that govern our
military operations, and as customary international law.
I will advise the Senate of the results of this initiative as
soon as it is possible to do so.32

This was a sensible approach, and one that
reflected actual practice. For several years, North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) lawyers had
been meeting on a regular basis discussing how best
to handle interoperability issues arising from the
ratification or otherwise by NATO States of Additional
Protocol I. In fact, there were few issues that caused
any serious concern and, while there may have been
minor differences of interpretation, the fundamental
principles that underlay much of Protocol I were
unchallenged. In 1986, speaking at a Washington
College of Law Conference, Michael Matheson, then
Deputy Legal Adviser at the Department of State, had
laid out what was considered to be the official U.S.
position on Additional Protocol I. That speech was
turned into an article33 and has been cited frequently all
over the world, including in U.S. military manuals.34 It
always has been the document to which other Coalition
militaries have turned when seeking to ascertain the
U.S. position. However, all has now changed and
current United States thinking threatens to throw out
the baby with the bath water.
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In 2005, the Operational Law Handbook issued by
the Judge Advocate General’s Corps as guidance to its
officers contained reference to the Matheson article.35
However, an “Errata Sheet” quickly was issued,
stating, in relation to the citation, “Information was
taken from an Article written by Michael Matheson in
1986. It takes an overly broad view of the U.S. position
and, as a result, may cause some confusion as to U.S.
Policy.”36
This creates confusion as it is now impossible to
find any official source which clearly lays down what
is the U.S. position. Arguments rage, even over such
basic issues as the definition of military objective in
Article 52 (2) and, in particular, as to the customary
law status of Article 75, which lays out fundamental
guarantees—a baseline for treatment of detainees. The
current U.S. State Department Legal Adviser, John
Bellinger, speaking at Chatham House in London, in
February 2006, is reported as saying:
We have said that that’s customary international law in
the past, we are looking at whether that’s appropriate,
and we haven’t said that it isn’t, but we have not yet said
that it is, because this really is in that regard—dealing
with people whose whole aim in life is to kill civilians—
is sort of a different situation. 37

This creates serious interoperability problems on
the ground. How is it possible for Allied Forces to hand
detainees over to American custody if it is unclear as
to whether they will even be granted the most basic
guarantees granted under the law of armed conflict?
This is but one example of where such uncertainty
exists and is beginning to prove a serious difficulty. In
turn, it raises perhaps the most fundamental issue of
all: the nature of conflict.
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The Global War on Terror.
When President Bush announced “We are at war,”
he touched a chord with the American people. After
all, the United States had just suffered the first major
attack on its continental territory since the Civil War.
However, in Europe, terrorism was a problem that had
existed for many decades. Throughout that period, the
authorities resolutely had refused to treat terrorism
other than as a domestic law matter. In Northern
Ireland, through almost 30 years of insurgency, the
United Kingdom had insisted that the situation did
not reach the international law definition of “armed
conflict.” The point was made firmly when the United
Kingdom ratified the Additional Protocols to the Geneva
Conventions. One of the statements of understanding
made on ratification read: “It is the understanding of
the United Kingdom that the term ‘armed conflict’ of
itself and in its context denotes a situation of a kind
which is not constituted by the commission of ordinary
crimes, including acts of terrorism, whether concerted
or in isolation.”38
Spain, Germany, Italy, and other countries faced
similar problems and took a similar line. Terrorists were
“criminals.” However, this of itself caused difficulties.
As with organized crime, terrorists were adept at
using the criminal process to their advantage, and it
was found necessary to introduce special provisions
to counter this. In Northern Ireland, intimidation
of juries led to the introduction of “Diplock courts,”
where specialist judges heard criminal cases sitting
alone without juries. While this might seem to offend
the common law principle of trial by one’s peers, it
caused no ruffled feathers in continental Europe, where
professional judges had long been the deciders of both
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issues of fact and law. Other evidential provisions
were also introduced to ensure that the balance was
not tilted too far towards the accused.
It should be noted that the countries that introduced
these specialist provisions were all subject to the
European Convention on Human Rights and, while in
some cases, partial derogation was required, there was
little challenge. The balance between the rights of the
individual and the rights of society was maintained.
However, from the start, the Bush administration
made it clear that “war” was no political statement.
This was “war” in every sense of the word, and
terrorists would be hunted down and killed as “enemy
combatants.” Of course, if captured, they would be
subject where appropriate to trial, but even those trials
would take wartime form in the shape of Military
Commissions, and detention would not be subject to
the usual domestic law controls.
While this may have seemed a logical position,
it created legal difficulties. Under the law of armed
conflict, there are two types of armed conflict:
international and non-international armed conflict.
Each is defined in the Geneva Conventions. In the
case of international armed conflict, the definition is
“. . . all cases of declared war or of any other armed
conflict which may arise between two or more of the
High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is
not recognized by one of them.”39 Similarly, Common
Article 3 is applicable “. . . in the case of armed conflict
not of an international character occurring in the
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties.”40
The war against Afghanistan seems to fit into
the first category, international armed conflict, and
so far as Europe is concerned, it did. However, the
administration saw it differently. The Presidential
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Memorandum of February 7, 200241 makes it clear
that, in the view of the administration, there were
two conflicts (at least) going on in Afghanistan. First,
there was the “conflict with the Taliban” which, with
some reluctance, the President accepted as a “Geneva”
conflict. However, he determined that “none of the
provisions of Geneva apply to our conflict with alQai’da in Afghanistan or elsewhere throughout the
world.” So what is this “conflict with al-Qai’da?”
Clearly al-Qai’da is not a state, and so this is not
an international armed conflict within the terms of
Common Article 2. However, similarly, it is not a
conflict limited to the territory of a High Contracting
Party within the terms of Common Article 3, and so it
would appear that the President is right. This is not a
“Geneva” conflict. But then what is it? The President
elsewhere in the memorandum stated that “the war
against terrorism ushers in a new paradigm.” If it is
indeed a war within the legal meaning of the term, that
would appear to be correct. It is a “war” in which there
are no written rules, in which there is no reciprocity
and to which none of the normal conventions apply.
It is this, perhaps more than anything else, that
has concerned Europe. There is an understandable
reluctance to create a “legal black hole”—and this is
precisely how the war on terror is seen. This perception
is not helped by the failure of the United States to
outline any coherent view as to what law does apply.
In the same way as with the law of armed conflict in
general, there seems to be a reluctance to commit to
any particular view. Perhaps understandably, there is
a feeling that, in a “new paradigm,” it is safer to keep
one’s options open. However, this does nothing for
legal certainty.
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Conclusion.
Can this divide be bridged? I believe that it can. In
many ways, 9/11 was a classic military operation. Just
as a military commander looks for the weak spot in
the enemy line, often a boundary between formations,
so al-Qai’da struck at the dividing line between law
enforcement and armed conflict. “Catastrophic
terrorism,” as it is sometimes called, places severe
pressure on law enforcement mechanisms. However,
the nature of terrorist activity also threatens the
cohesiveness of the law of armed conflict as a legal
framework. It therefore poses a challenge for both
domestic and international lawyers.
At present, there is too great a divide between law
enforcement—where force may only be used where
absolutely necessary, and human rights bind only the
state to the advantage of the individual—and armed
conflict—where the use of force is governed by the
nature of the target, and participants are treated as
equals, subject to similar rights and responsibilities.
Terrorism is a method of warfare, though—in most
cases—an illegitimate one. However, terrorism is also
a criminal act, which can be committed outside armed
conflict. Put another way, not every act of terrorism is
an act of war. What is required is a more coherent legal
approach to acts of terrorism to avoid the stark divide
between domestic and international legal regimes. At
present, the use of ordinary criminal processes to deal
with “battlefield” situations is putting an immense
strain on domestic criminal law as is apparent from
efforts to prosecute insurgents in Iraq and elsewhere.
On the other hand, the use of selective law of armed
conflict provisions to replace inconvenient domestic
provisions equally casts doubt on the more general
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applicability of those provisions. The only victors will
be the terrorists themselves who will play the two
frameworks off against each other—with the unwitting
help of the lawyers.
A coherent approach will not be easy to devise. It
will involve an acceptance that “catastrophic terrorism”
does indeed pose a major challenge and needs to be
confronted. This may mean, in the domestic field,
recognition that human rights no longer can be seen
solely in terms of the rights of the individual set against
the power of the State. The rights of the individual
now need to be viewed in the light of the rights of the
majority, particularly the right to security. This may
require a revision of some of the interpretations of
human rights conventions which have been acceptable
in the past.
Similarly, those involved in the application of the
law of armed conflict must test their own interpretations
against the new reality. In conflicts where the majority
of participants do not meet the traditional definition
of “combatant,” is it any longer realistic to insist that
they are “civilians” and are thus entitled to the same
protections as all other civilians—except that they can
be prosecuted for their conduct? As we have seen,
criminal prosecution based on evidence gathered on
the battlefield may not be a feasible option.
One thing is clear—this is not a matter that can be
subject to unilateral decision. There must be a universal
response to a universal problem. National solutions,
particularly those ostensibly based on international
law, simply will complicate an already serious situation.
The challenge that we all face is one of collaboration.
In this, it is indeed correct to say that if we do not hang
together, we will hang separately.
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CONCLUSION
The then-anonymous author of Through Our
Enemies’ Eyes wrote in 2002 about the threat posed by
not recognizing with whom the United States was at
war. He used an engaging movie excerpt to make his
point:
In the wonderfully entertaining 1940 Warner Brothers’
swashbuckler titled The Sea Hawk, Queen Elizabeth I,
played by the inestimable Flora Robson, angrily convokes
her courageous, dashing, and exceptionally handsome
band of privateers—known collectively in the movie as
“the Sea Hawks”—for having had the temerity to sink
in the English Channel a Spanish galleon carrying the
new ambassador of Spain to her court. With the recently
rescued, and presumably still soggy, Spanish ambassador
looking on, the queen addresses herself to Captain
Geoffrey Thorpe—played by the equally inestimable
Errol Flynn—who is the leader of the Sea Hawks, the
queen’s favorite, and the sinker of said galleon. “Do
you imagine, Captain Thorpe, that we are at war with
Spain?” the queen thunders. Thorpe, with due respect
for his sovereign, responds firmly: “Madam, Spain is at
war with the world.” Flash ahead 60 years and a similar
question posed by any national leader in Christendom
might accurately earn the response: “Madam (or Sir),
Osama bin Laden is at war with the Christian world.”
If the exchanges above are reimagined to focus on Osama
bin Laden, they would have little entertainment value,
but their resulting unsubtle messages—that bin Laden
has been at war with Christendom, and has longed
to see a world map that is simply a map of the House
Islam—should be taken with deadly seriousness. Bin
Laden has declared war on the United States, the leader
of invading, barbarous Crusaders, and intends there to
be a struggle to the death against the United States.1
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More well-known philosophers on war—Sun Tzu
and Clausewitz among them—have extolled the virtue
of knowing one’s enemies and of knowing the type of
conflict in which a state is engaged. Even more basic
than that is the idea that a nation must know it is at war
before it can craft a strategy to succeed in it. Evidence
observed and presented by the panelists at the
Seventeenth Annual U.S. Army War College Strategy
Conference suggests that the Nation is at war, but that
various parts of the government and the public do not
appear to understand that. Some of that stems from
confusion about just what constitutes a war against
terrorists, and how the norms of law and custom must
adapt to reflect the peculiar nature of such a war.
Another part of the problem is that the comparison
is made against the outdated model of World War
II, not the more appropriate model of the Cold War.
Unlike the major combat of both World Wars, the
“long war” of the Global War on Terrorism does not
necessarily require the full mobilization of the country.
The country’s leaders must take the necessary steps to
ensure that all understand clearly that the Nation is at
war and should be able to justify that in the “court”
of international law. Those same leaders then must
mobilize selectively the parts of the Nation, both the
government and the public, that are needed to win the
war. Those parts will not be simply the military arm
of the government; all the tools of national power—
diplomatic, informational, economic and military—
must be utilized. Full mobilization—as in World War
II—may not be necessary, but the government agencies
involved must fully understand and vigorously execute
their responsibilities. If not, they place the Nation at
unnecessary strategic risk.
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National Guard. Brigadier General Nesbitt’s military
career began in February 1966 when he was drafted
into the U.S. Army. He completed basic training at Fort
Benning, Georgia, and Infantry Advanced Individual
Training at Fort Ord, California. He was commissioned
a second lieutenant of Infantry in January 1967 after
completion of Officer Candidate School at Fort Benning.
Following completion of the U.S. Army Special Forces
Officer’s Course at Ft Bragg, North Carolina, he was
assigned to the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) in
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the Republic of Vietnam. General Nesbitt entered the
Georgia Army National Guard in June 1973. Prior to his
current assignment, he was assigned as Commander
of the 48th Brigade (Rear). As Acting Commander, he
was responsible for the readiness and training of the
portion of the brigade that did not deploy to Bosnia.
Previously, Brigadier General Nesbitt served as Chief of
Staff, Headquarters, Georgia Army National Guard.
MICHAEL SQUIER assumed duties as the Deputy
Director, Army National Guard, National Guard
Bureau, Washington, DC, in March 1998 and served
there until his retirement. Prior to this assignment,
he served in various positions at National Guard
Bureau, including Chief of Staff, Army National
Guard; Executive Officer to the Chief, National Guard
Bureau; Chief, Readiness Division; and Deputy Chief,
Public Affairs. He enlisted in the Idaho Army National
Guard in August 1963. Brigadier General Squier was
commissioned through the Infantry Officer Candidate
School in August 1965. As a young officer, he served
at the state level in a variety of command and staff
positions in the 116th Ordnance Company and the
Idaho State Military Academy, culminating in the
positions of Company Commander and Commandant
respectively. In September 1978, Brigadier General
Squier was assigned to National Guard Bureau where,
as a Major, he served in various positions of the
Mobilization Readiness Division, ultimately serving
4 years as Assistant Executive to the Chief, National
Guard Bureau. In 1987, he assumed command of the
145th Support Battalion, 116th Cavalry Brigade, Idaho
National Guard. His last State assignment before
returning to National Guard Bureau was his second
command assignment, battalion-level command at The
Equipment Maintenance Center in Europe.
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DAVE BURFORD began his current assignment as
Assistant to the Director of the Army National Guard
in November 2005. Previously, he served and was
mobilized in the Global War on Terror as the Deputy
Commanding General of the Army’s Special Forces
Command at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, where he was
second-in-command of the Army’s 9,000-man inventory
of Green Beret soldiers, consisting of seven active duty
and two National Guard Special Forces Groups. During
this time, he was deployed several times to several
combat theaters. For the summer of 2003, General
Burford served as Acting Commanding General of
Special Forces Command (Airborne). His military
service began in 1973 when he was commissioned as a
Field Artillery officer after completing Reserve Officer
Training Corps training as a Distinguished Military
Graduate from Georgia Tech.
Keynote Speaker.
WILLIAM J. PERRY, a senior fellow at the Hoover
Institution, is the Michael and Barbara Berberian
Professor at Stanford University, with a joint
appointment in the School of Engineering and the
Institute for International Studies. He also is codirector of the Preventive Defense Project, a research
collaboration of Stanford and Harvard Universities.
His previous academic experience includes professor
at Stanford from 1988 to 1993, when he was the codirector of the Center for International Security and
Arms Control. He also served as a part-time lecturer
in the Department of Mathematics at Santa Clara
University from 1971 to 1977. Dr. Perry was the 19th
U.S. Secretary of Defense, serving from February
1994 to January 1997. His previous government
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experience was as Deputy Secretary of Defense
(1993–94) and Undersecretary of Defense for Research
and Engineering (1977–81). His business experience
includes serving as a laboratory director for General
Telephone and Electronics (1954–64); founding and
serving as the President of ESL (1964–77); Executive
Vice-President of Hambrecht & Quist (1981–85); and
founding and serving as the Chairman of Technology
Strategies and Alliances (1985–93). He serves on the
Board of Directors of Anteon International Corporation
and several emerging high-tech companies and is
Chairman of Global Technology Partners. Dr. Perry is a
member of the National Academy of Engineering and a
fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.
From 1946 to 1947, Dr. Perry was an enlisted man in
the Army Corps of Engineers and served in the Army
of Occupation in Japan. He joined the Reserve Officer
Training Corps in 1948 and was a second lieutenant in
the Army Reserve from 1950 to 1955. Dr. Perry received
B.S. and M.S. degrees from Stanford University and a
Ph.D. from Pennsylvania State, all in mathematics.
Panel IV—The Economic Context.
MICHAEL J. FRATANTUONO is Associate Professor
of International Studies, Business and Management
at Dickinson College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania. He
has worked as a project manager in the software
development industry. He also has been visiting
professor in the Department of National Security and
Strategy at the U.S. Army War College. Dr. Fratantuono
is interested in international economics, governmentbusiness relations, and U.S. foreign economic policy.
He received the Dickinson Award for Distinguished
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Teaching for 2004-05. Dr. Fratantuono received a B.A.
from Brown University in 1974; an M.A. from the
University of Rhode Island in 1982; and a Ph.D. from
the University of Washington in 1988.
EDWARD M. GRAHAM, senior fellow at the Institute
for International Economics since 1990, has been an
Adjunct Professor at Columbia University in New York
since 1992. Previously he was Associate Professor in the
Fuqua School of Business at Duke University (1988-90),
Associate Professor at the University of North Carolina
(1983-88), Principal Administrator of the Planning and
Evaluation Unit at the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (1981-82), International
Economist in the Office of International Investment
Affairs at the U.S. Treasury (1979-80), and Assistant
Professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(1974-78). He is the author, coauthor, or coeditor of
a number of studies, including Does Foreign Direct
Investment Promote Development? (2005); Reforming
Korea's Industrial Conglomerates (2003); Fighting the
Wrong Enemy: Antiglobal Activists and Multinational
Enterprises (2000); Global Competition Policy and
Competition Policies in the Global Economy, with J. David
Richardson (1997); Global Corporations and National
Governments (1996); and Foreign Direct Investment in the
United States, 3d ed., with Paul R. Krugman (1995).
LEIF ROSENBERGER has been the Economic Advisor
at the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) since 1998. Dr.
Rosenberger analyzes the strategy and performance of
43 economies in Asia and the Pacific. In January 2006,
Access Asia of the National Bureau of Asian Research
evaluated the top 141 experts on Asian economies and
selected Dr. Rosenberger as their top-ranking expert. He
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is the author of all but one chapter in Volume 1 and each
chapter in Volume 2 of the Asia Pacific Economic Update
2005, which received the highest 5-star rating from
the Australian National University. Before coming to
PACOM, Dr. Rosenberger worked for 10 years at the
U.S. Army War College, where he held the General
Douglas MacArthur Academic Chair of Research. In
October 1993, Dr. Rosenberger was promoted from
Associate Professor of Economics to full Professor
of Economics at the U.S. Army War College. He also
worked at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S.
Army War College, Central Intelligence Agency, and
the Defense Intelligence Agency. Dr. Rosenberger
currently teaches International Finance and Trade
in the Executive MBA Program at the University
of Hawaii. He spent his sabbatical year of 1997 as a
Visiting Scholar on the Economic Faculty at Harvard
University, funded by a Secretary of the Army
Research and Study Fellowship. He was also a Visiting
Professor of International Relations at Providence
College and taught Economics and Political Science at
Dickinson College. Dr. Rosenberger is a 1989 graduate
of the U.S. Army War College, and received a B.A. with
honors from Harvard University, a Master’s Degree
from Boston University, and a Ph.D. from Claremont
Graduate School.
JOHN D. LANGE worked as an economist for the
International Monetary Fund and as Assistant Vice
President of CitiBank. He joined the U.S. Treasury in the
Nixon administration and served there until the end of
the Clinton administration. While in the Department
of the Treasury, Mr. Lange served as Director of
Foreign Exchange Operations, where he managed the
U.S. foreign reserves in support of the dollar. He also
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served with Treasury as the U.S. Chief Negotiator on
official trade finance. Currently, Mr. Lange is Managing
Director of Lange, Mullen, and Bonn, LLC, a firm which
provides strategic and tactical advice and counsel for
international project management, investment, and
foreign exchange strategies.
Panel V: International Law
and National Security Context.
DAVID S. GORDON is a Colonel in the Judge
Advocate General’s Corps, U.S. Army Reserve, and
was mobilized in 2002 for the Global War on Terrorism.
He spent a year in Kabul, Afghanistan, where he
was the senior legal advisor and Rule of Law Officer
for the U.S. Office of Military Cooperation. He was
responsible for synchronizing efforts to bring about
civilian judicial sector reforms and reforms of military
law. He has remained on active duty after returning
from Afghanistan. He is currently assigned to The
Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, U.S.
Army War College, with duty at the U.S. Army Civil
Affairs and Psychological Operations Command
(Airborne) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, where his
primary duty is to develop training and doctrine for
U.S. Army Civil Affairs military lawyers who perform
rule of law missions overseas. Colonel Gordon served
on active duty with the U.S. Army Judge Advocate
General’s Corps from 1977 to 1986. His assignments
were primarily in Europe, including 2 years as an
attorney in the International Affairs Division of the
Office of the Judge Advocate, U.S. Army Europe.
From 1987 until he was mobilized in 2002, he was
the General Counsel for Caldwell Aircraft Trading
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Company in Charlotte, North Carolina. He was
promoted to Senior Vice President in 1990. During that
period, Colonel Gordon also served in the Reserves
as the International Law Officer of the 360th Civil
Affairs Brigade, and deployed to Saudi Arabia in
Operation DESERT STORM in 1991. He has published
law journal articles on legal status and rights under
the NATO SOFA and legal practice in the European
Communities. He holds the Army Skill Identifier for an
International Law Specialist. Colonel Gordon received
AB and JD degrees from the University of Georgia, and
is licensed to practice law in North Carolina, Georgia,
and Maryland. He received an M.A. degree in Church
History from Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, and
is a graduate of the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General
Course and the U.S. Army War College. Colonel
Gordon has done graduate work in international
law at the Hague Academy of International Law and
Georgetown University Law Center.
MICHAEL F. NOONE, a member of the California and
District of Columbia bars, served 20 years as a judge
advocate in the U.S. Air Force, retiring as a Colonel before
he joined the law faculty of The Catholic University of
America in 1978. He remains active in national security
issues. He is a fellow of the Inter-University Seminar
on Armed Forces and Society, and serves as a member
of the International Advisory Board, Geneva Centre
for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, the
board of the National Institute of Military Justice, the
executive board of the Judge Advocate's Association
Inn of Court, and the legal committee of the National
Inter-religious Service Board for Conscientious
Objection. He was a distinguished visiting professor
of law at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point,
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New York, in 1991 and co-authored the text book used
by the West Point Law Department. His professional
interests include torts and products liability, remedies,
and comparative and international law. His research
and writing on peacekeeping and political violence
have taken him in recent years to Australia and New
Zealand, to South Africa, and to Northern Ireland and
Israel. Professor Noone holds a B.S. in Foreign Service
(1955) from Georgetown University’s Edmund A.
Walsh School of Foreign Service, an LL.B. (1957) and
LL.M. (1962) from Georgetown University Law School,
and an S.J.D. (1965) from The National Law Center of
George Washington University. He is a Distinguished
Graduate of the U.S. Air Force Air Command and Staff
College.
JANE G. DALTON was commissioned an Ensign
through Officers Candidate School in Newport, Rhode
Island, in December 1977 and graduated from Surface
Warfare Officers School, also in Newport, in July
1978. As a line officer, Professor Dalton was among
the first 10 women assigned to sea duty and to earn
designation as a Surface Warfare Officer after 10 U.S.C.
6015 was amended to permit women to serve aboard
noncombatant vessels. She served as Third Division
Officer (1978-80) and Assistant Operations Officer
(1980-81) onboard the U.S.S. Puget Sound (AD-38). She
then taught History at the U.S. Naval Academy, 198182. In 1982, she was selected for the Law Education
Program. As a judge advocate, Professor Dalton’s initial
duty assignment was to Naval Legal Service Office,
Treasure Island, San Francisco, California, where she
served as a defense counsel (1985-1987) and the senior
trial counsel (1987-88). Professor Dalton was the Staff
Judge Advocate to the Commander, Naval Surface
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Group, Middle Pacific (1988-90) and the Commander,
Naval Base Pearl Harbor (1990-91). She was the Oceans
Law and Policy Planner in the Strategic Plans and Policy
Directorate (J-5), Joint Staff, Washington, DC (1992-94),
and became the first woman to serve as the Fleet Judge
Advocate to a numbered fleet, Commander, Third
Fleet, San Diego, California, (1994-96). Professor Dalton
served two additional tours on the Joint Staff—Deputy
Legal Counsel (1996-98) and then Legal Counsel (200003) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. She
served for 2 years as the Commanding Officer, Naval
Legal Service Office, North Central, headquartered
in Washington, DC (1998-2000). In June 2003, thenCaptain Dalton assumed duties as the Commanding
Officer, Naval Civil Law Support Activity, and in July
2003, she was appointed the Assistant Judge Advocate
General (Civil Law). In August 2005, Professor Dalton
reported to the Naval War College as the Charles H.
Stockton Professor of International Law. Professor
Dalton officially retired from the U.S. Navy on October
1, 2005, with the rank of Rear Admiral (lower half).
Professor Dalton graduated from the University
of Kansas with a B.A. in Political Science in 1972
and an M.A. in Latin American Studies in 1974. She
earned a Juris Doctor degree magna cum laude from
Georgetown University Law Center and was admitted
to the Maryland Bar in 1985. She also received a Master
of Laws degree with a focus in international law from
the University of Virginia in 1992.
CHARLES GARRAWAY retired in 2003 after 30 years
in the United Kingdom (UK) Army Legal Services,
initially as a criminal prosecutor but latterly as an
adviser in the law of armed conflict and operational
law. In that capacity, he represented the Ministry of
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Defence at numerous international conferences and
was part of the UK delegations to the First Review
Conference for the 1981 Conventional Weapons
Convention, the negotiations on the establishment of
an International Criminal Court, and the Diplomatic
Conference that led to the 1999 Second Protocol to the
1954 Hague Convention on Cultural Property. He was
the senior Army lawyer deployed to the Gulf during
the 1990-91 Gulf Conflict. Since retiring, he spent 3
months in Baghdad working for the Foreign Office
on transitional justice issues and 6 months as a Senior
Research Fellow at the British Institute of International
and Comparative Law before taking up the Stockton
Chair in International Law at the U.S. Naval War
College in August 2004 for the year 2004-05. He is a
Visiting Professor at King's College, London. Professor
Garraway is a member of the teaching faculty at the
International Institute of International Law, San Remo,
Italy, and has lectured extensively on the law of armed
conflict to both civilian and military audiences. His
publications include contributions to The International
Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure
& Evidence (Roy Lee, ed., Oceana Publications, 1999);
as well as articles on superior orders (“Superior
Orders and the International Criminal Court: Justice
Delivered or Justice Denied,” 1999, IRRC No.836
p.785), internal conflict (“The Code of Conduct for
Military Operations during Non-International Armed
Conflict,” IIHL, November 2001); and interoperability
(“Interoperability and the Atlantic Divide—A Bridge
over Troubled Waters,” Israel Yearbook on Human Rights
[2004], p. 105).
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